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This monograph is based on the SJD dissertation of the author. The 
primary goal of the work is to examine the requirements of lawful taking 
of foreign property in international law. Furthermore, it tries to prove that 
there are three1 requirements of such taking, that is to say, taking should 
be for public purpose, non-discriminatory and appropriate compensation 
should be provided. To prove this, international jurisprudence, related 
academic literature, and international case law is analyzed.
Taking of foreign property is one of the so-called non-commercial 
risks foreign investors have to face abroad.2 There might be other non-
commercial risks as well, like that of currency inconvertibility, repatriation 
limitation, currency devaluation, political violence (which includes war, 
terrorism and revolution), and deterioration in investment environment.3 
However, the risk of taking property constitutes the greatest risk for 
a foreign investor.4 This does not need much explanation: when the 
investment is taken it is not possible to operate it any more. Thus, for 
many investors the issue of decreasing the risk of taking their investment 
1 Additional requirement is that during taking ‘due process’ should be re-
spected. However, this last requirement is not examined in this book be-
cause of  its procedural character.
2 Some examples for commercial risk: rescission or cancellation of  contract, 
suspension of  performance, non-payment because of  insolvency or de-
fault of  the debtor. See Hans van Houtte, tHe Law of InternatIonaL 
trade 286 (2002).
3 See J. W. Yackee, Political Risk and International Investment Law, 24 Duke J. 
Comp. & Int’l L. 477, 478-83 (2013-2014); robert b. sHanks, ProtectIng 
agaInst PoLItIcaL rIsk, IncLudIng currency convertIbILIty and rePa-
trIatIon of ProfIts In eastern euroPe 26 (1992).
4 See sebastIán LóPez escarcena, IndIrect exProPrIatIon In InternatIon-
aL Law 1 (2014).
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is a crucial one. With good investment protection systems (e.g., investment 
protection treaties, investment insurance) the risk of taking cannot 
be avoided entirely - but, the loss to the investor can be minimized. 
However, many times, even a good investment protection system can 
only mitigate the loss. The reason is that even if there is compensation 
paid for the property taken, usually it does not gratify foreign investors. 
For example, they will not be compensated for (as appropriate or full 
compensation usually does not include)5 the expected future profits, or 
for the business idea and know-how of where (it can be geographic place 
or an economic branch) and how to look for good profit. Transferred 
technology and transferred know-how can also constitute a considerable 
value, for what there is usually no compensation paid. Therefore, the 
risk factor is many times present for the investors. In addition, many 
investments require high initial expenditure. This means that in the case 
of indirect expropriation, it is very expensive to withdraw from the host 
state quickly if the investment environment becomes hostile. Therefore, 
investors usually look for investment opportunities with low risk of 
taking. Such law risk of taking exists in countries with long tradition 




1.1. Importance of foreign direct investments 
During the last two decades the net inflow of foreign direct investments 
has showed huge growth worldwide. It is important, as foreign 
direct investment can contribute significantly to the development 
and modernization of the economy. Furthermore, it can offer new 
technologies and technical knowledge for the modernization of key 
important processing industry branches (although, it is also true that 
developed countries frequently export-outdated technology). Foreign 
direct investments can also contribute to the training of the workforce, 
and to the improvement of the management. Foreign investors can offer 
necessary information on foreign markets, and how to use these markets. 
Besides, foreign investors can help developing countries to access and 
seize foreign markets already in the hands of these foreign investors. In 
addition, they can facilitate privatization processes. For example, foreign 
capital that streamed in during the privatization process helped East 
European countries in transition to maintain the delicate equilibrium of 
the balance of payments.6 The enterprise restructuring would also have 
been unthinkable without the expertise and capital of foreign investors.
On the other hand, one should be under no delusion that foreign 
investors are investing in the hope of good profit, what is not always in 
the interest of the host country. The Southeast Asian economic crisis of 
1997 was a good example for this. In countries without strict investment 
regulation (routing the investments into particular sectors) like Thailand 
or Malaysia, foreign investments went into sectors where they could realize 
6 See Vlastimir Stevanović, Okrugli Sto: Strane Direktne Investicije – Defektno 
Efektne [Round Table: Foreign Direct Investments – Defectively Effective], ekono-
mIst, Dec. 2001, at 25.
the highest profit (e.g. financing domestic consumption, luxury goods), 
and they were “wasted”. The crisis hit much stronger these countries.7
There is high competition worldwide to attract foreign working capital. 
Therefore, if a country wants to attract foreign capital, first it has to 
find out what are motivational factors of investors. There are many 
motivational factors that encourage foreign investors to invest in a 
country. Economist John H. Dunning categorizes these factors into the 
following four groups: investments aimed at (1) acquiring resources, (2) 
securing markets, (3) enhancing efficiency, (4) and establishing strategic 
advantages for the investors to improve their long-run competitiveness.8 
These motivational factors cannot be directly influenced by the investment 
recipient country. These factors objectively exist. However, these factors 
will influence the investment policy of investors, and the implementation 
of this policy. And this can be influenced by the investment recipient 
country by macroeconomic conditions.
Thus, capital ‘allurement’ has, besides motivational factors, also so-
called general macroeconomic conditions, and these conditions can be 
substantially influenced by the host country. These conditions involve, 
among others, a safe political, legal and institutional environment, and 
of course the proper protection of foreign investments. The existence 
of such general conditions is essential precondition for investments. 
According to a survey of Ernst and Young international corporations 
during their international investments find the most retardant force to 
be political instability.9 Besides political stability, a well-functioning legal 
and judicial system is also necessary. Therefore, theoretically, political 
stability, a perspicuous legal system, and an efficient judicial system can 
raise the inflow of foreign capital.
7 See Joe studweLL, How asIa works 139-144 (2013).
8 See JoHn H. dunnIng, sarIanna m. Lundan, muLtInatIonaL enterPrIses 
and tHe gLobaL economy 63-77 (2008).
9 Ernst and Young (visited on Oct. 16, 2018) <www.ey.com/gl/en/issues/
business-environment/ey-attractiveness-surveys>.
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1.2. Risks for foreign investors
There are two categories of risks that foreign investors have to face: 
commercial (e.g. rescission or cancellation of contract, suspension of 
performance, non-payment because of insolvency or default of the debtor, 
etc.)10 and non-commercial. This latter can be any of the following: taking 
(expropriation, nationalization), currency inconvertibility, issues related 
to the transfer of profit, currency devaluation, political violence (e.g. war, 
terrorism, revolution), and deterioration in investment environment.11 
However, with good investment protection systems (e.g. investment 
protection treaties, investment insurance) the loss of the investor can be 
minimized, though these risks cannot be avoided entirely. The reason 
is that even if there is compensation paid for the property taken, in 
some cases it will not gratify foreign investors. For example, important 
value is often constituted by the transferred technology and transferred 
know-how, for what there is usually no compensation paid. In addition, 
many investments require high initial expenditure, this means that in 
case of indirect expropriation, it is very expensive to withdraw from the 
host country quickly if the investment environment becomes hostile. 
Therefore, investors usually look for investment opportunities with low 
risk, which is typical for countries with long tradition of stable political 
and economic system.
1.3. Instruments for the protection of foreign investments
International legal instruments for the protection of foreign investments 
are crucial in this field if uncertainty wants to be avoided. Examining these 
instruments, first of all, distinction should be made between diplomatic 
and legal protection of foreign investments. Here, legal protection, that 
is to say, legal instruments are examined, which can be divided into 
10 See Hans van Houtte, tHe Law of InternatIonaL trade 286 (2002).
11 See mIkLós kIráLy, ferenc mádL, a küLföLdI beruHázások JogI védeLme 
[LegaL ProtectIon of foreIgn Investments] 43 (1989).
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domestic (those of the host state) and international instruments. The 
foreign investor might have theoretically the right to take his case to a 
local court under the local laws in the host state. However, there is always 
the risk of bias and partiality of local courts and political influence of the 
host state. Therefore, foreign investors prefer international instruments 
of protection. These can be individual agreements between the investor 
and the host country, bilateral investment treaties (BITs), or multilateral 
agreements.12 Host states are usually reluctant to conclude individual 
agreements with foreign investors except when the investment is of crucial 
importance for the former. Such agreements usually contain investment 
protection provisions, and the host states agrees to treat the investor 
equal (e.g. in case of dispute to accept international arbitration, etc.). 
However, often investors are not influential enough to conclude such 
individual agreements, and highly appreciate the existence of bilateral 
or multilateral investment protection agreements.
1.3.1. Bilateral investment treaties
It can be said, that most important international legal tools for the 
protection of foreign investments are bilateral investment treaties. 
During the last few decades bilateral investment treaties have proliferated 
enormously. Currently, there are 2358 bilateral investment treaties in force 
worldwide.13 Their spread was initiated and powered by capital exporting 
countries in the first place. They have become the major international 
instruments through which investments are protected worldwide.
For some commentators, bilateral investment treaties are tools for 
entrenching customary principles of international law related to the 
12 Imre vörös, a nemzetközI gazdaságI kaPcsoLatok Joga I. 133-134 
(2015).
13 Source: Investment Policy Hub of  UNCTAD (visited on Oct. 12, 2018) 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA>.
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protection of foreign investment.14 Kishoiyian is of the opinion that the 
reason for concluding so many bilateral investment treaties in the last 
decades is that there is uncertainty in international law concerning the 
protection of foreign investment in the case of taking of foreign property 
(all bilateral investment treaties have special provisions establishing 
conditions for taking of foreign property).15 According to him, it follows 
that these treaties are “lex specialis between parties designed to create a 
mutual regime of investment protection,”16 but they do not evidence 
customary international law. However, accepting certain practices in 
international relations of States by States creates international custom, and 
international custom is the bases of international law.17 At the same time, 
somehow paradoxically, Kishoiyian argues that: ”The essential function 
of a treaty is to represent the consent of its parties, but it may be used as 
well to demonstrate the existence of a rule of customary law.”18 Dixon 
makes distinction between law making treaties in international law, that 
are multilateral treaties and so called ‘contract’ treaties that are bilateral 
14 Kishoiyian agrees with F.A. Mann who was on the opinion that these trea-
ties “establish and accept and thus enlarge the force of  traditional con-
ceptions of  the law of  State responsibility for foreign investment.” Ber-
nard Kishoiyian, The Utility of  Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of  
Customary International Law, 14 nortHwestern JournaL of InternatIonaL 
Law and busIness 2 (1993). On this issue see also Bergmann (1997); mIkLós 
kIráLy, ferenc mádL, a küLföLdI beruHázások JogI védeLme [LegaL 
ProtectIon of foreIgn Investments] (1989).
15 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 379 (1997).
16 Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of  Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation 
of  Customary International Law, 14 nortHwestern JournaL of InternatIon-
aL Law and busIness 3 (1993).
17 ICJ Statute art 38 (1) (b) states: “international custom, as evidence of  a 
general practice accepted as law”.
18 Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of  Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation 
of  Customary International Law, 14 nortHwestern JournaL of InternatIon-
aL Law and busIness 9 (1993). Also Ian brownLIe, PrIncIPLes of PubLIc 
InternatIonaL Law 13 (1998).
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treaties. With such distinction he suggests that bilateral international treaties 
have no effect in general on international law, they have international 
legal effect only between the parties.19 However, one might argue that 
if there has evolved a body of bilateral investment treaties that support 
the same standard for a longer period of time, it can represent customary 
international law. Many standards and provisions of multilateral treaties 
are the result of standards that were first applied in bilateral treaties. Thus, 
some other authors state that the main idea of these treaties is to create 
clear international legal rules and an effective enforcement mechanism to 
protect foreign investments in host states. At the end of the day, violation 
of bilateral investment treaty is at the same time violation of international 
law, and it infers international responsibility.20
Bilateral investment treaties aim to protect foreign direct investments 
and at the same time they are devices to boost investor confidence. 
Guarantees given on international level are usually more reliable than 
national guarantees of the host country. It is easier to manipulate 
domestic legislation than to abrogate unilaterally international treaties. 
For example, domestic legislation that is detrimental to foreign investors 
can be many times justified with social reasons. However, if international 
agreements are unilaterally abrogated, it can have much worse negative 
effect on the whole foreign policy of the country concerned (and such 
political decision does not affect only investments). A study of the United 
Nations’ Center on Transnational Corporations on bilateral investment 
treaties reports, that although appropriate legal protection of foreign direct 
investments has a large influence on the willingness of foreign investors 
to invest in a country, the existence of bilateral investment treaties, as a 
19 See martIn dIxon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 25 (2002).
20 See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining 
the Popularity of  Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 vIrgInIa JournaL of Interna-
tIonaL Law 642 (1998); Joachim Karl, The Promotion and Protection of  German 
Foreign Investment Abroad, IcsId revIew, Spring 1996, at 3.
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matter of fact, do not influence the inflow of foreign investment.21 That 
is to say, generally, there cannot be proven direct conjunction between 
the investment inflow and the number of bilateral investment treaties 
concluded. The study also mentions that the existence of such a treaty is 
only one of several factors that can influence investors to invest to a certain 
country, however, this is not the most decisive one. This conclusion of 
the study is based on the results of empirical research. However, a well-
organized regime of bilateral investment treaties can largely contribute 
to the growth of foreign investments. With a bilateral investment treaty 
regime the host state can target certain investors, grant certain privileges 
that make the host country more attractive, in one word it can offer a 
‘customized’ investment environment. Thus, it could be said that bilateral 
investment treaties have two major advantages: for the investors they 
offer legal protection, and for the investment receiving country (host 
state) they help to attract investments. However, Guzman claims that 
it only ‘seems’ that they are beneficial for both parties. He asserts that 
while such treaties increase efficiency on the global level, at the same 
time they probably reduce the overall welfare of developing countries.22 
This might be true, as from the examined bilateral investment treaties 
concluded by large economic powers, like the United States of America, 
it can be seen that the stronger party ‘many times’ imposes its conditions 
on the economically weaker party (this is assumed from the fact that the 
United States is very rarely willing to depart from its model treaty).23
Besides the above-mentioned major arguments, there are many other 
reasons that can motivate countries to conclude bilateral investment 
21 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (visited on Jun. 4, 
2005) <http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/index.aspx>.
22 See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining 
the Popularity of  Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 vIrgInIa JournaL of Interna-
tIonaL Law 643 (1998).
23 The latest version of  the Model Bilateral Treaty is from 2012: US Mod-
el Bilateral Treaty (visited on Dec. 22, 2018) <https://ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf>.
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treaties. Among others, such treaties for example facilitate entry of 
investment by inducing other states to remove impediments in their 
regulatory system, help investors to gain market and improve political 
climate between states.24 Another very important argument for, or 
advantage of the new generation of bilateral investment treaties, is that 
they offer a binding mechanism resolving investment disputes, or an 
important practical implications of such treaties is that their existence 
is usually condition for obtaining insurance against taking in the home 
country of the investor.25
1.3.2. Multilateral investment treaties
Multilateral instruments (and organizations established by them) in the 
field of investment protection also play an important role, because of the 
enormous growth of investments worldwide, growing number of free 
trade zones, and international character of the guarantees these treaties 
can provide for foreign investments. Regarding the relation of bilateral 
investment treaties and multilateral treaties, it should be mentioned that 
the rule lex posterior derogat legi priori applies.26
24 Id.
25 E.g., such insurance is usually obtained from international investment in-
surance companies (e.g., Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (see 
Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (visited on Nov. 22, 2018) 
<http://nexi.go.jp/e/> or it can be also obtained from the government 
of  the investor, provided such scheme exists in the investor’s home coun-
try (e.g., Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) that is partially 
financed by the government of  the United States, partially from insurance 
fees (see Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (visited on Nov. 
25, 2018) <http://www.opic.gov>.
26 International Law Commission, art. 30 (3) of  the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of  Treaties International Law Commission (visited on Nov. 25, 
2018) <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm>.
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Discussing multilateral investment protection treaties, the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States should be mentioned first. This treaty has established 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
in 1965, as an autonomous international organization to facilitate the 
settlement of investment disputes between member states and nationals of 
other member states (both natural and legal persons).27 The organisation’s 
importance is in providing conciliation and arbitration facility and rules, 
with seat in Washington. ICSID arbitrators are nominated by member 
states, they should be experts from the field of law, commerce, industry 
or finances, and first of all impartial.28 However, the arbitrators can 
proceed only if the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit 
their dispute to the Centre (this is usually done in BITs or individual 
investment agreements). Another important provision of the Agreement 
is that the arbitral award of the ICSID tribunals is binding on the parties 
and should not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except 
those provided for in the ICSID.29
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1998 
worked out and proposed a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). 
The main aim of the proposal was to establish a uniform system of investment 
protection with a broad multilateral framework and high standards that 
fosters liberalization of investment regimes and investment protection. It 
also planned to create an effective dispute settlement system. However, 
negotiations were discontinued and it seems that they will not be resumed.30
27 ICSID art. 25 (1) states: “The jurisdiction of  the Centre shall extend to any 
legal dispute arising directly out of  an investment, between a Contracting 
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of  a Contracting State des-
ignated to the Centre by that State) and a national of  another Contracting 
State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the 
Centre.” ICSID (visited on Nov. 26, 2018) <https://icsid.worldbank.org>.
28  Art. 14, ICSID (visited on Nov. 26, 2018) <https://icsid.worldbank.org>.
29  Art. 53, ICSID (visited on Nov. 26, 2018) <https://icsid.worldbank.org>.
30  OECD MAI (visited on Nov. 12, 2018) <www.oecd.org/investment/inter-
A good example for functioning multilateral investment protection 
treaty containing substantive law is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
that was launched in the beginning of the 90’s, when the energy sector 
offered an excellent opportunity for cooperation between the West (that 
had the necessary money and increased need for energy) and Russia and 
some of its neighbors (having energy, but no money to invest into its 
exploitation). The ECT, besides creating a legal framework for striving 
towards open, efficient, sustainable and secure energy markets, it contains 
a whole chapter on investment promotion and protection. Among others, 
this chapter contains provisions related to the treatment of investors, 
expropriation of investment, transfers of profit. There is an ever growing 
case law related to the treaty, including the famous Yucos case.31
One of the main obstacles for the spread of foreign direct investments 
in the second half of the last century was that the non-commercial risk 
(nationalization, exchange restrictions, revolutions) was high. Therefore, 
a special type of multilateral instruments for the protection of foreign 
investment (in fact a kind of insurance for foreign investors) was introduced 
by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The Agency 
was created by the World Bank to promote foreign direct investment in 
developing countries. Besides reduction of poverty, research on investment 
opportunities in developing countries and informing potential investors, 
MIGA offers investment guarantees (insurance) to foreign investors from 
member states (for investments in other member states) against non-
commercial risk (e.g., expropriation). From the time of its establishment, it 
has issued 28 billion USD investment insurance. It should be mentioned 
that assuror can be only citizen or legal person with its seat in a member 
country, and only for foreign investments. In case of insurance event MIGA 
pays the compensation to the assuror and the claim cedes to MIGA.32
nationalinvestmentagreements/multilateralagreementoninvestment.htm>.
31 Energy Charter Treaty (visited on Nov. 23, 2018) <https://energycharter.
org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf>.
32 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) (visited on Nov. 17, 
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And finally, some of the most important modern free trade agreements - 
as international multilateral treaties - should be also mentioned, as they 
also contain investment protection provisions, and there is a tendency 
to replace bilateral investment treaties with such treaties.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a trilateral 
economic agreement concluded among the United States, Mexico and 
Canada, whose objectives include eliminating trade barriers, promoting 
fair competition, increasing investment opportunities, providing effective 
protection of intellectual property rights and resolving disputes throughout 
these countries. This Agreement deals with the issue of investment protection 
and expropriation in its Chapter 11. The case law under this Chapter has 
unleashed a vast body of scholarly commentary.33 At the same time the 
NAFTA might serve as a model multilateral trade agreement in the future.
New generations of EU free trade agreements should be also mentioned 
here, which among others regulate investment protection issues.34 
Economically the most significant from these is the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreemen (CETA). This Agreement 
has entered provisionally into force in 2017, however, provisions related 
to investments will enter into force only following its ratification.35 It 
contains substantive law related to investment protection similar to 
bilateral investment treaties (clarifies the standards of treatment, FET 
standard, right to regulate of the host state, etc.), however, there is a novel 
2018)<http://www.miga.org>; Imre vörös, a nemzetközI gazdaságI 
kaPcsoLatok Joga I. 150 (2015).
33 NAFTA cases can be found on: US Department of  State NAFTA cases 
(visited on Nov. 18, 2018) <http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3742.htm> and 
NAFTA Claims.com (visited on Nov. 28, 2018) <www.naftalaw.org>.
34 European Parliament, Benefits of  EU international trade agreements 
(visited on Dec. 21, 2018) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/BRIE/2017/603269/EPRS_BRI(2017)603269_EN.pdf>.
35 Csongor Nagy, ‘Editorial: Missed and New Opportunities in World Trade’. 58 
acta JurIdIcaL HungarIca 379-383 (2017).
22
solution regarding procedural rules: the Agreement intends to establish 
a permanent investment court.36 At the same time, according to some 
opinions, the regulatiory system under CETA might cause a so called 
„regulatory chill” effect, meaning that host countries will abstain from 
environmental, labor and other legislation that might be contrary to 
the interest of foreign investors, fearing of high legal and compensation 
costs in case a dispute arise between the host state and the investor.37 
1.4. Conclusion
The importance of foreign investments in a globalised world cannot 
be denied. There are several ways of protecting these investments. 
However, it can be said that the most important legal instruments for 
the protection of foreign investments are still bilateral investment treaties. 
At the same time, there is clear tendency towards their replacement by 
new generation multilateral free trade agreements. NAFTA and CETA 
are good examples for this, especially the novel solution of the latter 
regarding the establishment of a permanent investment court. Another 
issue, related to the descending importance of bilateral investment 
treaties, although only on regional (European) level, is a recent decision 
of the European Court of Justice that an arbitration clause in a bilateral 
investment treaty concluded between two European Union member 
states is incompatible with European Union law. However this decision 
does not invalidate automatically bilateral investment treaties in force 
between the member states, and there are some new arbitral decisions 
rejecting some of the arguments of the court in this case.38
36 European Commission (visited on Nov. 18, 2018) <http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/>.
37 Zoltan Víg, Gábor Hajdu, CETA and Regulatory Chill. In görög, márta, 
mezeI, Péter (eds), a szeLLemI tuLaJdonvédeLem aktuáLIs kérdéseI. 44-49 
(2018).





Before examining the notion of taking, few words should be devoted 
to the notion of property and also to the issue of what can be object 
of taking. The term property is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as 
“an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the 
government”39. According to Bergmann, a German scholar, there is 
no common notion of property in international law. International law 
deduces this notion from different national laws.40 Another scholar, 
Sacerdoti, claims that all rights having an economic content (including 
immaterial and contractual rights) are covered by international law in 
the case of taking, thus any of such rights can be considered property 
(and thus can be taken) in his understanding.41 Regarding case law, in 
Starett Housing Corporation case the Iran – United States Tribunal42 
stated that shareholder rights and contractual rights can also be the 
object of expropriation.43 Or in another case, Amoco v. Iran, the Tribunal 
39 bLack’s Law dIctIonary 845 (6th ed. 1991).
40 See HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe 
der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 31 (1997); It is inter-
esting to mention that the Chinese Constitution stipulates that “the State 
protects the right of  citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, hous-
es and other lawful property”. (wenHua sHan, tHe LegaL ProtectIon of 
foreIgn Investment 47 (2012)).
41 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 381 (1997).
42 The Iran - United States Claims Tribunal was established to solve disputes 
related to expropriated American property following the Iranian revolution 
in 1979.
43 Starrett Housing Corporation v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 156-57 (1983); See also rIcHard b. LILLIcH et aL., tHe Iran-unIt-
stated that “Expropriation, […], may extend to any right which can be 
the object of a commercial transaction, i.e., freely sold and bought, and 
thus has a monetary value”.44 Based on all this, it can be concluded that 
the term property is relatively widely defined.
2.2. Taking
Academic literature, treaties, court and arbitral decisions frequently use 
interchangeably the notions taking, expropriation and nationalization for a 
very similar legal concept. Hence, it is a very difficult task to define what 
is exactly understood under the notion of taking of foreign property. We 
use this term, as we have found it the most comprehensive and general 
of the above mentioned three notions. In Black’s Law Dictionary the 
notion of taking is formulated as:
The government’s actual or effective acquisition of private 
property either by ousting the owner and claiming title or 
by destroying the property or severely impairing its utility. 
There is a taking of property when government action directly 
interferes with or substantially disturbs the owner’s use and 
enjoyment of the property.45
This definition can be considered broad, as it includes not only direct, 
but also indirect taking of property, the owner is not in the position of 
using and enjoying his property. Richard Epstein gives an even broader 
definition when he argues that any governmental action, that interferes 
ed states cLaIms trIbunaL: Its contrIbutIon to tHe Law of state re-
sPonsIbILIty 189 (1998); V. Heiskanen, Doctrine of  Indirect Expropriation in 
Light of  the Practice of  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 8 J. World Invest-
ment & Trade 215, 221-25 (2007); andrew newcombe LLuís ParadeLL, 
Law and PractIce of Investment treatIes 327 (2009).
44 Amoco Int’l Finance Corp. v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 220 (1987).
45 bLack’s Law dIctIonary 1467 (7th ed. 1999).
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with any aspect of the use of private property protected by common law, 
constitutes a taking.46 Under this theory, every regulation, even taxation 
(not only excessive taxation, but the regular one as well), would constitute 
a taking.47 Folsom and Gordon, two American authors, formulate this 
notion as the loss, to various degrees, of the “use and/or ownership 
incidents, which accompany the private ownership of property”.48 The 
above definitions might sound general, but at the same time they cover 
the comprehensive nature of the term. Infra, where the notion is examined 
in related case law, this comprehensive nature is showed, in the sense 
that there is no single definition for taking, and that even rights, like 
contractual rights, can be included, that is to say, ‘taken’.
Not only in international legal literature, as already mentioned above, 
but also in legislation of individual countries and in international 
agreements, many times, taking, expropriation and nationalization are 
used interchangeably. The problem is usually not with the usage of these 
terms, but more with the issue what is in practice covered by them. 
Sometimes these terms are defined in detail in legal texts containing 
these words. However, the majority of documents examined show that 
46 See neIL k. komesar, Law’s LImIts 93 (2001) [Primary source was not 
available].
47 There is an interesting article on this issue by P. B. Stephan (Taxation and 
Expropriation - The Destruction of  the Yukos Oil Empire. Houston Jour-
nal of  International Law. Vol. 35, Issue 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 1-52.
48 See raLPH H. foLsom, mIcHaeL w. gordon, InternatIonaL busIness 
transactIons 639 (3d ed. 1995); Ian Brownlie defines it as: “[…] depriva-
tion by state organs of  a right of  property either as such, or by permanent 
transfer of  the power of  management and control”. The right of  man-
agement also constitute a right that has a value and can be taken. See Ian 
brownLIe, PrIncIPLes of PubLIc InternatIonaL Law 534 (5th ed. 1998); 
Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of  the United States, sec. 192 
(1965) defines it as ”conduct attributable to state that is intended to and 
does, effectively deprive an alien of  substantially all the benefit of  his in-
terest in property even though the state does not deprive him of  his entire 
legal interest in property”.
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there is frequently a lack of exact definition of the concept of taking 
(expropriation, nationalization), and it is not at all clear what is covered 
by these terms in certain situations.49 The reason might be that it is the 
interest of capital exporting countries to understand taking of property 
as widely as possible, and therefore, they will refrain from any definition 
that is too narrow. These countries might sometimes even prefer vague 
definitions when concluding investment protection agreements to avoid 
dispute at the time of concluding such agreements. However, such policy 
might result in later disputes with a very uncertain outcome. It should be 
noted, that it is also very difficult to draw the line between de jure and 
de facto expropriation. However, this issue is discussed in detail infra. 
Some authors use the term taking as a collective notion, covering even 
intervention and confiscation.50 Following this path, the analysis of the 
notion is channeled accordingly. However, it has to be emphasized 
again that both in practice and in theory, terms taking, expropriation 
and nationalization are many times used interchangeably.51 It follows 
49 Here under ‘certain situation’ we mean cases when legal norms are applied 
in practice.
50 See raLPH H. foLsom & mIcHaeL w. gordon, InternatIonaL busIness 
transactIons 639 (3d ed. 1995); sacerdoti even simply defines taking of  
property as non-commercial risk. See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL trea-
tIes and muLtILateraL Instruments on Investment ProtectIon 380 (1997).
51 For example some awards of  the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal 
deliberately confuse these terms. See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIon-
aL Law of exProPrIatIon as refLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. 
s. cLaIms trIbunaL 66 (1994); Moreover, in the award Dames and Moore 
of  the Tribunal, the two terms (taking and expropriation) were equated. 
See Dames and Moore v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 223 (1985); Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice in connection with the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal study use the term taking as “general concept of  depriva-
tion by the state of  alien-owned property, and as such it encompasses both 
‘expropriation’ and ‘nationalization’”. See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, 
Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 
netHerLands yearbook of InternatIonaL Law 53, 55 (1988).
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that there is no elaborated concept on these terms in international law, 
which might give opportunity for abuse and for legal uncertainty.
2.3. Expropriation, nationalization
The most widespread term connected to taking of foreign investment, 
though it does not have such a general meaning as the term taking, 
is expropriation. The simplest definition of expropriation is given in 
Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines it as a “governmental taking or a 
modification of an individual’s property rights.”52 However, this is a fairly 
general definition again. It can include both de facto and de jure taking. 
Nationalization is defined in the same dictionary as the “act of bringing 
an industry under governmental control or ownership.”53 It is, in one 
aspect, narrower than the definition of expropriation: it emphasizes the 
taking of ‘industry’, and not property or property rights which definitely 
makes it narrower. However, it is worth mentioning that the wording 
“governmental control” does not make the definition of nationalization 
wider compared to the definition of expropriation, as this control is not 
more and not less than “taking or a modification of an individual’s 
property rights” as it is stated in the definition of expropriation.
Folsom and Gordon define expropriation as an ‘angry’ taking of property of 
foreigners where the two (or more) states are involved in political conflict. 
They suggest that expropriation has a harsher tone than nationalization,54 
but at the same time they argue that an important element of the 
term expropriation is that in such case we assume that there is some 
compensation for the taken property.55 In their opinion, nationalization 
is the taking of property on a permanent basis by the government, with 
52 bLack’s Law dIctIonary 602 (7th ed. 1999).
53 Id. at 1046.
54 See raLPH H. foLsom, mIcHaeL w. gordon, InternatIonaL busIness 
transactIons 640 (3d ed. 1995).
55 See id.
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the intention to become the owner and the operator. In their opinion, it 
is a softer word than expropriation.56 Folsom and Gordon assume some 
kind of conflict between the home state of the investor (or the individual 
investor) and the expropriating state. However, we do not find necessary 
the existence of conflict for expropriation, first of all, because regulatory 
taking is the reason for many expropriations; and also, as usually in 
the case of conflict between the nations, there is no good chance for 
adequate compensation.
A very simple, but good “textbook” definition of expropriation is given 
by O’Keefe, when he writes that:
Expropriation may be defined as a compulsory acquisition of 
property by the state. Usually this means that the property of 
a private person is directly taken over by the state, the former 
being divested of ownership which is reinvested in the latter.57
Sacerdoti, a European scholar, gives a concise and simple definition. He 
defines expropriation as a “coercive appropriation by the state of private 
property”.58 In his opinion, nationalization differs only in the fact that it is 
directly statutory based and has a wider coverage.59 He also emphasizes the 
socio-economic element in the case of nationalization.60 Though Sacerdoti’s 
56 See id. 
57 See P. O’Keefe, UN Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 JournaL of 
worLd trade Law 239, 256 (1974).
58 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 379 (1997).
59 See id.; Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice makes similar distinction between the 
two terms: under expropriation is meant “single, more or less isolated 
deprivation, while the term nationalization denotes large-scale takings,…” 
See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of Interna-
tIonaL Law 53, 55 (1988).
60 Brownlie and Kronfol also place the emphasis on the social and economic 
reform element: “Expropriation of  one or more major national resources 
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definition seems simple, it touches the heart of the matter better.
Another distinguished European commentator in the field, Dolzer, 
offers a different and more ‘modern’ definition of expropriation and 
nationalization. He defines expropriation as “individual measures taken 
for a public purpose,“ as opposed to nationalization, which he defines as 
“large-scale taking on the basis of an executive or legislative act for the 
purpose of transferring property or interests into the public domain.“61 
In our understanding, the difference is in the scale of the measure and in 
the character of the underlying legislation. In the case of expropriation, 
it should be based on a ‘general’ legislation as opposed to nationalization 
that is based on ‘specific’ legal act which is created with the purpose to 
take a certain property. In both cases public purpose is a precondition 
and this requirement makes it ‘modern’ not only in the sense that it 
is new (the requirement of public purpose became widely accepted by 
international law in the seventies) but also that it requires justification 
(the ‘public purpose’) for an act that infringes with one of the oldest 
human rights, the right to property. Thus, the latter definitions are 
as part of  a general programme of  social and economic reform is now 
generally referred to as nationalisation or socialisation.” See Ian brownLIe, 
PrIncIPLes of PubLIc InternatIonaL Law 535 (5th ed. 1998); “[Expropri-
ation is]… the utilization of  all or part of  the means of  production in 
the interests of  society and not of  private individuals.” See zouHaIr a. 
kronfoL, ProtectIon of foreIgn Investment 20 (1972). In comparison 
Foighel emphasizes the economic element when she writes: “[Nationali-
zation is] the compulsory transfer to the state of  private property dictated 
by economic motives and having as its purpose the continued and essen-
tially unaltered exploitation of  the particular property.” See we. foIgHeL, 
natIonaLIzatIon 19 (1957); As O’Keefe places the emphasis on both: 
“[Nationalization] whereby certain industries or means of  production, dis-
tribution or exchange are, in pursuance of  social or economic policies, 
concentrated in public hands.”. See P. O’Keefe, UN Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Natural Resources, 8 JournaL of worLd trade Law 239, 256 (1974).
61 See rudoLf doLzer & margrete stevens, bILateraL Investment trea-
tIes 98 (1995).
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modern, in the sense that they focus on the public interest in the case of 
taking, and also that they suggest some kind of obligation of the state, 
so the state is subjected to the interest of its citizens.
Examining international case law, we can say that there were only a 
few awards that tried to define these terms. For example, the case law 
of the Iran - United States Claims Tribunal is a good example of how 
inconsequentially these terms are used.62 At the same time the essence 
is not in what term is used, but what is understood under the concept 
(which is basically the same here). In Dames and Moore case the claimants 
filed claims for breach of contract, or, as an alternative, for reasonable 
value of services rendered by this corporation.63 The Tribunal was of 
the opinion that: “unilateral taking of possession of property and the 
denial of its use to the rightful owners may amount to expropriation”.64 
Here, the Tribunal used the wording “may amount,” meaning in our 
interpretation that it depended on the circumstances. Here, taking the 
possession of the property and denying the rightful owner the use of 
it, in the Tribunal’s opinion, was sufficient to constitute expropriation.
In another decision, Amoco Int’l Fin. v. Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the Tribunal required “transfer of property rights” from 
the original owner (claimant) to the expropriating state to consider it as 
taking.65 In the opinion of the Tribunal, the act of the state is qualified 
62 The Tribunal itself  stated that Claims Settlement Declaration applies equally to 
expropriation, nationalization and other forms of  taking not making distinction 
among these terms, or separately defining them. See American International 
Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96,101 (1983).
63 The Tribunal found that it has no jurisdiction over the claim and dismissed 
it. See Dames and Moore v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 220 (1985).
64 Dames and Moore v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
223 (1985).
65 Amoco Int’l Fin. v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 
(1987).
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as expropriation only if these rights have been transferred.66 However, 
such requirement might be interpreted broadly, and might mean that 
the transfer of all the classical rights related to property are required, 
which is, in fact, a narrow interpretation for the rightful owner and 
gives more elbow-room to the expropriating state. Another decision 
of the Tribunal raises an interesting question: does the expropriated 
(nationalized) property have to be taken by the state itself to constitute 
expropriation? This decision was related to the Eastman Kodak Company 
case, where Kodak claimed that due to the acts of the Government of 
Iran it lost control over a subsidiary in Iran, and that it holds liable the 
Government of Iran for the debts owed by its subsidiary to Eastman 
Kodak Company. It also alleged that Iran expropriated the subsidiary, 
and claimed compensation. The Tribunal found for the respondent.67 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Brower, an arbitrator in Iran – United 
States Claims Tribunal, formulated the term expropriation as “when the 
state involved has itself acquired the benefit of the affected alien’s property 
or at least has been the instrument of its redistribution”.68 Meaning that 
the ‘intermediary’ role of the state can already equal expropriation.69
It can be concluded that both in the case of expropriation and nationalization 
private property is taken by the state on permanent basis. According to 
some writers, in the case of nationalization, compensation is generally 
not assumed. In the case of expropriation the expropriating state usually 
provides some compensation. Another important difference is that 
nationalization is usually related to some socio-economic and/or political 
66 Id.
67 Eastman Kodak Company v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 161 (1985).
68 Eastman Kodak Company v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 167 (1985).
69 Throughout the history there were some takings when the ruling political 
elite tried to gain supporters by ‘redistributing’ the property of  the old elite 
to its own supporters. See e.g., Tanzania.
changes in the given society, and there is a ‘specific’ underlying legislation, 
while, in case of expropriation, ‘general’ legislation constitutes the basis 
of the taking.
2.4. Intervention
Few words should be devoted to terms intervention and confiscation. 
Intervention means an action of the government, when it assumes 
control of a business (or any other private property) with the intention 
of operating the business for a limited period of time and to achieve a 
particular goal.70 It is important that after a reasonable period of time 
the property gets back to the original owner.71 Here the question may 
arise as to what compensation the original owner is entitled to, even 
if there was no expropriation in question. According to experts in the 
field, owners of such property are entitled to compensation for the time 
they were not able to use their property.72
2.5. Confiscation
Confiscation is taking of private property without compensation.73 
We can find some similarities to the definition of nationalization and 
expropriation, in the sense that, in case of confiscation, there always should 
be underlying public interest (either social or economic). Alternatively, 
Wortley defines confiscation as deliberate seizure of property by the 
70 See raLPH H. foLsom & mIcHaeL w. gordon, InternatIonaL busIness 
transactIons 639 (3d ed. 1995).
71 See id.
72 See Loukis G. Loucaides, The protection of  the right to property in occupied territo-
ries 53 IcLQ 677 (2004); H. LauterPacHt ed., oPPenHeIm’s InternatIonaL 
Law II: dIsPutes, war and neutraLIty 234-5 (7tH ed., 1952); However, 
the right of  states for intervention is usually limited by laws that foresee 
compensation (e.g., confiscation of  goods during war time). 
73 See id. at 641; Ian brownLIe, PrIncIPLes of PubLIc InternatIonaL Law 534 
(5th ed. 1998).
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state, without providing adequate compensation.74 This means that he 
still implies some compensation, however not necessarily ‘adequate’. 
According to him, confiscation also typically implies the denial of any 
right to restitution or to damages. Wortley finds confiscation justifiable 
by international law only in the following two exceptional cases: when 
there is a forfeiture or a fine to punish or suppress crime75, or when 
the loss is indirectly caused by the territorial state imposing legislation 
restricting the use of property, thereby confiscating or limiting rights 
normally enjoyed by an owner (e.g., environmental regulations).76 Wortley 
is of the opinion that taxation is in no case confiscation, as in the case 
of taxation there is some consideration received for the tax paid.77 We 
agree that there is some kind of reward, as taxpayers receive certain 
services for the tax paid. However, there is the case of excessive taxation 
that, in our opinion, falls under indirect expropriation, and in such case 
compensation is due.
2.6. Indirect expropriation78
Distinction can be made between de jure and de facto expropriation 
(taking).79 The host state may take measures which in fact (de facto) 
dispossesses the owner of his property, but legally do not affect the 
74 See ben atkInson wortLey, exProPrIatIon In PubLIc InternatIonaL Law 
39 (1959).
75 E.g., The Serbian Criminal Code provides the confiscation of  goods that 
result from a criminal delict (e.g., art. 199 (5) of  the Code).
76 See id.
77 wortley cites Adam Smith in support: “Every tax, however, is to the per-
son who pays it a badge, not of  slavery, but of  liberty.” See ben atkInson 
wortLey, exProPrIatIon In PubLIc InternatIonaL Law 39,46 (1959).
78 The expression “indirect expropriation” instead of  “indirect taking” is 
used by scholars, thus we use this one.
79 See rudoLf doLzer & margrete stevens, bILateraL Investment treatIes 
99 (1995); aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as 
refLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL 70 (1994).
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ownership – this is called indirect or de facto expropriation.80 Creeping 
expropriation is also a kind of such indirect expropriation. Such measures 
(e.g., requiring undue permits, restricting the activities of the business, 
extensive taxation) may significantly reduce the investor’s economic 
opportunities and prospects of making profit. This is the reason why, for 
example, in bilateral investment treaties investor states usually include 
quite general clauses concerning the definition of expropriation.
Sacerdoti defines indirect expropriation as “measures which, even if they are 
not aimed at transferring property rights, imply an interference with the 
exercise of such rights equivalent to that of a measure of expropriation”81. 
Sacerdoti gives two other definitions as well. He also defines it as a measure 
that “do not involve an overt taking but that effectively neutralizes the 
benefit of the property for the foreign owner”.82 Another definition he uses 
is a ”progressive erosion of the investor’s rights by regulatory measures”.83 
“Neutralizing the benefits” means that there is no chance given to the 
investor to make profit, although the objective of investments is making 
profit. It can be also defined as loss over the use of the enjoyment of the 
owner’s property, but at the same time the owner does not relinquish 
the title to the property.84 Examples of indirect expropriation could be 
80 See andrew newcombe LLuís ParadeLL, Law and PractIce of Invest-
ment treatIes 325 (2009); rudoLf doLzer & margrete stevens, bILat-
eraL Investment treatIes 100 (1995); According to the European Court 
of  Human Rights de facto expropriation occurs when a state deprives the 
owner of  his “right to use, let or sell property.” See also Mellacher and 
Others judgement of  15.12.1989. Mellacher and Others v. NN, 20 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. B) at 23 (1989).
81 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 383 (1997); 
82 See id. 382.
83 See id. 339.
84 Marisa Yee, The Future of  Environmental Regulation After Article 1110 of  
NAFTA: A Look at the Methanex and Metalclad Cases, 9 HastIngs w.-n.w.J. 
env. L. & PoL’y 85, 88 (2002).
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excessive taxation, prohibition of dividend distribution, refusal of access 
to raw materials, restricting the repatriation of profits, imposing new 
labor or local content requirements, etc.85 Thus, it would be very difficult 
task to find uniform criteria for this kind of taking.86
We can agree that the issue of indirect expropriation is a very delicate issue, 
because it is difficult to determine what constitutes such expropriation, 
and to evaluate legal effects of certain measures. The examination of 
international case law might be of some help. For example, in the case 
law of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal, at first glance it seems 
that the Tribunal easily solved the problem of definition: it stated that 
the term expropriation covers both de jure and de facto expropriation, 
that is to say, all kinds of taking whether formal and direct or informal 
and indirect (like creeping expropriation).87 At the same time, it does not 
85 The Commentary to article 3 of  the OECD Draft Convention on the Pro-
tection of  Foreign Property of  1967; See also Andrew T. Guzman, Why 
LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of  Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties, 38 vIrgInIa JournaL of InternatIonaL Law 644 (1998). 
See also Markus Perkam, The concept of  indirect expropriation in comparative public 
law – searching for light in the dark, in InternatIonaL Investment Law and 
comParatIve PubLIc Law (ed. stePHan w. scHILL), 127 (2010).
86 The Commentary to article 3 of  the OECD Draft Convention on the Pro-
tection of  Foreign Property of  1967 defined it as: ”[…] measure otherwise 
lawful applied in such a way as to deprive ultimately the alien of  the enjoy-
ment or value of  his property, without any specific act being identifiable 
as outright deprivation.”; Article 11.a.ii. of  the 1985 MIGA Convention: 
”A creeping nationalization would exist besides when there is no immedi-
ate prospect that the owner will be able to resume the enjoyment of  his 
property.” See Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Info page (visited 
Aug. 10, 2011) <http://www.miga.org/screens/about/about.htm>.
87 In Mouri’s opinion, the jurisprudence of  the Tribunal shows that “de facto 
expropriation relates to the actual seizure or control over property, coupled 
with its use by the government or beneficiaries appointed by it”. See aLLaHy-
ar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as refLected In tHe 
work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL 69 (1994). See also V. Heiskanen, 
solve the problem of determining an action of the state (does not give 
conditions), if it constitutes de facto expropriation at all. Concerning the 
practice of international tribunals in general, including that of the Iran 
– United States Claims Tribunal, Dolzer, in one of his writings, argues 
that courts tend to bring decisions on the basis of clearly identifiable 
measures of the host state, and not on the basis of general economic or 
social developments that can be connected to the alien property affected 
only indirectly.88
Indirect expropriation can also have another important effect on the 
compensation in case of expropriation: it can devalue the property 
in the state where such expropriation happens.89 Sometimes only the 
threat of formal expropriation or further regulatory change leads to 
property devaluation. And taking the advantage of this loss of value of 
the property, the host state might de facto and de jure expropriate the 
investment on low value.90
2.7. Indirect expropriation: case law
Examining case law, in one of the latest awards of the United States-Iran 
Claims Tribunal, in the Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran case, the Tribunal tries to give a very precise 
definition of de facto expropriation.91 In this case the claimant (Frederica 
Doctrine of  Indirect Expropriation in Light of  the Practice of  the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal, 8 J. World Investment & Trade 215, 218-19 (2007).
88 Rudolf  Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of  Alien Property, 1 IcsId revIew 41, 
65 (1986).
89 See Patrick Del Duca, The Rule of  Law: Mexico’s Approach to Expropri-
ation Disputes in the Face of  Investment Globalization 51 UCLA L. Rev. 
35, 56 (2003).
90 See id.
91 Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. The Government of  the Islamic Republic of  
Iran, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. cite: IRAN FINAL AWARD 600-485-1, 
signed February 27, 2003, filed February 27, 2003.
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Lincoln Riahi), a United States citizen, filed a claim against the Iranian 
Government seeking compensation for expropriation of her property.92 
This property included, among others, equity interests in different Iranian 
businesses.93 Concerning de facto expropriation, the Tribunal stated in 
this case that: “[…] measures taken by a state can interfere with property 
rights to such an extent that these rights must be deemed expropriated, 
even though no law or decree was issued in this respect.”94 Examples of 
such taking given by the Tribunal are the following: when the owner is 
deprived of the effective use, control or benefits of his/her property. So, 
expropriation can happen even if the state does not formally recognize 
it, and even if the legal title of the property formally remains with the 
original owner (the one whose property was de facto expropriated).95 In 
the opinion of the court, once the owner is deprived of fundamental 
rights of ownership (provided such measures are not temporary, because 
then it is intervention) the intent of the Government is not relevant 
any more, the factual state of affairs has to be taken into consideration 
when examining whether taking has happened.96 However, the Tribunal 
emphasized an additional requirement, that is to say, such action has to 
be attributable to the state.97 This broad interpretation of expropriation 
is supported by some other decisions and authors as well.98 For example, 
in Otis case the Tribunal was of the opinion that there is expropriation 
92 Id. para. 1.-40.
93 Id. para. 2.
94 Id. para. 3.
95 Id. para. 344. See also V. Heiskanen, Doctrine of  Indirect Expropriation in Light 
of  the Practice of  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 8 J. World Investment 
& Trade 215, 220 (2007).
96 Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. The Government of  the Islamic Republic of  
Iran, para. 345.
97 Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. The Government of  the Islamic Republic of  
Iran, para. 136-138.
98 See Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 15 (1997) at 220; See also V. Heiskanen, 
Doctrine of  Indirect Expropriation in Light of  the Practice of  the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal, 8 J. World Investment & Trade 215, 217 (2007).
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if the claimant proves that “[…] its property rights had been interfered 
with to such an extent that its use of those rights or the enjoyment of 
their benefits was substantially affected and that it suffered a loss as a 
result [...].” In this case, the claimant Otis claimed compensation for its 
shares expropriated in an Iranian elevator producing company. 
It is also worth examining case law of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) when we talk about the 
issue of indirect expropriation. The convention does not define the term 
expropriation. However, this might be ascribed to its nature. Thus, we 
examine the latest cases decided under the convention (the Eudoro 
Armando Olguin case, the Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. 
case, the Tradex Hellas S.A. case and the Tecnicas Medioambientales 
case) and see how is taking (expropriation and creeping expropriation) 
interpreted in these cases. It should be emphasized that issues that have 
relevance to parts on bilateral investment treaties will be also examined 
under ICSID convention. 
In the Eudoro Armando Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay case,99 the 
claimant argued that Paraguay’s actions, with respect to the claimant’s 
investment, were tantamount to an expropriation.100 Olguin alleged that 
the Republic of Paraguay carried out indirect expropriation through a 
series of omissions like not preventing the financial institution, into which 
Olguin had invested his money, from becoming insolvent and from the 
ongoing economic crisis.101 In 1993 E. A. Olguin, a citizen both of Peru 
and the United States, with residence in the United States, transferred a 
certain amount of money to Mercantil, a Paraguayan financial institution, 
with the intention of financing an establishment of a corn product 
plant in Paraguay. Investment titles issued by Mercantil on the name 
99 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration Vol. XXVII – 2002, International 
Council for Commercial Arbitration, Gen. ed. Albert Jan van den Berg, 
The Hague, 2002 at 48.
100 Id. at 55 para 20.
101 Id. at 60 para 46.
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of E. A. Olguin were signed by a Banco Central del Paraguay official 
and by an official of the authority supervising financial institutions in 
Paraguay. In 1995, during the financial crisis in Paraguay, Mercantil 
stopped payments under these investment titles. Following this, E. A. 
Olguin initiated ICSID arbitration against the Republic of Paraguay 
under the Bilateral Investment Protection Treaty between Paraguay 
and Peru claiming that the Republic of Paraguay was responsible for 
unpaid investment titles under the investment protection treaty. The 
Tribunal dismissed E. A. Olguin’s claims. In the award, among others, 
the Tribunal stated the following:
In expropriation, a person is deprived of a good by an act of 
the state which appropriates this good and is logically bound 
to pay its price. It cannot be said in this case that Paraguay 
appropriated Olguin’s investment, which was lost in the crisis 
of La Mercantil and of the Paraguayan financial system in 
general.102
Furthermore, the Tribunal admitted that there can be cases where the 
state indirectly acquires possession, or at least profits from private property 
(acknowledging the concept of de facto or creeping expropriation). 
Meanwhile, it also stated that “expropriation also requires an intention 
to expropriate; omissions, serious as they may be, do not suffice for 
expropriation to exist”.103
In another case, Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic 
of Costa Rica,104 the Tribunal analyzed at some length the notion of 
“creeping expropriation”. Among others, it stated that:
102 Id. at 56 para. 26.
103 Id. at 60 para. 47.
104 Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of  Costa Rica 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1). The award can be found at: ICSID Info 
page, ICSID Cases (visited on Jan. 24, 2011) <http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/cases/santaelena_award.pdf>.
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[…] measure or series of measures can still eventually amount 
to a taking, though the individual steps in the process do not 
formally purport to amount to a taking or to a transfer of title.105 
It concluded that it is crucial to establish the “extent to which the 
measures taken have deprived the owner of the normal control of his 
property”.106 In Compania del Desarrollo, the Tribunal concluded that 
the expropriation had happened, even though the investor remained in 
possession of his property, but he could not use freely his property (for 
the purpose of commercial development).107 Thus, the expropriation is 
subject to compensation when the state’s “interference has deprived the 
owner of his rights or had made those rights practically useless”.108 It also 
established that it is the task of the Tribunal, case by case, to determine 
whether it has happened.109
In Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania case Tradex, a Greek 
company, commenced arbitration proceedings against the Republic 
of Albania for alleged expropriation of an agricultural joint venture in 
Albania.110 Tradex, following negotiations with the Albanian Government, 
entered into a joint-venture (in the field of agricultural production) with 
T.B. Trovitsa, an Albanian state-owned company.111 Tradex claimed that 
shortly after the conclusion of the joint-venture agreement, Albania had 
expropriated “substantial” part of the agriculture land owned by the 
105 Id. para. 76.
106 Id. 
107 Id. para. 81.
108 Id. para. 78.
109 Id. Related to this see Max Gutbrot, Steffen Hindelang, Steffen, Externaliza-
tion of  Effective Legal Protection against Indirect Expropriation, 7 J. World Invest-
ment & Trade 59, 63 (2006).
110 Id. para. 1-4 and 52-58 in Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of  Albania (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/94/2), (visited on Jan. 24, 2013) <http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/cases/tradex_award.pdf  >.
111 Id. para. 52.
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joint-venture and had given it to local farmers.112 Furthermore, Tradex 
claimed that, following the grant of land to villagers, local farmers stole 
crops and other property (not expropriated) of the joint-venture, and 
the Albanian state did not intervene.113 Therefore, Tradex claimed that 
Albania had expropriated its investment.114 The Tribunal concluded that 
Tradex could not prove that expropriation occurred, and therefore denied 
Tradex’s claim.115 What is relevant to us, is the Tribunal’s interpretation 
of the provision of the applicable law116 that states: “foreign investment 
shall not be expropriated: (1) directly; (2) indirectly; (3) or by any 
measure of tantamount effect.”117 Thus, the Tribunal concluded that 
this provision covers:
A wide range of takings and makes it clear that not only 
government measures expressly denominated as ‘expropriations’ 
or directly taking away all or part of the investment are 
prohibited, but also other measures that indirectly or by their 
effect lead to the foreign investor losing acquired rights […]118
In Tecnicas Medioambientales case119, Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed 
S.A. (Tecmed), a Spanish company, requested arbitration against Mexico 
based on the bilateral investment treaty concluded between Spain and 
112 Id. para. 57.
113 Id.
114 Id. para. 59.
115 Id. para. 208.
116 Albanian Law No. 7764 of  2 November 1993 on Foreign Investments, 
para. 68.
117 Id. para. 133.
118 Id. para. 134.
119 Award in Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican 
States (Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2). ICSID web page (visited on March 16, 
2013) <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/laudo-051903%20-Eng-
lish.pdf>. See also carLos JIménez PIernas (ed.), tHe LegaL PractIce In 
InternatIonaL Law and euroPean communIty Law, 218-22 (2007).
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Mexico.120 Tecmed, among others, claimed that Mexican authorities 
had in fact expropriated its investment by denying the renewal of the 
license to operate Tecmed’s landfill.121 The claimant also argued that 
not granting the permit deprived the investment of its market value.122 
The respondent argued that it had the discretionary powers for not 
granting the permit, as it was regulatory measure123 within the state’s 
police power.124 The Tribunal concluded that such denial was in fact 
expropriation of the investment and awarded damages of USD 5.5 million 
to the claimant.125 As the bilateral investment treaty did not define what 
is to be understood by expropriation, the Tribunal tried to define it. It 
based the definition of expropriation on the opinion of the Tribunal in 
the Metalclad case and defined expropriation as follows:
Although formally an expropriation means a forcible taking 
by the Government of tangible or intangible property owned 
by private persons by means of administrative or legislative 
action to that effect, the term also covers a number of situations 
defined as de facto expropriation, where such actions or laws 
transfer assets to third parties different from the expropriating 
state or where such laws or actions deprive persons of their 
ownership over such assets, without allocating such assets to 
third parties or to the Government.126
As we can see, the Tribunal interpreted the term of expropriation very 
broadly, including de facto taking as well. It also construed terms contained 
in the treaty like “equivalent to expropriation” and “tantamount to 
120 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, para. 1-4.
121 Id. para. 35-45.
122 Id. para. 96.
123 Regarding the issue of  regulatory measures that are for public purpose, the 
Tribunal referred to the Compania del Desarollo case. Id. para. 121.
124 Id. para. 97.
125 The claimant originally requested USD 52 million. Id. para. 201.
126 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, para. 
113.
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expropriation” meaning “indirect expropriation”, “creeping expropriation” 
or “de facto expropriation”.127 It set up the following test to determine 
whether not granting of the permit constituted expropriation: “[…] if 
the claimant, […], was radically deprived of the economical use and 
enjoyment of its investment, as if the rights related thereto – […] - had 
ceased to exist”.128 Basically, it examined to what extent did the investment 
lost its “value and economic use”.129 It also concluded that measures
adopted by a state, whether regulatory or not, are an indirect de 
facto expropriation if they are irreversible and permanent and if 
the assets or rights subject to such measure have been affected 
in such a way that “…any form of exploitation thereof…” has 
disappeared; i.e. the economic value of the use, enjoyment or 
disposition of the assets or rights affected by the administrative 
action or decision have been neutralized or destroyed.130 
It also stated that:
Under international law, the owner is also deprived of property 
where the use or enjoyment of benefits related thereto is 
exacted or interfered with to a similar extent, even where legal 
ownership over the assets in question is not affected, and so 
long as the deprivation is not temporary.131
Furthermore, it concluded that the intention of the government, when 
implementing such measure, is less important than the actual effects of 
the measure on the investor.132
127 Id. para. 114.
128 Id. para. 115.
129 Id.




There is a recent ICSID case, which shows how complicated can be the 
factual background of expropriation of foreign investment. In this case, 
CEAC Holdings Limited (hereafter: CEAC), a company incorporated 
under the laws of Cyprus was the claimant.133 The case concerns an 
aluminum plant located in Montenegro, known as Kombinat Aluminijuma 
Podgorica, A.D. (hereafter: KAP). Originally, this plant was state-owned, 
but in 2003, the Montenegrin Government initiated a public tender 
process with the goal of privatizing it. This was accomplished when in 
2005, Rusal Holdings Limited submitted a winning bid for the plant. 
CEAC was an affiliate company of Rusal, and thus it was the company 
that purchased KAP’s shares. According to the agreement, CEAC paid 
48.5 million Euros to acquire about 65% of the company’s shares and 
also committed to invest 75 million euros over a five-year period, for the 
dual purposes of improving KAP’s facilities and implementing various 
social and environmental programs. Later in 2005, CEAC also deigned 
to acquire a minority block of shares in Rudnici Boksita Nikšić, A.D. 
(hereafter: RBN), the company chiefly responsible for supplying the 
aluminum plant with raw materials, for 6 million Euros. To further 
ensure the profitability of KAP, CEAC decided to provide the plant with 
a dedicated source of electricity. This was accomplished by purchasing all 
the shares in the state-owned coal power plant, TE Pljevlja, and a 31% 
stake in the state-owned coal mine Rudnik Uglja. Despite these steps, 
CEAC began experiencing troubles in 2006, when the Claimant allegedly 
learned that the Montenegrin Government misled it about KAP and RBN 
during the tender process. Namely, the Government understated KAP’s 
debts and obligations by tens of millions of euros. To further compound 
this revelation, the Montenegrin Parliament decided to terminate the 
privatization of TE Pljevlja and Rudnik Uglja, with scant reasoning. 
This severely compromised KAP’s critical need for competitively-priced 
electricity. As a result of these issues, CEAC initiated arbitration against 
the Respondent (Montenegro) in 2007. This was discontinued in 2009, 
when the parties settled. As a result of the settlement, CEAC transferred 
133 CEAC Holdings Limited v. Montenegro (ICSID Case No. ARB148).
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50% of its shares in KAP to the Montenegrin Government (giving it 
an equal stake), and a seat on KAP’s board of directors. In exchange for 
this, Montenegro committed to subsidize KAP’s electricity supply and 
issue 135 million Euros in state guarantees to KAP.
However, the relationship between CEAC and the Government further 
deteriorated, as CEAC alleged that its attempts to restructure and 
modernize the aluminum plant were frustrated by the Respondent, which 
supposedly undertook several actions aimed at causing the plant to default 
on its debts. These alleged actions included Montenegro refusing to provide 
KAP with the electricity subsidies that were promised in the settlement. 
To aggravate this, CEAC alleged that the state-owned electricity company 
actually reduced KAP’s supply of electricity. Enhancing this alleged 
malignancy, CEAC also claimed that Montenegro’s representative on 
the KAP board of directors refused to approve the plant’s 2012 financial 
statements and its business plan, which approvals were conditions of 
a loan agreement between KAP and Deutsche Bank. Lastly, CEAC 
suggested that Montenegro refused to provide its written consent as 
guarantor under this loan agreement.
These events apparently led to KAP defaulting on its debt. In 2013, the 
Montenegrin Ministry of Finance commenced insolvency proceedings 
against KAP in the Commercial Court of Podgorica, and appointed 
an insolvency manager for the plant. The conduct of this manager 
was allegedly highly irregular. In particular, he had KAP enter into an 
agreement with a state-owned oil trading company. CEAC claimed that 
this enabled the Montenegrin Government to reap the benefit of the 
revenues associated with KAP’s aluminum production. The insolvency 
manager subsequently announced a public tender for the sale of all 
of KAP’s assets, without seeking the approval of the plant’s Board of 
Creditors, which was supposedly responsible for major decisions in the 
bankruptcy proceedings. The value estimate provided by the insolvency 
manager, 52 million Euros, was alleged by CEAC to be far below the 
actual market value of the property. Moreover, the Claimant also alleged 
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that Montenegro attempted to intimidate CEAC by initiating criminal 
proceedings against the chief financial officer of CEAC and KAP, for 
stealing electricity. CEAC described this criminal proceeding as „absurd 
and unfounded”, and when the case was brought to ECHR, Montenegro 
promptly dismissed the local proceedings. Based on the alleged misconduct 
described above, CEAC filed a case against Montenegro, based on the 
2005 BIT between Montenegro and Cyprus, on March 20 2014. CEAC 
claimed that Montenegro has breached several of its obligations under 
the BIT, including its obligation to provide fair and equal treatment; 
to provide full protection and security; to provide national and most-
favoured-nation treatment, including with respect to the “management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment, expansion or disposal” of investments; to 
not expropriate, except in cases in which such measures are taken in the 
public interest, observe due process of law, are not discriminatory, and 
are accompanied by adequate compensation effected without delay; to 
guarantee the free transfer of payments and to “encourage and create 
stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for [foreign 
investors] to make investments in its territory”.
However, before the merits of the case could have been debated, the 
issue of „seat” arose. The arbitration tribunal decided to dedicate first 
phase of the proceedings to determining whether CEAC has a „seat” 
under Article 1(3)(b) of the BIT.134 This would eventually grow into the 
central – and only – question of the proceedings, and the arbitration 
tribunal came to the conclusion, that CEAC did not have a „seat” in 
Cyprus at the relevant time. Thus, CEAC is not an investor within the 
meaning of the BIT, and the arbitration tribunal has no jurisdiction to 
134 „The term “investor” shall mean: [...] b) a legal entity incorporated, con-
stituted or otherwise duly organised according to the laws and regulations 
of  one Contracting Party having its seat in the territory of  that same Con-
tracting Party and investing in the territory of  the other Contracting Par-
ty.” (visited on Dec. 12, 2018) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/4738>.
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hear the case. Still, the case is a good example of the complexity of an 
international investment case.
The case law of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
is also rather interesting.135 In the recent years the issue of regulatory 
takings has become more and more actual in North America. There is an 
extensive literature on this issue, primarily in United States legal literature 
concerning article 1110 of NAFTA.136 Article 1110 of NAFTA actually 
135 This Agreement deals with the issue of  foreign direct investment and 
expropriation of  investment in its Chapter 11. It distinguishes between 
‘direct’ taking and ‘indirect’ taking (and ‘measures tantamount to expro-
priation’). NAFTA Secretariat (visited Nov. 15, 2013) <http://www.naf-
ta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/legal/index_e.aspx?articleid=79>. See also 
on this issue Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate 
Through the Eyes of  a Property Theorist, 33 envtL. L. 851, 859-60 (2003).
136 E.g. Kevin Banks, NAFTA’s Article 1110 – Can Regulation Be Expropriation? 
5 nafta: L. & bus. rev. am. 499 (1999); Joel C. Beauvais, Regulatory Ex-
propriation under NAFTA: Emerging Principles and Lingering Doubts 10 n.y.u. 
envtL. L.J. 245 (2002); Maurizio Brunetti, The Iran – United States Claims 
Tribunal, NAFTA Chapter 11, and the Doctrine of  Indirect Expropriation 2 cHI. 
J. Int’L L. 203 (2001); Raymundo E. Enriquez, Expropriation Under Mexican 
Law and Its Insertion Into a Global Context Under NAFTA 23 HastIngs Int’L 
& comP. L. rev. 385 (2000); Julian Ferguson, California Concerned About 
Contaminated Water: Canadian Corporation Files NAFTA Expropriation Claim 
Against U.S. 1999 coLo. J. Int’L envtL. L. & PoL’y 65 (2000); Elyse M. 
Freeman, Regulatory Expropriation Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Some Lessons 
From the European Court of  Human Rights 42 coLum. J. transnat’L L. 177 
(2003); David A. Gantz, Protection of  Foreign Investment under the NAFTA 
Chapter 11—UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules—National Treatment—Perfor-
mance Requirements—Fair and Equitable Treatment—Expropriation—Damag-
es—Allocation of  Costs 97 American Journal of  Int’l L. 937-51 (2003); Jason 
L. Gudofsky, Shedding Light on Article 1110 of  the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) Concerning Expropriations: an Environmental Case Study 
21 nw. J. Int’L L. & bus. 243 (2000); Tali Levy, NAFTA’s Provision for Com-
pensation in the Event of  Expropriation: A Reassessment of  the “Prompt, Adequate 
and Effective” Standard, Stanford Journal of  International Law Vol. 31, No. 1, 
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makes distinction between direct and indirect expropriation, and also 
recognizes the institution of “measures tantamount to expropriation” 
when it states that:
No party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate 
an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or 
take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation 
of such an investment (“expropriation”).137
The term ‘measure’ is also defined in NAFTA, under Chapter II, article 
201: “measure includes any law, regulation, procedure, requirement 
or practice.“138 In connection with NAFTA article 1110 Mark Poirier 
defines indirect expropriation as actions of the States based on regulatory 
power of the same that reduces the scope of use of property and thus 
cause the owner economic harm (e.g., environmental and land-use 
regulations intended to address negative externalities from particular 
uses of property). He also argues that such regulation is entered and 
Winter 1995, 423-448; Sean D. Murphy, NAFTA Waste Management Tribunal 
Finds No Arbitrary Treatment, No Expropriation 98 am. J. Int’L L. 838 (2004); 
Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the 
Eyes of  a Property Theorist 33 envtL. L. 851 (2003); Gregory M. Starner, 
Taking a Constitutional Look: NAFTA Chapter 11 as an Extension of  Member 
States’ Constitutional Protection of  Property 33 Law and Policy in International 
Business 405-437 (2002); Joseph A. Strazzeri, A Lucas Anallysis of  Regulatory 
Expropriation Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven 14 geo. Int’L envtL. L. rev. 
837 (2002); Timothy Ross Wilson, Trade Rules: Ethyl Corporation V. Canada 
(NAFTA Chapter 11) Part II: Are Fears Founded? 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. Rev. 
Am. 205, 215-16 (2000), Marisa Yee, The Future of  Environmental Regulation 
After Article 1110 of  NAFTA: A Look at the Methanex and Metalclad Cases 
Hastings West-Northwest Journal of  Environmental Law and Policy, Vol. 
9, p. 85-108.
137 See NAFTA Secretariat (visited Nov. 15, 2004) <http://www.nafta-sec-ale-
na.org/DefaultSite/legal/index_e.aspx?articleid=160#A1110>.
138 See NAFTA Secretariat (visited Nov. 15, 2004) <http://www.nafta-sec-ale-
na.org/DefaultSite/legal/index_e.aspx?articleid=84>.
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applied in good faith, and is not merely a pretext for expropriation, with 
this distinction between legal and illegal expropriation.139
Marisa Yee argues that the term expropriation within article 1110 of 
NAFTA is not clear, as only on the bases of the text of the Agreement it 
is not possible to tell what measure ‘tantamounts’ to expropriation (there 
is no test offered by the Agreement’s text). This vagueness leaves States 
vulnerable to lawsuits by foreign investors whenever the host country’s 
actions reduce the companies’ profits. She further argues that this may 
put at risk many regulations in the host country like efforts to protect 
the environment.140
Examining case law, we can get broader view of what covers the term 
expropriation, and what is meant under creeping expropriation under the 
NAFTA. In the Metalclad case, a U.S. waste disposal company, Metalclad 
Corporation, initiated arbitration proceedings against Mexico alleging, 
among others, breach of NAFTA articles 1110. Its notice of arbitration 
asserted that Mexico wrongfully refused to permit Metalclad’s subsidiary 
to open and operate a hazardous waste facility that the company had built 
in La Pedrera, despite the fact that the project was allegedly executed 
in response to the invitation of certain Mexican officials and allegedly 
met all Mexican legal requirements.141 Metalclad sought damages of 
139 See Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the 
Eyes of  a Property Theorist 33 envtL. L. 851, 871-72 (2003); See also Tahoe-Si-
erra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302; See also 
Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American 
Law, 22 Utah L. Rev. 1, 6 (2000).
140 Furthermore, Yee claim that this article gives foreign investors the right to 
sue host governments while offering no such protection to domestic inves-
tors. Thus, in her opinion foreign investors gain an unfair advantage over 
domestic companies. See Marisa Yee, The Future of  Environmental Regulation 
After Article 1110 of  NAFTA: A Look at the Methanex and Metalclad Cases, 9 
HastIngs w.-n.w.J. env. L. & PoL’y 85, 101-03 (2002).
141 The Metalclad case is of  crucial importance also for the “Trade and envi-
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USD 43,125,000 and damages for the value of the enterprise taken.142 
In this case, the ICSID Arbitral Tribunal interpreted expropriation143 
as including:
[…] not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of 
property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer 
of title in favor of the host state, but also covert or incidental 
interference with the use of property which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use 
or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property 
even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state.144
The Arbitral Tribunal was of the opinion that Mexico took measures 
that “amount to an indirect expropriation” in violation of article 1110 
of NAFTA by allowing and/or tolerating145 the conduct of the local 
government.146 It also added that the implementation of Ecological Decree 
ronment debate”. See Balázs Horváthy, Az Észak-amerikai Szabadkereskedel-
mi Egyezmény környezetvédelmi összefüggései [Environmental Aspects of  the North 
American Free Trade Agreement]. 56 Külgazdaság Jogi Melléklet, 71-90 (2013).
142 United States Department of  state, Metalclad Corp. (visited on Apr. 27, 
2013) <http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3752.htm>; See also on this case Pat-
rick Del Duca, The Rule of  Law: Mexico’s Approach to Expropriation 
Disputes in the Face of  Investment Globalization 51 UCLA L. Rev. 35, 
85-94 (2003); Also Charles H. Brower II, Beware the Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. 
Thomas. 40 coLumbIa JournaL of transnatIonaL Law 454, 465 (2012).
143 Under article 1110 of  NAFTA.
144 ICSID CASE No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (visited on May 5, 2013) <http://www.
worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf>, para 103.
145 Id. para. 107. These measures, taken together with the representations of  
the Mexican Federal Government, on which Metalclad relied, and the ab-
sence of  a timely, orderly or substantive basis for the denial by the Munic-
ipality of  the local construction permit, amount to an indirect expropria-
tion. (Id. para. 107 of  ICSID CASE No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (visited on May 
14, 2012) <www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf>).
146 Para. 107 and 112 of  ICSID CASE No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (visited on May 
14, 2013) <www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf>.
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issued by the local governor, that also affected the rights of Metalclad, 
would have in itself tantamounted to an act of expropriation. But, even 
without such decree, the events preceding the announcement of the 
decree (conduct described above) themselves constituted expropriation.147 
However, we have to mention that the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
was in part on different opinion when the case reached this court.148 It 
concluded that:
[…] the Tribunal did decide the matter beyond the scope 
of the submission to arbitration when it concluded that the 
acts preceding the announcement of the Ecological Decree 
amounted to an expropriation within the meaning of article 
1110 because it based its conclusion, at least in part, on a lack 
of transparency.”149
The Court also found that the Arbitral Tribunal gave “an extremely broad 
definition of expropriation” for the purposes of NAFTA article 1110.150 
However, as the definition of expropriation was a question of law, the 
147 Id. para. 109. See also sebastIán LóPez escarcena, IndIrect exProPrIatIon 
In InternatIonaL Law 1-2 (2014); Alberto R. Salazar V., NAFTA Chapter 
11, Regulatory Expropriation, and Domestic Counter-Advertising Law. 27 Ariz. 
J. Int’l & Comp. L. 31, 38 (2010); Justin R. Marlles, Public Purpose, Private 
Losses: Regulatory Expropriation and Environmental Regulation in International In-
vestment Law. 16 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 275, 280-83 (2006-2007).
148 Reasons for Judgement of  the Honourable Mr. Justice Tysoe lexis 2 Asper 
Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 473.
149 Reasons for Judgement of  the Honourable Mr. Justice Tysoe lexis 2 Asper 
Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 473. at 498, 499; According to Yee ‘transparency’ 
means access of  investor to relevant information for the operation of  the 
investment. See Marisa Yee, The Future of  Environmental Regulation After Arti-
cle 1110 of  NAFTA: A Look at the Methanex and Metalclad Cases, 9 HastIngs 
w.-n.w.J. env. L. & PoL’y 85, 101 (2002).
150 Reasons for Judgement of  the Honourable Mr. Justice Tysoe lexis 2 Asper 
Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 473 at 500.
Court did not try to define it.151 Finally, the Court concluded that the 
Arbitral Tribunal was correct when stating that the Ecological Decree 
constituted an act tantamount to expropriation without compensation, 
and did not set aside the arbitral award.152
Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Canada is the next NAFTA case worth examining. 
In this case, Pope and Talbot claimed that, by reducing its quota of 
lumber that could be exported to the United States without paying a fee, 
Canada “had taken actions that so extensively interfered with claimant’s 
Canadian production and exports” that these actions were tantamount 
to expropriation in violation of article 1110.153 Pope and Talbot based 
its claim on the following arguments: (i) Canada’s export control regime 
deprived the investment of its “ordinary ability” to sell its products to its 
traditional markets,154 (ii) expropriation under international law “refers 
to an act by which governmental authority is used to deny some benefit 
to property”,155 (iii) the Canadian action tantamounted to expropriation 
in violation of article 1110.156 Pope and Talbot argued that the phrase 
‘tantamount to expropriation’ expanded to the concepts of indirect 
taking and creeping expropriation, covering even non-discriminatory 
measures of general application which have the effect of substantially 
interfering with investments of investors.157 Canada, in contrast, argued 
that: (i) Pope and Talbot could continue to export lumber, (ii) “mere 
interference is not expropriation; rather, a significant degree of deprivation 
151 Id. 
152 Id.
153 Pope and Talbot interim award (visited on Apr. 8, 2013) <http://www.naf-
talaw.org>. See also Justin R. Marlles, Public Purpose, Private Losses: Regulatory 
Expropriation and Environmental Regulation in International Investment Law. 16 J. 
Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 275, 286-88 (2006-2007).
154 Id. para. 81.
155 Id. para. 83.
156 Id. para. 84-86.
157 Id.
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of fundamental rights of ownership is required,”158 (iii) ‘tantamount’ 
simply means ‘equivalent’ and did not expand article 1110’s coverage 
beyond creeping expropriation to cover regulatory action.159 The Tribunal 
was of the opinion that the investment’s access to the U.S. market 
(meaning that the investor is allowed to invest in the U.S. market) is a 
property interest subject to protection under article 1110.160 The Tribunal 
also rejected the claim that “those regulatory measures constitute an 
interference with the investment’s business activities substantial enough 
to be characterized as an expropriation under international law”, or that 
the expression ‘tantamount’ to nationalization or expropriation widened 
the ordinary concept of expropriation under international law.161 It was 
the Tribunal’s opinion that ‘tantamount’ means nothing more than 
equivalent.162 The Tribunal rejected the claim of expropriation under 
article 1110, because it considered it significant that Pope & Talbot 
“continues to export substantial quantities of softwood lumber to the 
U.S. and to earn substantial profits on those sales”. It suggested further 
that in determining “whether a particular interference with business 
activities amounts to an expropriation, the test is whether that interference 
is sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the property has 
been “taken” from the owner”.163
158 Id. para. 87-88.
159 Id. para. 89.
160 Id. para. 96.
161 Id.
162 Id. para. 104.
163 Id. para. 100-102; “First of  all, there is no allegation that the Investment 
has been nationalized or that the [export control] Regime is confiscatory 
[…] The investor remains in control of  the Investment, it directs the day-
to-day operations of  the Investment, and no officers or employees of  the 
Investment have been detained [...] Canada does not supervise the work 
of  the officers or employees of  the Investment, does not take any part of  
the proceeds of  company sales […,…] does not prevent the Investment 
from paying dividends to its shareholders, does not interfere with the ap-
pointment of  directors or management and does not take any other actions 
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Another NAFTA case where article 1110 was scrutinized is the S. D. Myers 
case. S. D. Myers, a U.S. company, was in the business of remediation 
of hazardous waste. Canada had an inventory of waste contaminated 
with polychlorinated biphenyls. S. D. Myers wanted to enter to the 
business of transporting such waste to the United States. There, S. D. 
Myers planned to recycle the waste, or dispose of it in a safe manner. S. 
D. Myers’ affiliate in Canada was Myers Canada, which also had to be 
involved in this business.164 We should mention that S. D. Myers spent 
considerable effort and money in Canada and in the United States to 
develop its business.165 Among others, it lobbied long and hard to obtain 
regulatory approval from U.S. authorities to import waste into the U.S. 
It got the permit in 1995. However, immediately after this, Canada 
imposed a ban on the export of PCB wastes into the United States.166 
The Government of Canada said that it had “environmental concerns 
about the proposed export of PCBs by companies like S.D. Myers”.167 
Following this, S. D. Myers claimed that the export ban amounted in 
substance to a nationalization or expropriation.168
In this case, the Tribunal defined the difference between expropriation 
and regulation: 
Expropriations tend to be severe deprivations of ownership 
rights; regulations tend to amount to much less interference. 
The distinction between expropriation and regulation screens 
out most potential cases of complaints about regulatory conduct 
outing the Investor from full ownership and control of  his investment.” 
(Id. para. 100.).
164 S.D. Myers, Inc. and Government of  Canada NAFTALA.ORG Info page 
(visited on May 22, 2013) <http://www.naftalaw.org>. See also JeswaLd w. 
saLacuse, tHe Law of Investment treatIes 316 (2009).





by the state, and reduces the risk that governments will be 
harassed or chilled as they go about managing public affairs.169
The Tribunal further stated that article 1110 of NAFTA applies to 
indirect expropriations or measures tantamount to expropriation, but 
the phrase ‘tantamount to expropriation’ in such case needs deeper 
scrutiny. The Tribunal examined whether the governmental conduct 
amounted in substance to an expropriation. It concluded that the real 
purpose and impact of a measure must be considered, not merely the 
official explanations offered by the government:
A government might proceed with a gradually unfolding 
series of disparate measures; none of them individually may 
amount to expropriation, but the whole series might in some 
cases be substantially equivalent to an expropriation. Usually, 
an expropriation amounts to a lasting removal of the ability 
of an owner to make use of its economic rights. The export 
ban here was temporary. It may be that in some contexts and 
circumstances, it would be appropriate for international law 
to view a deprivation as amounting to an expropriation, even 
though it is partial or temporary. But the temporary nature 
of the impairment here is one factor, albeit not decisive in 
itself, in refraining from characterizing the export ban as an 
expropriation.170
Whole in whole, the Tribunal did not qualify the export ban as 
expropriation.171
In another, relatively new case decided by the Permanent Court of 




172 See Investment Policy Hub (visited on Dec. 11, 2018) <http://investment-
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1478>.
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the issue. This case concerned the Greek corporation known as Mytilineos 
Holdings as Claimant. The Claimant signed multiple collaboration 
agreements with a Serbian state-controlled company, known as RTB-Bor. 
RTB-Bor was one of the largest metallurgical and mining companies173 
for copper extraction and production in the world (a typical socialist 
giant of strategic importance once). These collaboration agreements 
date back to 1996, and under their provisions, RTB-Bor was obliged 
to pay the Claimant regularly in metal and money, in exchange for the 
working capital and copper ore provided by the Claimant. However, 
starting from 2004, RTB-Bor refused to honor its obligations towards 
the Claimant. The Claimant was furthermore unable to seek resolution 
for this issue in Serbia, as the Serbian Government took a number of 
administrative and legal measures in order to prevent the enforcement 
of RTB-Bor’s obligations.
As a result of this, the Claimant turned to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in 2014, invoking the 1998 BIT between Greece and 
Serbia as a basis for its claims. The resulting arbitration case was then 
administered according to UNCITRAL rules. The Claimant alleged 
indirect expropriation, and breach of the requirement of fair and equitable 
treatment, which included claims that the Serbian state denied justice 
to the Claimant. The requested damages amounted to 100 million 
USD. Although the award’s full text is not public, it is known from the 
Claimant’s press release174 and various journalistic writings, that the 
Tribunal accepted the Claimant’s allegations, and found that the measures 
taken by Serbia between 2004 and 2012 to prevented the enforcement 
173 In the Serbian media it is sometimes referred to as „mine of  debts”.
174 See 4-traders (visited on Dec. 11, 2018) <http://www.4-traders.com/
MYTILINEOS-HOLDINGS-1408783/news/MYTILINEOS-PRE-
VAILS-IN-INTERNATIONAL-ARBITRATION-AGAINST-SER-





of RTB-Bor’s obligations amounted to indirect expropriation without 
compensation, and frustrated the Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable 
expectations to be afforded fair and equal treatment by the host country. 
However, it ultimately only awarded 40 million USD to the Claimant in 
2017. The award, as mentioned before, was not made public. However, 
according to the Serbian media, there is another case going on against 
RTB Bor lodged in front of a Greek court for 60 million USD. The 
above mentioned Greek company claims in this case that RTB Bor did 
not fulfill three contracts concluded in the nineties.175 However, some 
sources claim that Mytilineos promised to revoke its claim, once the 
above mentioned 40 million USD is paid by Serbia.176
2.8. The issue of repudiation or breach of contract by the state
Few words should be devoted to the problem of repudiation or breach 
of contract by states. The issue examined here is whether contractual 
rights can be taken (expropriated) or not. In general, contracts between 
a state and a foreign investor are governed by the municipal law of the 
host state.177 From this follows that, if the state breaches the contract, 
it will not automatically infer international liability, it will not be in 
breach of international law per se.178 However, according to Dixon, 
there are few exceptions.179 One of these is the case when the investor 
175 See Insajder (visited on Dec. 11, 2018) <https://insajder.net/sr/sajt/vaz-
no/9600/>.
176 See Insajder (visited on Dec. 11, 2018) <https://naslovi.net/2018-02-09/
insajder/mitilineos-povlaci-tuzbu-protiv-rtb-bor-nakon-isplate-duga-od-
40-miliona-evra/21204425>.
177 See martIn dIxon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 218 (1993); P. 
O’Keefe, UN Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 JournaL of 
worLd trade Law 239, 254 (1974); A good example is China.
178 See martIn dIxon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 218 (1993); P. 
O’Keefe, UN Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 JournaL of 
worLd trade Law 239, 255 (1974).
179 See martIn dIxon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 218 (1993).
is prevented from obtaining due process of law, in which case the home 
state of the investor has the right to make an international claim against 
the state that denied the due process of law against the investor. Another 
exception is when contractual rights are regarded as property that may 
be unlawfully expropriated.180 The most interesting exception is when 
the contract becomes ‘internationalized’. This can be achieved with a 
so-called stabilization clause in the contract.181 Such clauses provide that, 
even if the legislation is changed after the signature of the investment 
contract, only that law applies to the investment contract and to the 
investment that was in force at the time of signing the contract. If the state 
agrees to add such a clause to the contract, it becomes an international 
obligation, and it may mean that property or property rights connected 
to such contract cannot be lawfully expropriated.182
The case law of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal also supports 
that contractual rights can be expropriated. In the Mobil Oil case, 
a consortium of companies negotiated a 20 years long concession 
agreement in 1973 for purchase of crude oil produced in Iran. Following 
the revolution in 1980 the Revolutionary Council of Iran nullified the 
concession contract.183 One of the issues in this case was whether Iran 
had breached the concession agreement, and, with this, unlawfully 
expropriated property interest of the company.184 The Tribunal found 
Iran liable and stated that a concession (that is to say, contract) might be 
the object of taking (‘nationalization’, with the words of the Tribunal).185
180 Example for this might be concession contracts between the state and a 
company.
181 See martIn dIxon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 218 (1993); See also 
unIted natIons centre on transnatIonaL corPoratIons, bILateraL In-
vestment treatIes 57 (1988). 
182 See martIn dIxon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 218 (1993).
183 Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
25 (1987).
184 Id. para. 128.
185 Regardless of  the law the parties chose as the law of  the contract. Id. para. 175.
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In Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran (claimant) v. Islamic Republic of Iran 
case, the claimant, a Delaware corporation, had rights to explore and 
exploit petroleum resources in Iran on the basis of the contract signed 
with the National Iranian Oil Company in 1965. Following the Iranian 
revolution,186 the Government of Iran declared these contracts null and 
void ab initio.187 The claimant asked for compensation on the basis of 
expropriation of contractual rights.188 However, the Tribunal was of 
the opinion that if there is liability, it should be assessed on the basis 
of taking of foreign property in international law. Finally, the Tribunal 
found Iran liable for taking of contractual rights, maintaining that: 
“expropriation by or attributable to a state of the property of an alien 
gives rise under international law to liability [...] whether the property 
is tangible, […], or intangible, such as the contract rights […]”.189 These 
cases of the Tribunal strengthen the proposition that not only tangible 
assets but also contractual rights can be expropriated.190 This is based 
on the above findings and on other case law and academic literature 
that will be examined infra in this work.191
186 Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 106 (1989), para. 1-4.
187 Id.
188 Id. para. 75.
189 Id. para. 76.
190 See rIcHard b. LILLIcH et aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: 
Its contrIbutIon to tHe Law of state resPonsIbILIty 192 (1998).
191 Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims [Norway v. U.S.A in Reports of  Interna-
tional Arbitral Awards, Vol. 1, New York: United Nations, 1948 at 332]; See 
P. O’Keefe, UN Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 JournaL of 
worLd trade Law 239, 255 (1974); American Law Institute, Restatement 
of  the Law, Second, Foreign Relations Law of  the United States (1965), pt. 
IV, Responsibility of  States for Injuries to Aliens, at 587.
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2.9. Relevant notions in bilateral investment treaties and in related 
academic literature
Bilateral investment treaties usually define what is to be understood 
under taking of foreign property, expropriation or other relevant term. 
These definitions typically try to cover all forms of actions of the host 
State that might be detrimental to foreign investors.192 Sacerdoti argues 
that bilateral investment treaties intend to protect foreign investments 
in respect of political or non-commercial risk disregarding the language 
used in these agreements.193 We agree with this statement; however we 
find it important to have a clear-cut definition in bilateral investment 
treaties of taking or similar measures, as when it comes to disagreement 
between the parties, it is very difficult to prove the original intent of 
the parties. In bilateral investment treaties we can find a large variety of 
terms that intend to cover the above mentioned and defined194 notion 
of taking. Usually the term expropriation or nationalization is used in 
these agreements.195 However, the term ‘taking’ itself is many times 
used, as well as ‘dispossession’, ‘deprivation’ or ‘privation’.196 Although, 
192 For example, bilateral investment treaties have contributed to the expan-
sion of  a concept of  property in international law to include intellectual 
property rights as well. See Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of  Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties in the Formulation of  Customary International Law, 14 nortHwest-
ern JournaL of InternatIonaL Law and busIness 16 (1993).
193 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 380 (1997).
194 See supra II.A.1.
195 This is based on the examination of  all bilateral investment treaties in force 
concluded by the United States, and by the writing of  scholars like Rudolf  
Dolzer and Margarete Stevens (rudoLf doLzer & margrete stevens, bI-
LateraL Investment treatIes (1995)). It is also true that most BITs do not 
even differentiate between expropriation and nationalization, even though 
we could see in the forgoing that there is substantial difference.
196 See HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe 
der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 48 (1997).
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we are on the opinion that for legal certainty, the heart of the matter 
has to be a precise definition of the term; but at the same time it is also 
important for investors to see what is or can be covered by such definitions 
under the host country’s legal system. Capital exporting countries try 
to define taking as broad as possible. The reason is that host States may 
take measures that do not constitute de jure taking, but they are de 
facto takings.197 Such measures might be extensive taxation, restrictions 
on the repatriation of profit, or obligatory local contents. This is the 
reason that capital exporting States try to cover in these treaties every 
and all kind of measures, even if these actions do not constitute direct 
taking of property. The determination of what may constitute indirect 
expropriation is naturally of significance also to the host State. The host 
State usually tries to exclude indirect expropriatory measures from these 
treaties, and tries to define taking as narrow as possible.
However, we may not forget that whenever it comes to dispute and such 
dispute is taken to arbitration or court, it is the arbitrator or the court 
that interprets the wording of the treaty and gives meaning to it.
2.10. Conclusion
We can see that there are many different definitions for the terms 
mentioned above: taking, expropriation, nationalization, intervention, 
confiscation and creeping expropriation. Generally, we may conclude that 
capital exporting countries try to define the term taking (expropriation, 
nationalization) as general as possible, while capital importing countries 
try to give an interpretation to the term as narrow as possible. As we could 
see, in common usage, the term expropriation is used both in wide and 
narrow sense, as an individual measure for a public purpose, generally 
decided on the basis of a pre-existing law. Nationalization is a matter of 
public policy concerning a state’s internal order. It may affect a whole 
branch of the economy or some of the major enterprises.
197 See supra II.A.5.
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Defining these terms should be the first and basic step towards a secure 
legal environment for foreign investors. These investors want to have 
clear and internationally valid definitions and rules that will protect 
their investments to the maximum extent possible.
In the following chapters we will study three issues of dominant 
importance that arise in connection with taking, and which constitute 
the core of the work: the issue of the right to take property, the issue of 
non-discrimination, and the issue of compensation. Each of the foregoing 
issues will be discussed in a separate chapter.
63
3. The righT To Take ProPerTy and 
‘Public PurPose’
3.1. Introduction
Before examining the requirements of taking of foreign property in 
international law, a short overview of the rules of customary international 
law will be given regarding the treatment of foreigners, and accordingly, 
the treatment of foreign investors. These rules are mainly derived from the 
practice of states (and from different international treaties),198 therefore they 
are not uniform.199 First of all, it is apparent under international customary 
law that in principle (historically) there is no obligation to admit foreigners 
to the territory of sovereign states.200 From this follows that, theoretically, 
there is also no obligation on the state to allow foreigners to undertake 
investments on their territory. However, if they do, it should be borne in 
mind that foreign investors, as a general rule, are subject to national laws.201 
198 Of  course, there are many international treaties that establish some basic 
standards.
199 See zouHaIr kronfoL, ProtectIon of foreIgn Investment 13 (1972); 
Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of  Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 tHe Inter-
natIonaL Lawyer, 655, 660 (1990); Ian brownLIe, PrIncIPLes of 
PubLIc InternatIonaL Law 13-16 (1998).
200 See P. O’Keefe, UN Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 JournaL 
of worLd trade Law 239, 252 (1974); zouHaIr kronfoL, ProtectIon 
of foreIgn Investment 13 (1972); Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The 
Growth of  Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in 
Developing Countries, 24 tHe InternatIonaL Lawyer 655, 660 (1990); gIor-
gIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instruments on 
Investment ProtectIon 321 (1997); wenHua sHan, tHe LegaL Protec-
tIon of foreIgn Investment 27 (2012).
201 “The alien rights are not derived directly from international law, but from 
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Of course, states can voluntarily limit their sovereignty through treaties,202 
and, in this case, investors are also subject to treaties, conventions and, in 
some cases, even to contracts concluded between investors and the host 
state. In general, according to international law, sovereign states have the 
right to expropriate foreign property under certain conditions.203 This is 
supported by several international documents and agreements. The General 
Assembly Resolution 1803 on Permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
is one of the first documents of the United Nations that laid down the 
right of sovereign states to take property. In its Preamble, it emphasizes 
the right of sovereign nations to dispose with their natural resources. In 
its article IV, it explicitly grants the right to states to expropriate foreign 
property.204 Another important document of the United Nations was 
the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order of 1974. This document reinforces the rights granted by the General 
Assembly Resolution 1803 as to “full permanent sovereignty of every state 
over its natural resources and all economic activities”. To achieve this end, 
the Declaration empowers sovereign states to “nationalize or to transfer 
municipal law of  the state of  residence, […]” See zouHaIr kronfoL, Pro-
tectIon of foreIgn Investment 14 (1972); Also supported by gIorgIo sac-
erdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instruments on Invest-
ment ProtectIon 321 (1997).
202 See P. O’Keefe, UN Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 JournaL of 
worLd trade Law 239, 242 (1974).
203 See M. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of Interna-
tIonaL Law 53, 60 (1988); P. O’Keefe, UN Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources, 8 JournaL of worLd trade Law 239, 256 (1974); abI-saab, Per-
manent sovereIgnty over naturaL resources and economIc actIvItIes, 
In InternatIonaL Law: acHIevements and ProsPects 608-609 (1991); Ver-
wey and Schrijver, The taking of  foreign property under international law: a new 
legal perspective? 15 netH. y. b. Int’L 1, 3-9 (1984); xIaodong yang, state 
ImmunIty In InternatIonaL Law 298 (2012).
204 General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of  14 December 1962 on 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources (visited on May 11, 2013) 
<http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/8.shtml>.
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[the] ownership to its nationals”.205 We assume that the expression ‘to its 
nationals’ in the provision of this document must have been inserted to 
emphasize that, primarily, the property of foreign nationals is targeted 
by taking, as, in these countries, mostly the property of the ex-colonizers 
and foreign investors had been taken. This attitude was the result of social 
justice promotion efforts of newly de-colonized countries.206 Taking of 
foreign property was one of the tools for promotion of this ‘justice’. Newly 
de-colonized countries internationally declared and succeeded to make 
the international community to accept the right of sovereign states to 
take property of foreigners. However, this principle is still valid nowadays. 
Another international document of importance for the issue of right of 
sovereign states to take private property is the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States of 1974, which states in its article 2 that ”each state has 
the right: […] to nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign 
property, […]”.207 These documents constitute strong basis and support for 
our claim that sovereign states have the right to take private property, as they 
are primary sources of international law. However, states should be liable 
for the taking of foreign property both under national and international 
law. According to Martin Dixon state responsibility occurs when a state 
“violates an international obligation owed to another state.” Such obligation 
may be derived from a treaty or customary law or may consist of the non-
fulfillment of a binding judicial decision. According to Dixon, responsibility 
may also occur when a state ill-treats the national of another state, and the 
origin of the international obligation is irrelevant for the purposes of state 
responsibility. Furthermore, he states that state responsibility comprises 
205 Art. 4 (e) of  the Declaration on the Establishment of  a New International 
Economic Order (1974). The text of  the declaration can be found at The 
Robinson Rojas Archive web page (visited on Feb. 21, 2011) <http://www.
rrojasdatabank.org/basdv03.htm>.
206 Id. art. 4 (d).
207 Art. 2 of  the Charter of  Economic Rights and Duties of  States, Dalhousie 
University Info page (visited on Apr. 16, 2011) <http://www.dal.ca/~ww-
wlaw/kindred.intllaw/EcRtsandDuties.htm>.
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two elements: an unlawful act, which is attributable to the state.208 At the 
same time, it should be mentioned that a distinction can be made between 
responsibility for lawful and unlawful acts of states according to technical 
literature in the field.209 The basic assumption is that sovereign states can 
take foreign property lawfully only under well-established conditions 
in international law.210 At the beginning, there was no accord regarding 
208 Dixon also states that “It is clear, however, that responsibility may be 
avoided if  the state is able to raise a valid defense. If  not, the consequenc-
es of  responsibility is a liability to make reparation.” See martIn dIxon, 
textbook on InternatIonaL Law, 197 (1993); See also M. Pellonpaa, M. 
Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of InternatIonaL Law 53, 73,74 
(1988). Dixon also writes that: “[…] conduct in international law is judged 
by international rules.” See id. 198. “[…] responsibility can arise from either 
an act or an omission, so long as this causes a breach of  an international 
obligation.” See id. 198. “In order for a state to be fixed with responsibility, 
not only must there be an unlawful act or omission, but that unlawful act 
or omission must be attributable to the state. In other words, it must be an 
unlawful act of  the state itself  and not of  some private individuals acting 
for themselves.” See id. 200. “[…], it should be noted that according to the 
International Law Commission, ‘damage’ is not a precondition of  interna-
tional responsibility. In other words, for responsibility to arise it is enough 
that there has been an internationally unlawful act attributable to the state.” 
See id. 204. “In general, every state is under an obligation not to ill-treat 
foreign nationals present in its territory.” See id. 205.
209 See martIn dIxon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 197-205 (1993); M. 
Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of InternatIonaL Law 
53, 74 (1988).
210 “According to general international law a state is free to adopt measures 
of  expropriation or nationalization of  a foreign investment in its territo-
ry.” See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL In-
struments on Investment ProtectIon 380 (1997); HeIdI bergmann, dIe 
vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe der enteIgnung vertrags-
recHtLIcHer PosItIonen 24 (1997); sebastIán LóPez escarcena, IndIrect 
exProPrIatIon In InternatIonaL Law 4 (2014); See also Pellonpaa M., Fitz-
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these conditions. The United States Supreme Court stated in 1964 that: 
“There are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion 
seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state’s power to expropriate 
the property of aliens.”.211 Circumstances have changed since then, and, 
respecting certain requirements, sovereign states have the power to take 
the property of foreigners. These requirements are the following: the taking 
has to serve public purpose, has to be non-discriminatory, accompanied by 
maurice M., Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal in Netherlands Yearbook of  International Law, Vol. 19, 
(1988) 53-178 at 60. But what constitutes international law? The answer 
for this question we can find in art. 38 (1) o the Statute of  the International 
Court of  Justice, as this provision is usually accepted as constituting a list 
of  the sources of  international law. See Peter maLenczuk, aHeHurst’s 
modern IntroductIon to InternatIonaL Law 36 (7th ed. 1997). These are 
the following sources: (a) international conventions; (b) international cus-
tom, as evidence of  a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general prin-
ciples of  law recognized by civilized nations; (d) judicial decisions and the 
teachings of  the most highly qualified publicists of  the various nations. See 
International Court of  Justice Info page (visited on Nov. 2, 2012) <http://
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/Basetext/istatute.htm>. How-
ever, we can say that bilateral investment treaties are the major instruments 
in international relations related to the protection of  foreign investments. 
E.g., Western countries have concluded more than thousand bilateral trea-
ties promoting and protecting foreign investments to clarify the relevant le-
gal framework. See Peter maLenczuk, aHeHurst’s modern IntroductIon 
to InternatIonaL Law 37 (7th ed. 1997); See also Taylor, J. Michael, The 
United States’ Prohibition On Foreign Direct Investment In Cuba-Enough 
Already?!? 8 SPG L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 111, 118 (2002). Bergmann quotes 
arbitrator Dupuy (original source not available) who wrote the following: 
“The exercise of  the national sovereignty to nationalize is regarded as the 
expression of  the state’s sovereignty.” See HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLker-
recHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLI-
cHer PosItIonen 24 (1997); See also Pellonpaa M., Fitzmaurice M., Taking 
of  Property in the Practice of  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in 
Netherlands Yearbook of  International Law, Vol. 19, (1988) 53-178 at 60.
211 Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 428 (1964).
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appropriate compensation and due process of law should be guaranteed for 
the investor whose property is taken.212 If these conditions are not fulfilled, 
the assumption is that the taking is unlawful.213 
3.2. Standard of treatment of foreign investors
The standard of treatment of foreign investors is closely related to the 
issue of conditions of taking. The strong protection of private property, 
212 Section 712 of  the Restatement (Third) of  the Foreign Relations of  the Unit-
ed States of  America also emphasizes these three basic principles; See also 
raLPH H. foLsom et aL., InternatIonaL busIness transactIons - a Prob-
Lem-orIented coursebook 1020 (3d ed. 1995); martIn dIxon, textbook 
on InternatIonaL Law 214-15 (1993); M. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking 
of  Property in the Practice of  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHer-
Lands yearbook of InternatIonaL Law, 53, 65 (1988); HeIdI bergmann, 
dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe der enteIgnung ver-
tragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 40 (1997); gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL 
treatIes and muLtILateraL Instruments on Investment ProtectIon 381 
(1997); Hans van Houtte, tHe Law of InternatIonaL trade 248 (2002); 
E.g., The International Law Association on August 30, 1986 adopted the 
Seoul Declaration on the Progressive Development of  Principles of  Public 
International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order. Article 
5 (5) of  this Declaration states: “A state may nationalize, expropriate […] 
subject to the principle of  international law requiring a public purpose and 
non-discrimination, and subject to appropriate compensation as required by 
international law and to any applicable treaty […]”. See para. 46 Sola Tiles, 
Inc. v. the Government of  Iran, Award No. 298-317-1.
213 In this case principles applying to state responsibility for a wrongful con-
duct is applicable. See also L. C. A. Barrera, Lack of  Definition of  Compensation 
in International Investment Disputes for Non-Expropriation Claims: Is There an Ap-
propriate Mechanism to Determine It, 10 Revista E-Mercatoria, 81, 84 (2011); 
gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instruments 
on Investment ProtectIon 389 (1997); However, for the purpose of  
compensation a distinction should not be made between lawful and un-
lawful taking of  foreign property. Interview with Prof. David J. Bederman, 
Law Professor, Emory Law School (Apr. 21, 2004).
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as well as property of foreigners, that came into existence in the 19th 
century, following decolonization has lost its strength. Therefore, it was 
desirable for capitalist states to develop and promote in international law 
the so-called minimum standard of protection of foreigners.214 According 
to this theory, there are rights created and defined by international law: 
once a state lets the investor and his investment to enter the country, it 
has to ensure for the investor and his investment the same protection as 
it ensures for its own citizens, and the investor, in addition, has the right 
for protection that is considered fair and equitable under international 
law.215 These rights may be claimed by or on behalf of aliens who were 
214 See rudoLf doLzer, eIgentum, enteIgnung und entscHädIgung Im geL-
tenden vöLkerrecHt [ProPerty, exProPrIatIon and comPensatIon In 
current InternatIonaL Law] 128 (1985); HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLker-
recHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLI-
cHer PosItIonen 39 (1997).
215 Martin Dixon writes about State responsibility the following: “State re-
sponsibility occurs when a State violates an international obligation owed 
to another State. […] The obligation may be derived from a treaty or cus-
tomary law or may consist of  the non-fulfillment of  a binding judicial deci-
sion. Similarly, responsibility may occur when a State ill-treats the national 
of  another State […] The origin of  the international obligation is irrele-
vant for the purposes of  State responsibility. […] In general terms, State 
responsibility comprises two elements: an unlawful act, which is imputable 
[attributable] to the State. It is clear, however, that responsibility may be 
avoided if  the State is able to raise a valid defense. If  not, the consequenc-
es of  responsibility is a liability to make reparation.” See MARTIN DIX-
ON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 197 (1993); See also 
M. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 53, 73,74 (1988). Dixon also writes that: 
“[…] conduct in international law is judged by international rules.” See 
id. 198. “[…] responsibility can arise from either an act or an omission, so 
long as this causes a breach of  an international obligation.” See id. 198. 
“In order for a State to be fixed with responsibility, not only must there 
be an unlawful act or omission, but that unlawful act or omission must be 
attributable to the State. In other words, it must be an unlawful act of  the 
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lawfully admitted to the state and acquired property.216 According to this 
standard, foreigners should be treated in a fair and equitable manner.217 
The theory of minimum standard rejects the Calvo Doctrine, according 
to which aliens have only the same rights as local nationals.218 This 
standard requires more than national treatment of foreign investors, 
because sometimes, national treatment of private property can be poor 
(e.g., Cuba). In other words, the investment recipient state has to respect 
minimal international norms (international public order), irrespectively 
of what is allowed by the municipal law concerning the treatment of 
its own citizens in the case of taking.219 States that do not respect these 
basic principles of minimum standard, and thus harm foreign investors, 
commit international wrong, according to this theory.220
State itself  and not of  some private individuals acting for themselves.” See 
id. 200. “[…], it should be noted that according to the International Law 
Commission, ‘damage’ is not a precondition of  international responsibility. 
In other words, for responsibility to arise it is enough that there has been 
an internationally unlawful act attributable to the State.” See id. 204. “In 
general, every State is under an obligation not to ill-treat foreign nationals 
present in its territory.” See id. 205.
216 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 341 (1997).
217 See id.
218 See Detlev Vagts, Minimum Standard, in 3 encycLoPaedIa of PubLIc Inter-
natIonaL Law 408 (Rudolf  Bernhardt ed., 1997); HeIdI bergmann, dIe 
vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe der enteIgnung vertrags-
recHtLIcHer PosItIonen 40 (1997); martIn dIxon, textbook on Inter-
natIonaL Law 212-13 (1993).
219 See martIn dIxon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 206 (1993); Detlev 
Vagts, Minimum Standard, in 3 encycLoPaedIa of PubLIc InternatIonaL 
Law 408 (Rudolf  Bernhardt ed., 1997); Hans van Houtte, tHe Law of 
InternatIonaL trade 4 (2002).
220 With committing international wrong States become liable. See Hans van 
Houtte, tHe Law of InternatIonaL trade 248 (2002).
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A similar standard to the minimum standard mentioned above is the 
standard of equitable treatment. This requires states to apply their law in a 
“fair, reasonable, equitable and adequate manner” to foreigners.221 Both of 
these standards could be applied without any treaty provision among states.
There is also a standard, called the standard of national treatment in 
international law that is a special one, in connection with the treatment of 
foreign investors, which can be applied only on treaty basis (an exception 
might be if the host state unilaterally grants this treatment). Under this 
treatment, investors should not have less favorable treatment than that 
granted to domestic investors.222
The standard of most favored treatment requires that all the benefits 
conceded to any other investor in the host state, also have to be given 
to the investor under most favored treatment.223 This treatment can be of 
crucial importance if there is a strong international competition present 
in the field of the specific investment.224
Finally, preferential treatment is a kind of exception to the most favored 
treatment, and it is used within custom unions and free trade areas.225
Both international multilateral instruments and bilateral treaties are 
based on the combination of the above-mentioned treatment standards.226
221 See id. at 4.
222 See id.; Also zouHaIr kronfoL, ProtectIon of foreIgn Investment 15 
(1972); gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL In-
struments on Investment ProtectIon 348 (1997).
223 See Hans van Houtte, tHe Law of InternatIonaL trade 5 (2002); zou-
HaIr kronfoL, ProtectIon of foreIgn Investment 16 (1972). wenHua 
sHan, tHe LegaL ProtectIon of foreIgn Investment 21-22 (2012).
224 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 350 (1997).
225 See Hans van Houtte, tHe Law of InternatIonaL trade 6 (2002).
226 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 343-45 (1997).
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It has to be noted, regarding these international standards of treatment 
of foreign investors, that different states apply (depending on whether 
they are investment expropriating or investor states) different standards. 
These standards are laid down in international bilateral or multilateral 
treaties concluded between parties.
3.3. ‘Public purpose’
It is seldom disputed by international legal literature that lawful taking 
should be only for public purpose.227 Many other international documents, 
like multilateral and bilateral treaties, mention this requirement explicitly 
and, almost without exception, require the existence of public purpose 
in the case of taking. This requirement is not only widely accepted in 
227 See e.g., P. O’Keefe, UN Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 Jour-
nal of  World Trade Law 239, 256 (1974); Abi-Saab, Permanent Sover-
eignty over natural resources and economic activities, in international law: 
achievements and prospects 608-609 (1991); Verwey and Schrijver, The 
taking of  foreign property under international law: a new legal perspective? 15 Neth. 
Y. B. Int’l 1, 3-9 (1984); M. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in 
the Practice of  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 Netherlands Yearbook 
of  International Law 54, 65 (1988); Ralph H. Folsom et al., Internation-
al Business Transactions - A Problem-Oriented Coursebook 1020 (3d ed. 
1995); Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law 214-15 (1993); HeIdI 
bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe der enteIg-
nung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 40 (1997); Taylor, J. Michael, The 
United States’ Prohibition On Foreign Direct Investment In Cuba-Enough 
Already?!? 8 SPG L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 111, 125 (2002); gIorgIo sacerdotI, 
bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instruments on Investment Pro-
tectIon 381 (1997); Hans van Houtte, tHe Law of InternatIonaL trade 
248 (2002); m. sornaraJaH, tHe InternatIonaL Law on foreIgn Invest-
ment 395 (2004). Seoul Declaration on the Progressive Development of  
Principles of  Public International Law Relating to a New International 
Economic Order and The Restatement (Third) of  the Foreign Relations 
of  the United States.
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legal doctrine, but has also found expression in state practice.228 Some 
documents use the expression public interest, general interest or public 
utility instead of public purpose with the same meaning. For example, 
the First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, article 1 (Protection of property) states that:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles 
of international law.229
However, more important issue is what is covered by this concept (i.e., 
these terms), than what term is used to express it. It is still not clear 
in international law what should be understood under public purpose, 
that is to say, what is covered by this concept. International legal 
228 See LILLIcH et. aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: Its con-
trIbutIon to tHe Law of state resPonsIbILIty 200 (1998); Folsom, Ralph 
H., International Business Transactions , 2 International Business Trans-
actions § 33.7 (2d ed.) Source: Westlaw; A Project of  the American Soci-
ety of  International Law Interest Group on International Economic Law 
(June 12, 1990) Document III-H World Bank: Report to the Development 
Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of  Foreign Direct Invest-
ment para. 38 (Source: Westlaw). See also art.1 (1) of  the Protocol No. 1 to 
the European Convention on Human Rights and UN General Assembly 
Resolutions 1803.
229 The same article also states that: “The preceding provisions shall not, how-
ever, in any way impair the right of  a state to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of  property in accordance with the general 
interest or to secure the payment of  taxes or other contributions or penal-
ties.”. Art. 1 of  the First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of  
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms European Court of  Human 
Rights (visited on Apr. 5, 2012) <http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/
webConvenENG.pdf>; See also racHeLLe aLterman (ed.), takIngs Inter-
natIonaL 26 (2010).
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instruments do not define this term. Therefore, in the following we try 
to find the answer to the question who and on the basis of what and 
how determines what is public purpose. First, let us see what does the 
academic literature say about this issue. Some authors argue that public 
purpose must principally be directed toward improving the quality of 
life in the nation.230 It might be defined as well as the improvement of 
the social welfare or economic betterment of the nation.231 As a matter 
of fact, public purpose is somehow defined in almost all legal systems 
in legal norms in a certain way (however, it should be noted that these 
are not international but national legal instruments).232 In the United 
States, the legislative defines what is considered public purpose, and 
when there is a dispute, courts have the power to decide on it. In the 
Hawaii Housing Authority case, the Court wrote the following in its 
opinion regarding the issue of public purpose:
We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has 
been known as the police power. An attempt to define 
its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case 
must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially 
230 See raLPH H. foLsom & mIcHaeL w. gordon, InternatIonaL busIness 
transactIons (3d ed. 1995); Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure 
of  the International Court of  Justice 12-13, vol. 1 (1986); f.a. mann, 
studIes In InternatIonaL Law 476 (1973); Kurt J. Hamrock, The ELSI 
Case: Toward an International Definition of  “Arbitrary” Conduct, 27 Tex. 
Int’l L.J. 837 (1992); gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muL-
tILateraL Instruments on Investment ProtectIon 391 (1997); A.F.M. 
Maniruzzaman, state Contracts with Aliens: The Question of  Unilateral 
Change by the state in Contemporary International Law, 9 J. INT’L ARB. 
141, 165-68 (1992); Ian brownLIe, system of tHe Law of natIons: state 
resPonsIbILIty 81 (1983).
231 See raLPH H. foLsom & mIcHaeL w. gordon, InternatIonaL busIness 
transactIons (3d ed. 1995).
232 See HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe 
der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 24 (1997); m. sor-
naraJaH, tHe InternatIonaL Law on foreIgn Investment 316 (1994).
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the product of legislative determinations addressed to 
the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly 
nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject to 
specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature 
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms 
well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the 
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be 
served by social legislation, whether it […] be Congress 
legislating concerning the District of Columbia [..] or the 
States legislating concerning local affairs.[…] This principle 
admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent 
domain is involved.[…].233 
Black’s Law dictionary defines public purpose as ”an action by or at 
the direction of a government for the benefit of the community as a 
whole”.234 We agree with authors who claim that states have to exercise 
good faith concerning the issue and definition of public purpose when 
taking foreign property.235 For example, Sacerdoti argues that although 
233 Id., at 32 (citations omitted). HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY v. MID-
KIFF, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).




235 See A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, state Contracts with Aliens: The Question of  
Unilateral Change by the state in Contemporary International Law, 9 J. 
INT’L ARB. 141, 165-68 (1992); Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Pro-
cedure of  the International Court of  Justice 12-13, vol. 1 (1986); Kurt J. 
Hamrock, The ELSI Case: Toward an International Definition of  “Arbi-
trary” Conduct, 27 Tex. Int’l L.J. 837 (1992); gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILater-
aL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instruments on Investment ProtectIon 
391 (1997); Ian Brownlie, System of  the Law of  Nations: state Responsi-
bility 81 (1983); F.A. Mann, Studies In International Law 476 (1973); The 
Project of  the American Society of  International Law Interest Group on 
International Economic Law (June 12, 1990) Document III-H World Bank: 
Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment 
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public purpose (interest) is superior to contractual undertakings towards 
private parties, expropriation has to be justified and taking must be 
evaluated under a strict good-faith standard.236
Many times, foreign investors argue that public purpose should be 
defined by international law, as this might be more favorable for them 
when it comes to taking of their property in the host state. We are of 
the opinion that international law should have some kind of rational 
public purpose definition laid down in an international instrument 
that is accepted by the international community. Under rational public 
purpose we understand reasons that are beneficial for the wider society, 
respecting human rights. For example, Resolution of the United Nations 
on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1962) states that 
nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning “shall be based on grounds 
or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are 
recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both 
domestic and foreign”.237 This provision defines public interest broadly, 
including public utility, security and national interest. It is also good 
that individual interests are expressly excluded by the wording of the 
Resolution. A similar definition of public purpose could be acceptable 
in our opinion when foreign property is taken by sovereign states.
Important issue is who determines what falls under public purpose (public 
interest, etc.) if the term is not defined, defined vaguely or if there is a 
dispute regarding it. And also the basis on which it should be construed. 
Should it be the court of the host state, the court of the state of origin 
of the investor or maybe some international judicial body?
of  Foreign Direct Investment para. 38 and 48 (Source: Westlaw) also em-
phasises this requirement.
236 See id. at 393.
237 See Human Rights Internet (visited Apr. 5, 2013) <http://www.hri.ca/un-
info/treaties/8.shtml>.
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3.4. The right to take property and the ‘public purpose’ in chosen 
multilateral instruments and in related academic literature
3.4.1. Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
This document recognizes the right of States to take property. The 
document uses the term ‘public interest’ instead of public purpose as one 
of the requirements for taking foreign property. The Energy Charter Treaty 
expressly requires the existence of public interest in case of expropriation:
 Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area 
of any other Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, 
expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having 
effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation 
(hereinafter referred to as “Expropriation”) except where 
such Expropriation is: (a) for a purpose which is in the public 
interest; [emphasis added]238 
However, the Treaty does not give the definition of public purpose, and it 
gives no indication who should determine what is public purpose and on 
what grounds. We could find no case law related to the Energy Charter 
Treaty, thus we cannot examine practical application of this provision 
of the Treaty. However, we can establish that the provision follows the 
standard laid down in earlier multilateral treaties like that of NAFTA 
regarding the requirements of lawful taking of foreign property.
3.4.2. International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
Because of the character of the Convention it itself does not contain 
any provision related to our study. Although, we do not examine the 
Convention itself, we analyze the related case law throughout this work 
that constitutes a very important source of international cases.
238 Art. 13 (1) of  the ECT. ECT info page (visited on March 18, 2005) <www.
encharter.org/upload/1/TreatyBook-en.pdf>.
78
Regarding the issue of the right of States to take foreign property, no 
case questions this right provided the taking is lawful.239
In the case law of the International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes the issue of public purpose (or public interest) was raised in 
the Tecmed case (for the facts of the case see supra). In this case Mexico 
claimed that because of existence of public purpose (environmental 
regulation) it is not obliged to pay compensation. In some sense, the 
Mexican State misused the requirement of public purpose, interpreting 
it as excuse for not paying compensation. However, the Tribunal was on 
the opinion that the environmental regulation was itself an expropriation, 
and the fact that it was taken for environmental reason was only one 
of the requirements of lawful expropriation – i.e., this was the public 
purpose requirement. Thus the Tribunal stated that:  
Expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how 
laudable and beneficial to society as a whole – are, in this 
respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that 
a State may take in order to implement its policies: where 
property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, 
whether domestic or international, the State’s obligation to 
pay compensation remains.240
However, the Tribunal did not give any definition regarding public 
purpose and we could not find any other ICSID case where the issue of 
public purpose was raised. 
239 It is lawful if  it is for public purpose, non-discriminatory, for appropriate 
compensation and with due process.
240 See Para. 121. Award in Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Unit-
ed Mexican States (Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2). ICSID web page (visit-
ed on March 16, 2005) <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/lau-
do-051903%20-English.pdf>.
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3.4.3. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Convention in its article 
11 provides for some kind of public purpose requirement: “measures of 
general application which the governments normally take for the purpose 
of regulating economic activity in their territories”241 This provision 
is very similar to provisions used by national laws when determining 
what should be understood under public purpose (see supra). Actually, 
it authorizes the government of the expropriating State to determine the 
content of public purpose. However, as it can be seen from the above 
quotation, this purpose is restricted to “regulating economic activity”.
3.4.4. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
The North American Free Trade Agreement recognizes the right of 
States to take foreign property. It contains a provision that requires the 
existence of public purpose in case of taking of foreign property:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate 
an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or 
take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation 
of such an investment (“expropriation”), except: 
(a) for a public purpose[.]242
The NAFTA provision regarding its content is very similar to the Energy 
Charter Treaty, thus we presume that this text had influence on the 
drafting of the latter.
241 Art. 11 (a) (ii) MIGA Info page (visited March 10, 2005) <http://www.
miga.org/screens/about/convent/convent.htm>.
242 Art. 1110 of  the NAFTA (visited Apr. 10, 2005) <http://www.naf-
ta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/legal/index_e.aspx?articleid=160#A1110>.
Wilson, an American author, examines the issue of the definition of 
public purpose in connection with the Ethyl Corporation v. Canada 
case.243 Invoking Shrybman, he states that public purpose might have 
broad application and is basically concluding that this requirement is 
essentially “not subject to effective reexamination by other States”.244
We did a profound research regarding the issue of public purpose in 
NAFTA case law and related academic literature. Our research covered 
NAFTA cases published at NAFTALaw.org245 web page and several 
Westlaw databases246. However, we found no other case where this issue 
was discussed.
3.4.5. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – 
“Multilateral Agreement on Investment” Proposal (MAI)
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment Proposal also recognizes the 
right of States to take foreign property and contains the requirement 
of public interest:
A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalize 
directly or indirectly an investment in its territory of an 
investor of another Contracting Party or take any measure 
243 Wilson analyses the possible outcome of  the case.
244 See Wilson, Timothy Ross: Trade Rules: Ethyl Corporation V. Canada 
(NAFTA Chapter 11) Part II: Are Fears Founded? 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. 
Rev. Am. 205, 215-16 (2000).
245 See NAFTALaw.org web page (visited May 15, 2005) <http://www.nafta-
law.org/>.
246 The following databases were discussed: Dictionary of  NAFTA Terms 
(NAFTATERMS); North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); 
Enhanced Text of  NAFTA (NAFTATEXT); International Business 
Transactions (INTBUSTRAN); International Commercial Arbitration 
Treaties (ICA-TREATIES); Latin American Mexico and NAFTA Report 
(LANAFTAR); North American Free Trade Agreement – Bi-national Pan-
el (NAFTA-BIP); Law & Business Review of  the Americas (LBUSRAM).
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or measures having equivalent effect (hereinafter referred to 
as “expropriation”) except:
a) for a purpose which is in the public interest247
Given that the agreement still did not enter into force, there is no 
related case law or comments on the implication of the above provision. 
Hopefully, it will enter into force soon and after passing the test of time 
it will show if it works.
3.5. The right to take property and the ‘public purpose’ in bilateral 
investment treaties and in related academic literature
Bilateral investment treaties examined, likewise multilateral treaties, 
recognize the right of States to take property of foreigners. Capital 
exporting States have leading role in insuring their investments through 
bilateral investment treaties (however, this is not the only mean, there 
are also insurance and guarantee systems).248 Some authors argue that 
in and through bilateral investment treaties developed States do not 
want to question the right of the other States to take foreign property. 
They only want to secure the respect of substantive and procedural 
requirements prescribed by international law concerning redemption in 
case of taking.249 Examining bilateral investment treaties concluded by 
the United States we find the above assertion to be true. These treaties 
do not question the right of sovereign States to take foreign property.
According to the study of United Nations Center on Transnational 
Corporations on bilateral investment treaties, “practically all” of examined 
247 Art. IV.2.1.a. The MAI Negotiating Text OECD Info page (visited Apr. 10, 
2005) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/40/1895712.pdf>.
248 HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe der 
enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 22 (1997).
249 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 380 (1997); rudoLf doLzer & mar-
grete stevens, bILateraL Investment treatIes (1995).
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treaties subject expropriation of foreign property to the four ‘classical’ 
conditions, that is: public purpose, non-discrimination, compensation and 
judicial review.250 It means that the concept of public purpose251 can be 
found in “practically all bilateral investment treaties.”252 The same study 
states, supporting our previous claims, that there is no agreed definition 
of public interest in international law nor is there a standard definition 
common to all national legal systems.253 The study also ascertained that 
when there is disagreement between an investor and the investment 
recipient State, it is usually international arbitral body that has to decide 
on what should be regarded as public purpose.254 However, the same 
study came to the conclusion that in practice international arbitral bodies 
grant countries relatively wide discretion to define what falls under the 
definition of public purpose (interest), as according to this study it is 
widely accepted that national legislation should determine what is and 
what is not public purpose.255
3.6. The right to take property and the ‘public purpose’: case law
One of the cases dealing with the issue of public purpose is the case of 
James and others v. the United Kingdom. In this case, James and others 
represented the Westminster Family Trust against the United Kingdom. 
A legislative act of the United Kingdom entitled tenants (only with long 
term lease contract) of certain properties owned by the Trust to become 
owners on price determined on the basis of conditions given by the 
250 See unIted natIons centre on transnatIonaL corPoratIons, bILateraL 
Investment treatIes, 76 (1988).
251 Many times different terminology is used, like: public interest, public bene-
fit, national interest, social interest. See unIted natIons centre on trans-
natIonaL corPoratIons, bILateraL Investment treatIes, 76-77 (1988).
252 See unIted natIons centre on transnatIonaL corPoratIons, bILateraL 
Investment treatIes 76 (1988).




legislation. In many cases, the Trust (lessor) provided the land for the 
tenants (lessees) to build houses on it on their own cost, which did not 
become their property. They were only leasing it on long term. As the 
property of the Westminster family was affected by this legislation, the 
representatives of the Family Trust claimed that the compulsory transfer 
was against article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.256 The 
European Court on Human Rights ruled for the defendant, and stated 
that: “Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the 
national authorities are in principle better placed than the international 
judge to appreciate what is in the public interest.”.257 The only limit 
set up by the court was that this appreciation has to “[…] respect the 
legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in the public interest’ unless that 
judgment be manifestly without reasonable foundation”.258 The judgment 
clearly supports the idea that public purpose should be determined by 
national courts based on the norms of the national legislation.259
Examining further international case law, we can see that it also supports 
the assumption that one of the prerequisites for lawful taking is the 
existence of a public purpose.260 However, similarly to the case above, 
the definition of public purpose is not always clear. Thus, some awards 
256 James and Others v. the United Kingdom, published in A98 (visited 
on Oct. 14, 2013) <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.as-
p?Item=12&Action=Html&X=121025707&Notice=0&Noticemode=& 
RelatedMode=0>.
257 Id. para. 46
258 Id. 
259 This is also supported by authors (e.g., Taylor, J. Michael, The United States’ 
Prohibition On Foreign Direct Investment In Cuba-Enough Already?!? 8 
SPG L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 111, 125 (2002).
260 See Pellonpaa M., Fitzmaurice M., Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of Interna-
tIonaL Law 53-178, 60 (1988). See also Eisenber, Andra: “Public purpose” 
and Expropriation: Some Comparative Insights and the South African Bill 
of  Rights, 11 South African Journal on Human Rights 207-209 (1995).
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of the Iran - US Claims Tribunal expressly state that it is in the ambit 
of the host state to determine this term.261 Therefore it is not easy to 
cast doubt on the existence of this requirement in certain cases, as it 
would be, at the same time, question of the policy of a sovereign state.262 
Thus, international tribunals usually do not examine the existence of 
this prerequisite, so to say, they take it for granted.263
However, returning to the practice of the Iran – United States Tribunal, 
on the bases of the examined cases, we can say that the existence of 
public purpose was always required, but did not play a decisive role, as 
it was rarely used as base of dispute.264 At the same time, the Tribunal 
confirmed the continuing existence of this requirement.265 For example, 
in the American International Group case,266 the Tribunal stated that it 
cannot be held that the “[…] nationalization of Iran America was by itself 
unlawful, either under customary international law or under the Treaty 
of Amity […], as there is not sufficient evidence before the Tribunal to 
show that the nationalization was not carried out for a public purpose 
as part of a larger reform program […]“.
In the case of the Amoco International Finance Corporation the Tribunal 
stated that there is no definition for public purpose “agreed upon in 
international law nor even suggested”.267 Furthermore, it stated that “as a 
261 Pellonpaa M., Fitzmaurice M., Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in Netherlands Yearbook of  Interna-
tional Law, Vol. 19, (1988) 53-178 at 62.
262 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 387 (1997).
263 See id.
264 See LILLIcH et. aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: Its contrI-
butIon to tHe Law of state resPonsIbILIty 201 (1998).
265 See id. at 202-205.
266 American Int’l Group, Inc. and Islamic Republic of  Iran, 4 C.T.R. 96 and 
105 (1983-III)
267 15 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 189, Amoco International Finance Corporation v. the 
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result of the modern acceptance of the right to nationalize, this term is broadly 
interpreted, and that states, in practice, are granted extensive discretion”.268
Similar view was taken in the INA Corporation and Islamic Republic of Iran 
case regarding the requirement of existence of public purpose.269 In 1981 
INA Corporation (INA), a United States corporation incorporated under 
the laws of Pennsylvania, filed with the Tribunal a claim for compensation 
for the expropriation of its 20 percent shareholding in Bimeh Shargh 
(public joint-stock company) (Shargh), an Iranian insurance company. 
INA claimed USD 285,000 representing what it alleged to be the going 
concern value of its shares, together with interest at 17 percent and legal 
costs. The issue in this case was not if expropriation happened, but the 
determination of the level of compensation for the taken property. At the 
same time, in the INA Corporation case, the separate opinion of Judge 
Lagergren clearly states the requirement of public purpose: “It is generally 
accepted that some types of expropriation are inherently unlawful - among 
these one can cite cases in which foreign assets are taken […] for something 
other than a public purpose”.270 However, this case did not deal with the 
issue of who determines what is considered to be public purpose.
In the case law of the International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, the issue of public purpose (or public interest) was raised 
in the Tecmed case. In this case Mexico claimed that, because of the 
existence of public purpose (environmental regulation) it is not obliged 
to pay compensation. In a certain way, the Mexican State misused the 
requirement of public purpose, interpreting it as an excuse for not paying 
compensation. The Tribunal was of the opinion that the environmental 
Government of  the Islamic Republic of  Iran, award no. 310-56-3, 1987 
para. 145.
268 Id. para. 145, 146.
269 INA Corporation and Islamic Republic of  Iran 8 C.T.R. 373 (1985-I).
270 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 373, INA Corporation v. the Government of  the Islamic 
Republic of  Iran, award no. 184-161-1, 1985, para. Separate Opinion of  
Judge Lagargren.
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regulation was itself an expropriation. However, the fact that the proprty 
was taken for environmental reasons was only one of the requirements 
of lawful expropriation – i.e., this was the public purpose requirement. 
Thus, the Tribunal stated that:
Expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how 
laudable and beneficial to society as a whole – are, in this 
respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that 
a state may take in order to implement its policies: where 
property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, 
whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation to 
pay compensation remains.271
However, the Tribunal did not give any definition regarding public 
purpose and no other ICSID case was found during the research, where 
the issue of public purpose was raised.
Wilson, an American author, examined the issue of the definition of 
public purpose in connection with the Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, a 
NAFTA case. Invoking Shrybman, he stated that public purpose might 
have broad application and concludes that this requirement is essentially 
“not subject to effective reexamination by other States”.272
3.7. Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, we can conclude that the requirement 
of public purpose, in the case of taking foreign property, undoubtedly 
271 Para. 121. Award in Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Unit-
ed Mexican States (Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2). ICSID web page (visit-
ed on March 16, 2011) <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/lau-
do-051903%20-English.pdf>.
272 See Wilson, Timothy Ross: Trade Rules: Ethyl Corporation V. Canada 
(NAFTA Chapter 11) Part II: Are Fears Founded? 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. 
Rev. Am. 205, 215-16 (2000).
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exists in international law. In practice, many different expressions are 
used to denote public purpose; however, it is generally of no relevance. 
The real issue is how to define public purpose. We have seen that there 
is no general definition of public purpose in international law. The 
determination of what is considered public purpose is left to national 
legal systems and national courts. Thus, it seems that sovereign states 
have broad power to determine the content of public purpose based on 
legislative norm in good faith. The examined case law also supports our 
findings. The little case law that is related to this issue show that courts 
and tribunals are reluctant to re-examine the definition of public purpose 
given by state legislations. However, it has to be based on legislation 
respecting the principle of good faith. We have also noticed that, in the 
case of expropriation, public purpose is the least tested requirement of all.
Considering all the arguments, we believe that it would be useful to 
have some kind of definition of public purpose created and accepted by 
the wider international community that would give an unambiguous 
definition of public purpose or at least clear guidelines for international 
tribunals as to what should fall under public purpose.
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4. The PrinciPle of non-discriminaTion
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we will show that the principle of non-discrimination, 
as a requirement in the case of taking foreign property, is a generally 
accepted principle in international law. Non-discrimination is, in fact, 
the principle of equal treatment in international law expressed in negative 
form. As regards to the requirement of non-discrimination, a specific 
question is whether this treatment should be applied to the relationship 
between nationals and foreigners, between foreigners and foreigners or 
to both relationships. In our opinion, and also in the opinion of some 
authors, in both cases discriminative treatment tends to be considered 
forbidden under international law.273 Otherwise, the basic principle of 
freedom of competition would be infringed. Thus, we can talk about 
discrimination if the measure is directed against a particular party, and 
for reasons unrelated to the substance of the matter, persons in the same 
situation are treated in a not equivalent manner.274
273 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 388 (1997); Maniruzzaman, A. F. M.: 
Expropriation of  Alien Property and the Principle of  Non-Discrimination in Inter-
national Law of  Foreign Investment: An Overview. JournaL of transnatIon-
aL Law and PoLIcy Fall, 57 (1998); Ian brownLIe, system of tHe Law 
of natIons: state resPonsIbILIty 81 (1983); However, if  discriminative 
treatment (in regulatory mechanisms) is based on legitimate grounds, it is 
considered legitimate. See m. sornaraJaH, InternatIonaL Law of foreIgn 
Investment 380 (2004).
274 See kronfoL, zouHaIr a., ProtectIon of foreIgn Investment 25 (1972); 
gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instruments 
on Investment ProtectIon 390 (1997).
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4.2. The principle of non-discrimination
Based on our research (documents referred to in this very chapter), 
we found that discriminatory treatment of foreign investment, in the 
case of taking foreign property, is not accepted. However, it should be 
mentioned that opinions regarding the issue of non-discrimination were 
not as uniform a few decades ago as they are nowadays. Following the 
Second World War, when many former colonies became independent, 
there were some opinions in international legal literature that supported 
discrimination with the following justification:
[D]eveloping countries, which had to rebuild their national 
economies from the legacy left by colonialism, were not prepared 
to accept, equally with the highly developed countries, an 
obligation to guarantee the same economic rights to their 
nationals and to non-nationals. That was not discrimination; 
but it would be discrimination to compel countries of 
unequal strength to carry the same load. The developing 
countries held inevitably to correct the consequences of the 
discrimination practiced under the colonial regime by taking 
certain measures which might conflict with the interests of a 
privileged minority.275
In our understanding, this is a certain kind of affirmative action that is aimed 
to restore equality between newly de-colonized countries and developed 
countries. However, such arguments are more socio-political considerations 
than legal, and therefore cannot give legal foundation for discriminatory 
275 Summary of  Records of  Meetings of  3d Committee, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Comm., 17th Sess., at 358, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1206 (1962); This opinion 
is also supported by: Sornarajah (M. SORNARAJAH, The Pursuit Of  Na-
tionalized Property 187 (1986)); Baade (Hans W. Baade, Permanent Sov-
ereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources, in Essays on Expropriation 
24 (Richard S. Miller & Roland J. Stanger eds., 1967)); Schachter (Oscar 
Schachter, Sharing the World’s Resources, in International Law: A Con-
structive Perspective 525, 528 (R. Falk ed., 1985)).
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taking. Moreover, in our opinion, such discriminatory treatment can lead 
to unjust economic advantages and unfair competition both on local and 
global levels. Such socio-political considerations must be the reason why 
the United Nations Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties do not mention 
the principle of non-discrimination.276 The issue of discrimination was a 
very sensitive one in the decades following the de-colonization. Capital 
exporting countries secured non-discriminatory treatment for their investors 
through bilateral investment treaties. A good example is the United States 
of America. This way, newly de-colonized countries preserved their face 
and, at the same time, complied with the requirements of investors.
Contrarily to developing countries, American and other western authors 
emphasize the importance of the principle of non-discrimination when 
taking foreign property.277 The reason must be that the United States is 
276 U.N. GAOR, 17th Session, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); A/RES/3281 
(XXIX) art 2.; United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library (visited on 
10. Oct. 2012) <http://daccessods.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/
NR0/738/83/IMG/NR073883.pdf?OpenElement>; cHarLes n. brow-
er & JoHn b. tePe, tHe cHarter of economIc rIgHts and  tHe Interna-
tIonaL Lawyer 306 (Vol. 9, 1975).
277 See P. C. Choharis, U.S. Courts and the International Law of  Expropriation: Toward 
a New Model for Breach of  Contract, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2006-2007); Ken-
neth Robert Redden ed.: Modern Legal Systems Cyclopedia. North America. 
Vol. 1A. Buffalo, New York, USA: William S. Hein & Co. Law Publisher, 
1988, p. 1.A.30.10; Nevertheless, the United States itself  does not respect 
the principle of  non-discrimination. In theory, constitutional protection is 
guaranteed for any person, citizen or alien in the United States, but according 
to Redden, practice shows that judges are more likely to protect only resident 
aliens (See at 1.A.30.12). Non-resident aliens are subject to the protection of  
the Fifth Amendment only when fundamental human rights are involved 
(See Kenneth Robert Redden ed.: Modern Legal Systems Cyclopedia. North 
America. Vol. 1A. Buffalo, New York, USA: William S. Hein & Co. Law Pub-
lisher, 1988, p. 1A.30.12); This raises the question of  whether property rights 
can be treated as fundamental human rights. Article 1 of  the First Protocol 
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the biggest foreign investor in the world, and therefore, it is of crucial 
importance for it to get equal treatment with other investors. Besides, as 
already mentioned, discriminatory treatment disables free competition.
to the Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms ensures the peaceful enjoyment of  property (First Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Article 1 – Protection of  property: “Every natural or legal person 
is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of  his possessions. No one shall be 
deprived of  his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of  international 
law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right 
of  a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of  
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of  
taxes or other contributions or penalties” (visited on July 22, 2012) <http://
www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf>) In the case of  cor-
porations, there is also a distinction made between corporations registered 
in the United States and corporations registered in other countries. (See Ken-
neth Robert Redden ed.: Modern Legal Systems Cyclopedia. North America. 
Vol. 1A. Buffalo, New York, USA: William S. Hein & Co. Law Publisher, 
1988, p. 1A.30.12; “There has always been considerable support for the view 
[in international public law] that the alien can only expect equality of  treat-
ment under the local law because he submits to local conditions with benefits 
and burdens and because to give the alien a special status would be contrary 
to the principles of  territorial jurisdiction and equality. Before examining the 
validity of  the principle of  national treatment, it must be observed that it is 
agreed on all hands that certain sources of  inequality are admissible.” Ian 
brownLIe, PrIncIPLes of PubLIc InternatIonaL Law 526 (5th ed. 1998). “A 
state may place conditions on the entry of  an alien on its territory and may 
restrict acquisition of  certain kinds of  property by aliens.” “Apart from such 
restrictions, an alien individual, or a corporation controlled by aliens, may 
acquire title to property within a state under the local law.” Ian brownLIe, 
PrIncIPLes of PubLIc InternatIonaL Law 534 (5th ed. 1998)).
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4.3. Principle of non-discrimination in chosen multilateral 
instruments and in related academic literature
In this part we scrutinize chosen international multilateral treaties to 
examine whether they contain provision regarding non-discrimination of 
foreign investments or any other provision from which such conclusion 
can be drawn. 
4.3.1. Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
The Energy Charter Treaty does expressly states that foreign investment 
may not be taken in discriminatory way:
Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any 
other Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated 
or subjected to a measure or measures having effect equivalent 
to nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Expropriation’) except where such Expropriation is:
[…]
(b) not discriminatory;278
This is an important legal guarantee for investors whose home country 
has signed the Agreement. 
4.3.2. International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
We scrutinized ICSID case law, and could not find any case in which 
the issue was related to the principle of non-discrimination. This might 
mean that there are no such cases, as States expropriating do care not 
to violate this principle. This fact might indirectly support the opinion 
that the non-discrimination principle became a well-established principle 
of international law.
278 Art. 13 (1) of  the ECT (visited June 14, 2004) <http://www.encharter.
org/upload/1/TreatyBook-en.pdf>.
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4.3.3. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
Article 11 of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency agreement 
supports our claim that the principle of non-discrimination is 
internationally recognized and widely used in international treaties.
[A]ny legislative action or administrative action or omission 
attributable to the host government which has the effect 
of depriving the holder of a guarantee of his ownership or 
control of, or a substantial benefit from, his investment, with 
the exception of non-discriminatory measures of general 
application which the governments normally take for the 
purpose of regulating economic activity in their territories279
4.3.4. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
The same principle can be found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement that states the following:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate 
an investment of an investor of another [p]arty in its territory or 
take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation 
of such an investment (“expropriation”), except:
[…]
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis280
279 Art. 11 (a) (ii) MIGA Info page (visited Apr. 5, 2005) <http://www.miga.
org/screens/about/convent/convent.htm>.




4.3.5. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – 
“Multilateral Agreement on Investment” Proposal (MAI)
The language of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment Proposal is very 
similar to that of the NAFTA. This proposal also rejects discrimination:
A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalize 
directly or indirectly an investment in its territory of an 
investor of another Contracting Party or take any measure 
or measures having equivalent effect (hereinafter referred to 
as “expropriation”) except:
[…]
b) on a non-discriminatory basis,281
4.4. Principle of non-discrimination in bilateral investment treaties 
and in related academic literature
Reference to the requirement of non-discrimination is generally included 
in bilateral investment treaties.282 Concerning the non-discrimination 
principle (condition) most bilateral investment treaties examined by the 
United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations either stipulate 
that taking (expropriation or nationalization) shall not be discriminatory, 
or they provide for most-favored-nation treatment, or sometimes both.283 
Bilateral investment treaties examined by us show that the principle of 
non-discrimination in case of taking of foreign property is requirement 
in these treaties.
281 Art. IV.2.1.b. The MAI Negotiating Text OECD Info page <http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/46/40/1895712.pdf>
282 See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL Instru-
ments on Investment ProtectIon 386 (1997). See also examined treaties 
infra IV.C.1. and IV.C.2.
283 See unIted natIons centre on transnatIonaL corPoratIons, bILateraL 
Investment treatIes, 76 (1988).
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4.5. Principle of non-discrimination: case law
The existence of the requirement of non-discrimination is confirmed by 
international case law.284 However, it has to be admitted that, during our 
research, we found only a few cases dealing with this issue. At the same 
time, none of these cases rebutted the principle of non-discrimination.
In one of the cases of the Iran - US Claims Tribunal, the Amoco 
International Finance Corporation case, the Tribunal stated that 
discrimination is “widely held as prohibited by customary international 
law in the field of expropriation”.285 In this case, Amoco, an American 
corporation, had a joint-venture (Khemco) with the Iranian National 
Petrochemical Company (NPC) in the petrochemical industry.286 
Following the Iranian revolution, all American interests in petrochemical 
joint-ventures were expropriated, including that of Amoco.287 Whereas, 
in another of NPC’s joint-venture with a Japanese company, the Japanese 
share was not taken. 288 Therefore, Amoco argued that the fact that 
another joint-venture in the same economic branch had not been taken is 
discriminatory and therefore it had been unlawful expropriation.289 In its 
decision the Tribunal accepted that the principle of non-discrimination 
284 In American International Group and in Amoco cases. See also Pellonpaa 
M., Fitzmaurice M., Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal in Netherlands Yearbook of  International Law, Vol. 
19, (1988) 53-178 at 63-64). Lillich, Richard B., Daniel Barstow Magraw 
ed.: The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: its contribution to the law of  
state responsibility. Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 
c1998.at 205-207.
285 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 189, Amoco International Finance Corporation v. the 
Government of  the Islamic Republic of  Iran award no. 310-56-3, 1987 
para. 140.
286 Id. para. 28, 29 and 30.
287 Id. para. 139.
288 Id.
289 Id. para. 139 and 142.
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should be respected in the case of expropriation of foreign property, 
however, at the same time, it stated that characteristics of some cases 
could justify different treatment:
The Tribunal finds it difficult, in the absence of any other 
evidence, to draw the conclusion that the expropriation of a 
concern was discriminatory only from the fact that another 
concern in the same economic branch was not expropriated. 
Reasons specific to the non-expropriated enterprise, or to the 
expropriated one, or to both, may justify such a difference of 
treatment […]. In the present Case, the peculiarities discussed 
by the Parties can explain why IJPC was not treated in the 
same manner as Khemco. The Tribunal declines to find that 
Khemco’s expropriation was discriminatory.290
The ‘peculiarities’ referred to by the Tribunal were the two issues brought 
by the defendant as defense. The first one is that the operation of the 
IJPC joint venture was not closely linked with other contracts relating 
to the exploitation of oil fields, whereas the operation of the Khemco 
plant was linked to the supply of gas from the oil fields operated jointly 
by Amoco and NIOC.291 The second, that the Japanese-Iranian joint-
venture was not yet an operational concern at the relevant time.292 In 
our opinion, these are weak arguments. First of all, both companies 
were working (or at least were planning to work) in the same economic 
branch. Thus, we should not place emphasis on the fact that the Japanese 
joint-venture did not conclude specific contracts for the supply of gas. 
And secondly, the joint-venture was existing legally between the Japanese 
and the Iranian company, whether operating or not at the relevant time. 
However, it might easily be that the reason why it was not operating 
was the political situation in Iran.
290 Id. para. 142.
291 Id. para. 141.
292 Id.
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In another case, the one of the INA Corporation, the issue was not the 
non-discrimination requirement. However, the separate opinion of Judge 
Lagergren clearly refers to the requirement of non-discrimination as one of 
the requirements of lawful taking of foreign property: “It is generally accepted 
that some types of expropriation are inherently unlawful - among these one 
can cite cases in which foreign assets are taken on a discriminatory basis.”293
4.6. Conclusion
Based on the findings above, it can be concluded that the principle of 
non-discrimination, in the case of taking of foreign property is a generally 
accepted principle of international law nowadays. Though, during the 
sixties and seventies, following the last phase of de-colonization, there were 
views that, under certain circumstances, discrimination may be allowed. 
However, the majority of authors support the idea that discriminatory 
taking of foreign property is unlawful. This is not only supported by 
legal writers, but also by international multilateral and bilateral treaties, 
and the related case law examined.
In a free market economy, discrimination is impediment to free 
competition. Notwithstanding, such discriminatory treatment happens 
usually when a government wants to win the political support of its own 
nationals, strengthen national economy, or simply needs revenue by 
expropriating foreign property. At the same time, there are also examples 
for discrimination between foreigners, e.g., when the government prefers 
and treats better strategic investors or investors from countries with 
political influence on the expropriating government. However, on long 
term, it cannot be profitable.
293 In this case, following the revolution, the Iranian state expropriated the 
share (20%) owned by INA Corporation (INA), a United States corpora-
tion, in an Iranian insurance company. See 8 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 373, INA 
Corporation v. the Government of  the Islamic Republic of  Iran award no. 
184-161-1, 1985 para. Separate Opinion of  Judge Lagargren.
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5. comPensaTion for The Taken ProPerTy
5.1. Development of compensation theories
As it has been already showed in previous chapters, the right of sovereign 
states to exercise power on their territory and to take (expropriate) foreign 
property is recognized in international law. That is to say, we proceed from 
the assumption that the majority of states294 recognize the lawfulness of 
expropriation provided the taking is non-discriminatory, there is a public 
purpose and there is compensation for the taken property.295 In the previous 
294 This is also recognized by many constitutions of  independent states, several 
international documents, international arbitral awards, and by the majority 
of  authors dealing with the issue. See HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHt-
LIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer 
PosItIonen 47 (1997); martIn dIxon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 
213-14 (1993); M. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Prac-
tice of  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of 
InternatIonaL Law 53, 60 (1988).
295 See unIted natIons centre on transnatIonaL corPoratIons, bILateraL 
Investment treatIes 70 (1988); Ian brownLIe, PrIncIPLes of PubLIc In-
ternatIonaL Law 535 (5tH ed. 1998); martIn dIxon, textbook on Inter-
natIonaL Law 215 (1993); M. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property 
in the Practice of  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands year-
book of InternatIonaL Law 53, 69 (1988); It is interesting to mention that 
in the text of  the First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of  
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (art. 1 of  the First Protocol 
to the Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, ECHR Info page (visited on June 14, 2012) <http://www.echr.
coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf>) there is no explicit reference 
to the duty of  states to compensate (if  ”the conditions provided for by 
law” ensure such right then there is). However, the European Court of  
Human Rights stated that there is obligation of  compensation of  the state, 
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chapters, we have seen several proofs that the existence of public purpose 
and of non-discrimination is an indispensable requirement of lawful taking 
of foreign property. In this chapter, we will examine what standards of 
compensation exist as requirement of lawful taking, and if there is common 
agreement in international law on this issue. Indeed, the majority of states 
recognize that some form of compensation is due for taken foreign property. 
The dispute is usually about the standard of compensation.296 Therefore, in 
and this obligation has to be of  reasonable amount. See tamas ban, A 
TulAjdonjog Vedelme Az emberi jogok europAi egyezmenyeben [The 
proTecTion of righT To properTy in The europeAn humAn righTS con-
VenTion], in csaLad, tuLaJdon es emberI Jogok [famILy, ProPerty and 
Human rIgHts] 132 (1999).
296 Since, according to international law, every violation of  an international ob-
ligation creates the duty to make reparation. The principle of  restitution or 
compensation is also included in the Draft articles on Responsibility of  States 
for internationally wrongful acts of  the International Law Commission:
 “A state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation 
to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before 
the wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution:
 (a) is not materially impossible;
 (b) does not involve a burden out of  all proportion to the benefit deriving 
from restitution instead of  compensation.
 The state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obliga-
tion to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage 
is not made good by restitution.
 The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including 
loss of  profits insofar as it is established.”
 See art. 35 and 36 of  Draft articles on Responsibility of  States for interna-
tionally wrongful acts adopted by the International Law Commission at its 
fifty-third session (2001), UN Info page (visited on Sep. 28, 2012) <http://
www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/state_responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm>; See 
also L. C. A. Barrera, Lack of  Definition of  Compensation in International Invest-
ment Disputes for Non-Expropriation Claims: Is There an Appropriate Mechanism 
to Determine It, 10 Revista E-Mercatoria, 81 (2011); HeIdI bergmann, dIe 
vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe der enteIgnung vertrags-
recHtLIcHer PosItIonen 24 (1997).
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the following, the emphasis will be placed on the analysis of the standard 
of compensation in the case of taking foreign property.
In the first part of this chapter, we examine the development of 
compensation theories and the current state of international law concerning 
the issue of compensation in the case of taking property of foreign 
investors. The development of compensation theories will be examined 
through the two most important international landmark cases (the 
Norwegian Shipowners’ Claim Case and the Chorzow Factory Case), 
the Hull and Calvo Doctrines and the documents of the United Nations 
related to the protection of foreign property. Following this, we will give 
a general overview of the current state of international law and practice in 
the field, with special emphasis on the Restatement of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States and the work of the Iran – United States Claims 
Tribunal. During this examination, besides international legal sources 
and the above-mentioned ones, the opinion of distinguished authors in 
the field of international law will be invoked. This historical overview will 
help us to find out what compensation standard is the most acceptable 
and recognized in international law.
Many issues and questions can arise in connection with compensation; 
however it is beyond the scope of this book to examine all these issues. 
Thus, we will concentrate only on the most important ones when focusing 
on the development of compensation theories. The first of these will be 
the issue of the applicable law (whether this is the law of the host state, 
the investor’s home state or maybe some other source of law). The next 
important issue will be the standard of compensation. There is a strong 
interdependence between the standard of compensation and the method 
of valuation, thus the issue of valuation standard will be also examined. 
And finally, we will take a look at the form and the time of payment 
of the compensation. We begin our discussion with the first landmark 
case in the history of the development of compensation standards in 
international law.
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5.1.1. Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case – ‘ just’ compensation
The first well-known international case related to compensation of 
expropriated foreign property was the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims 
case, in which the arbitrators decided that just compensation should 
be paid.297 In 1917 the United States entered the First World War. The 
President of the United States was authorized to order the cancellation of 
shipbuilding contracts, the taking of legal title to ships and the requisition 
of shipyards in the United States in return for just compensation.298 This 
297 Kevin Smith, The Law of  Compensation for Expropriated Companies and the Valu-
ation Methods Used to Achieve That Compensation. Law & Valuation. Spring 2001, 
(visited on May 20, 2012) <http://www.law.wfu.edu/courses/Law&val-
ue-Palmiter/Papers/2001/Smith.htm>; We have to note that the govern-
ment of  the United States originally also promised, and later even offered 
just compensation, though this was a much lower amount that the one de-
termined by the Tribunal. See Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims Case (Nor. v. 
U.S.), 1 Reporters of  International Arbitral Awards (UN) 313-14 (1948).
298 Excerpt from the award: “It is common ground between the Parties to this 
arbitration that the fifteen claims against the United States are presented 
by the Government of  the Kingdom of  Norway, which Government, and 
not the individual claimants, “is the sole claimant before this Tribunal”. L 
‘ The claims arise out of  certain actions of  the United States of  America 
in relation to ships which were building in the United States for Norwe-
gian subjects at a time, during the recent Great War, when the demand for 
ships was enormous, owing to the needs of  the armies and to the losses 
of  mercantile ships. For some time before the United States declared war, 
the shortage of  shipping was serious both in European countries and in 
the United States. In these circumstances, Norwegian subjects, amongst 
others, directed their attention to the possibilities of  shipbuilding in the 
United States. From July 1915 onwards, various contracts were placed by 
Norwegian subjects with shipyards in the United States. Meanwhile, from 
the summer of  1916 onwards, the United States Government took a series 
of  steps for the protection of  its interests and these steps made possible 
the later “mobilisation for war purposes of  the commercial and industrial 
resources of  the United States”. […] On the 4th of  March 1917 (after the 
severance of  diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany 
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action affected Norwegian ship owners as well, who were promised just 
compensation for the physical property taken.299 However, Norway 
on February 3rd, 1917), a Naval Emergency Fund Act was passed. This 
Act authorized and empowered the President, “in addition to all other ex-
isting provisions of  law” within the limits of  the appropriation available, 
“to place an order with any person for such ships or war material as the 
necessities of  the Government, to be determined by the President, may 
require and which are of  the nature, kind, and quantity usually produced or 
capable of  being produced by such person.” Such orders were given prec-
edence over all other orders and compliance was made obligatory. In the 
case of  noncompliance, the President was authorized to “take immediate 
possession of  any factory3 or of  any part thereof.”5 The President was 
furthermore empowered, under the same penalty, “to modify or cancel any 
existing contract for the building, production, or purchase of  ships or war 
material,” to place an order for the whole or any part of  the output of  a 
factory in which ships or war material were being built or produced, and 
to “requisition and take over for use or operation by the Government any 
factory or any part thereof.” Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims Case (Nor. v. 
U.S.), 1 Reporters of  International Arbitral Awards (UN) 314-18 (1948).
299 “In all cases where these powers were exercised, provision was made for 
“just compensation” to be determined by the President, with the custom-
ary provision for an appeal to the courts. Then on June 15th, 1917, two 
months after the declaration of  War, further important powers were given 
to the President by the Emergency Shipping Fund Provision of  the Urgent 
Deficiencies Act. The relevant provisions of  this Act are as follows: The 
President is hereby authorized and empowered, within the limits of  the 
amounts herein authorized: (a) To place an order with any person for such 
ships or material as the necessities of  the Government, to be determined 
by the President, may require during the period of  the War and which are 
of  the nature, kind and quantity usually produced or capable of  being pro-
duced by such person. (6) To modify, suspend, cancel, or requisition any 
existing or future contract for the building, or purchase of  ships or materi-
al. (c) To require the owner or occupier of  any plant in which ships or ma-
terials are built or produced to place at the disposal of  the United States the 
whole or any part of  the output of  such plant, to deliver such output there-
of  in such quantities and at such times as may be specified in the order. (d) 
To requisition and take over for use or operation by the United States any 
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claimed compensation also for the affected contractual rights.300 The 
Tribunal was of the opinion that contracts were also taken, not only 
physical property:
plant, or any part thereof  without taking possession of  the entire plant, 
whether the United States has or has not any contract or agreement with 
the owner or occupier of  such plant. (e) To purchase, requisition, or take 
over the title to, or the possession of, for use or operation by the Unit-
ed States, any ship now constructed or in the process of  construction or 
hereafter constructed or any part thereof, or charter of  such ship. Com-
pliance with all orders issued hereunder shall be obligatory on any person 
to whom such order is given, and such order shall take precedence over all 
other orders and contracts placed with such person. If  any person owning 
any ship, charter, or material, or owning, leasing, or operating any plant 
equipped for the building or production of  ships or material shall refuse 
or fail to comply therewith or to give to the United States such preference 
in the execution of  such order, or shall refuse to build, supply, furnish, or 
manufacture the kind, quantities or qualities of  the ships or material so 
ordered, at such reasonable price as shall be determined by the President, 
the President may take immediate possession of  any ship, charter, material 
or plant of  such person, or any part thereof  without taking possession of  
the entire plant, and may use the same at such times and in such manner as 
he may consider necessary or expedient. Whenever the United States shall 
cancel, modify, suspend or requisition any contract, make use of, assume, 
occupy, requisition, acquire or take over any plant or part thereof, or any 
ship, charter or material in accordance with the provisions hereof, it shall 
make just compensation therefor, to be determined by the President; and 
if  the amount thereof  so determined by the President, is unsatisfactory to 
the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seven-
ty-five per centum of  the amount so determined by the President and shall 
be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added 
to said seventy-five per centum, will make up such amount as will be just 
compensation therefor, in the manner […]” Id. at 318-25.
300 Compensation offered by the United States for the physical property taken 
was only approximately USD 2.7 million, while the amount claimed by 
Norway amounted to about USD 18 million. See id. at 313-14.
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The Tribunal is therefore of opinion: 1. That, whatever the 
intentions may have been, the United States took, both in fact 
and in law, the contracts under which the ships in question were 
being or were to be constructed. 2. That in fact the claimants 
were fully and for ever deprived of their property and that this 
amounts to a requisitioning by the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain within the meaning of American municipal law.301 
And that this taking was exercise of the power of eminent domain under 
the United States law.302 Regarding the applicable law, the United States 
claimed that its municipal law should be applied; while Norway was 
of the opinion that it was the international law.303 The Tribunal stated 
that as long as international public order is not violated thereby, the 
municipal law of the United States was applicable.304 Concerning the 
issue of compensation, the Tribunal accepted that just compensation 
was due, however it interpreted it as: “Just compensation implies a 
complete restitution of the status quo ante, based, not upon future gains 
of the United States or other powers, but upon the loss of profits of the 
Norwegian owners as compared with other owners of similar property. 
[emphasis added].”305 The Tribunal also stressed that Norway was a 
friendly nation and that there were no extraordinary circumstances 
that would warrant the disregard of due process of law in the course 
301 “It is common ground that the word ‘property’ in the fifth Amendment of  
the United States Constitution, is treated as a word of  most general import, 
and that it is liberally construed and includes every so called ‘interest’ in the thing 
taken. [emphasis added]” See id. at 332.
302 “1… the United States took, both in fact and in law, the contracts under 
which the ships in question were being or were to be constructed. 2. That 
in fact the claimants were fully and for ever deprived of  their property and 
that this amounts to a requisitioning by the exercise of  the power of  eminent 
domain within the meaning of  American municipal law.” See id. at 325. 
303  See id. at 330.
304 See id. at 331.
305 See id. at 338.
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of the taking.306 Discussing the amount and time of compensation, 
the Tribunal added that Norway was entitled to immediate and full 
compensation.307 The Tribunal, furthermore, stated that the value of 
306 See id. at 338-39.
307 Excerpt from the award: “It is common ground between the Parties that 
just compensation, as it is understood in the United States, should be lib-
erally awarded, and that it should be based upon the net value of  the prop-
erty taken. It has been somewhat difficult to fix the real market value of  
some of  these shipbuilding contracts. The value must be assessed ex œquo 
et bono. The Parties have obviously acted in a way which would not have 
been usual or even possible under ordinary circumstances, when peaceful 
shipping and shipbuilding were entirely free, and not hampered in their 
customary activities by the intervention of  enemy or friendly Govern-
ments. The growing scarcity of  ships in 1917, the risks and difficulties 
due to submarine warfare and to the extension of  the field of  hostilities, 
contributed to make speculative shipbuilding transactions possible and 
even unavoidable. Belligerents and neutrals alike were fearful for their 
existence. The hardships of  neutrality were felt so deeply by the United 
States themselves that they declared war on Germany ELS the only means 
of  defence against its “repeated acts of  War against the Government and 
the people of  the United States of  America”. All neutral Nations needed 
ships for their food, materials and other commodities. Some governments 
took measures to protect themselves against speculation in ships and other 
property; they imposed standard prices and requisitioned ships for use dur-
ing the war, etc. As a rule, abnormal circumstances, speculative prices, etc., 
cannot form, the legal basis of  compensation in condemnation awards. 
While fair compensation cannot be artificially increased by such methods 
as were adopted by one of  those interested in the case and which have been 
brought to the notice of  this Tribunal, it would be equally unjust to attach 
much weight to artificial reduction of  hire, chartering or purchase price of  
ships, as fixed under compulsion, requisition or other environmental action 
during the war. For the reasons already stated, the Tribunal is not bound 
by section 3477 of  the Revised Statutes of  the United States, 1878 (quoted 
in U.S. Case Appendix page 51); nor by section 24 of  the Judicial Code of  
the United States 1911 ; nor by section 4 of  the Naval Emergency Fund 
Act of  4th March, 1917 ; nor by any other municipal law, in so far as these 
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the claimants’ initial property should be determined by the standard of 
provisions restricted the right of  the claimants to receive immediate and 
full compensation, with interest from the day on which the compensation 
should have been fully paid ex aquo et bono. Just compensation should 
have been paid to the Claimants or arranged with them on the basis of  
the net value of  the property taken: 1. On the 6th October, 1917, for use, 
during the war (whenever such use was possible without destroying the 
property, according to the contract, state of  completion of  ship, etc.), and 
2. At the latest on the 1st July 1919, as damages for the unlawful retaining 
of  the title and use of  the ships after all emergency ceased; or On the 6th 
October, 1917, as full compensation for the destruction of  the Norwegian 
property. Liberal compensation should be allowed in each case, inasmuch 
as the United States “recognizes its liability to make just compensation for 
the value of  the property taken on August 3rd, 1917”.1 The amounts of-
fered as compensation by the United States are shown in the table set out 
at the commencement of  this award. After careful comparative examina-
tion of  the results of  the two systems above described, the Tribunal is of  
opinion that the compensation hereinafter awarded is the fair market value 
of  the claimants’ property. In assessing the net amount of  compensation, 
the Tribunal has taken into consideration in each case all the circumstanc-
es pertaining to the net value of  the property requisitioned or taken by 
the United States and especially the following: the date of  each contract 
or sub-contract between shipbuilder and shipowner; the technical charac-
teristics and qualities of  each contract (type and dead weight tonnage of  
the ship; its speed, etc. ; the reputation, experience, technical and financial 
situation of  the shipyard); the legal value of  the contract, namely the liens, 
rights and interests in each original contract, etc. ; the original contract (or 
sub-contract) price; the progress (and brokerage) payments made by each 
of  the parties on the original contract price; the date of  delivery promised 
in the contract ; the date of  delivery which was expected at or about the 
date of  the general requisition order and about the date of  the effective 
requisition of  each contract as far as these can be ascertained; the various 
elements pertaining to the value and degree of  completion of  the tan-
gible objects of  completion as: for instance, the percentage of  materials 
ordered, and the percentage of  materials on hand ; the date at which the 
keel was laid, before or after the general requisition; and the date when 
the ship was launched; the contracts, settlements, etc. made by the United 
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fair market value.308 Finally, about USD 15 million was awarded, a sum 
which included interest.309 From the fact that the Tribunal ordered the 
States and by Norwegian or other shipowners, or by third parties, whether 
governments or private persons, whether with shipowners or shipbuilders, 
for the construction or purchase or hire of  ships ; the statistics, reports 
and opinions of  experts produced by the Parties ; the Award of  the United 
States Claims Committee on the present claims ; the reports of  the Ocean 
Advisory Committee on just compensation for certain American ships lost 
in the service of  the government; etc. On the other hand the Tribunal has 
taken into consideration all the facts, which are exclusively or principally 
due to the United States’ action (whether before or after the requisition 
of  the shipyards and the effective requisition of  the claimants’ property), 
and which therefore may be considered as res inter alios acta, or as being 
without or of  negligible influence upon the net value of  property lost by 
the claimants.” See id. at 340.
308 See id. Investorwords Dictionary defines fair market value as: “The price that 
an interested but not desperate buyer would be willing to pay and an in-
terested but not desperate seller would be willing to accept on the open 
market assuming a reasonable period of  time for an agreement to arise.“ 
(visited on Dec. 14, 2012) <http://www.investorwords.com/cgi-bin/get-
word.cgi?1878>; or Money Glossary defines it as: “Fair market value is the 
price, in cash or equivalent, that a buyer could be expected to pay, and a 
seller could be expected to accept, if  the asset were exposed for sale on the 
open market for a reasonable period of  time, both buyer and seller being 
knowledgeable of  the facts, and neither being under any compulsion to 
act.” (visited on Dec. 14, 2012) <http://www.moneyglossary.com/?w=-
Fair+Market+Value>.
309 Excerpt from the award: “For these reasons the tribunal of  arbitration 
decides and awards that: I. The United States of  America shall pay to the 
Kingdom of  Norway the following sums: In claim No. 1 by the Skibsak-
tieselskapet “Manitowoc” the sum of  $845,000 In claim No. 2 by the 
Skibsaktieselskapet “Manitowoc” the sum of  845,000 In claim No. 3 by 
the Dampskibsaktieselskapet” Baltimore” the sum of. 1,625,000 In claim 
No. 4 by the Dampskibsaktieselskapet “Vard II” the sum of  2,065,000 Out 
of  this amount of  $2,065,000 the United States are entitled to retain a sum 
of  $22,800 in order that this sum be paid to Page Brothers; In claim No. 
5 by the Aktieselskapet SOrlandske Lloyd the sum of  $2,045,000 In claim 
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respondent to pay the compensation in US Dollars we can infer that 
the form of compensation fulfilled the criterion of effectiveness, that is to 
say, it was in a realizable form. It should be mentioned that the United 
States complied with the arbitral award, however, it officially denied its 
precedential value in international law.310 Based on this landmark case, 
we can establish that just compensation means complete restitution of 
the taken property, including the lost profit.
5.1.2. Chorzow Factory case – ‘ fair’ compensation
The next landmark case in the history of compensation for taken foreign 
property was the Chorzow Factory case in front of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice.311 The subject matter of this case was the land in 
No. 6 by the Dampskibsaktieselskapet Ostlandet the sum of. 2,890,000 In 
claim No. 7 by Jacob Prebensen jun. the sum of  160,000. In claim No. 8 
by the Dampskibsaktieselskapet “Tromp” the sum of. $160,000 In claim 
No. 9 by the Aktieselskapet “Maritim” the sum of  175,000 In claim No. 
10 by the Aktieselskapet “Haug” the sum’of.... 175,000 In claim No. 11 
by the Aktieselskapet “Mercator” the sum of  190,000 In claim No. 12 by 
the Aktieselskapet Sôrlandske Lloyd the sum of  205,000 InclaimNo. 13 by 
H. Kjerschow the sum of  205,000 In claim No. 14 by Harry Borthen the 
sum of  205,000 InclaimNo. 15 by E. & N. Evensen the sum of. 205,000 
II. The claim made by the United States of  America on behalf  of  Page 
Brothers is disallowed as against the Kingdom of  Norway, but a sum of  
$22,800 may be retained by the United States as stated under claim No. 4 
above.” Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims Case (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 Reporters of  
International Arbitral Awards (UN) 343-44 (1948). See also Dolzer, Rudolf: 
Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims Arbitration in Encyclopedia of  Public In-
ternational Law, ed.: Rudolf  Bernhardt, Elsevier Science B.V.: Amsterdam, 
The Netherlands, 1997, Vol. 3, 693.
310 See Dolzer, Rudolf: Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims Arbitration in Encyclo-
pedia of  Public International Law, ed.: Rudolf  Bernhardt, Elsevier Science 
B.V.: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1997, Vol. 3, at 693.
311 See Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.we.J. 
(ser. A) No. 17, at 5-24.
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Chorzow on which a nitrate factory had been established. The land was 
originally registered in the name of Germany. However, Germany conveyed 
the land and the factory to Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke AG in 1919.312 
Following the First Word War, the region of Chorzow was transferred from 
German to Polish control. Under the Geneva Convention, countries that 
took over German territory had the right to seize certain land property 
on these territories owned by the Government of Germany and credit the 
value of this property to Germany’s reparation obligations.313 Disputes 
arising under the Convention were to be referred to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice.314 Shortly after Poland took over Chorzow, a 
Polish court decreed in 1922 that the land belonging to Oberschlesische 
Stickstoffwerke AG should be assigned to Poland, as Poland argued that 
the property belonged to the German State, and that it was not the private 
property of the above-mentioned company.315 The dispute finally reached 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court concluded that 
the land was privately owned at the time of taking, and that Poland had 
seized private property that was not lawful according to international law.316 
The Court stated that the rules of law governing the reparation were the 
rules of public international law in force between the two states concerned, 
and not the law governing relations between the state which committed 
the wrongful act and the individual who suffered damage.317 This case 
sets forth the basic principles that govern reparation after the breach of an 
international obligation.318 It gives priority to restitution in kind, however, 
312 See id. at 18-21.
313 See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining 
the Popularity of  Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 vIrgInIa JournaL of Inter-
natIonaL Law 643 (1998); See Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzow 
(Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.we.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 18, 21.
314 See id. at 26.
315 See id. at 21.
316 See id. at 46.
317 See id. at 28.
318 See Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on state Responsi-
bility, 96 tHe amerIcan JournaL InternatIonaL Law 833, 835 (2002).
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if it is not possible, it turns to the solution of monetary compensation.319 
Thus, concerning the question of compensation, the Court stated that 
“reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the 
illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, 
have existed if that act had not been committed”.320 The Court qualified 
the Polish measure as “seizure of property”, and in its opinion there was 
only one remedy for such an act, that is fair compensation which equals 
full321 compensation.322 Related to this, Dinah Shelton argues that one 
widely accepted form of reparation is correcting the injustice done by 
restoring the status quo ante.323 Shelton further argues that the objective 
of reparation is “to place the aggrieved party in the same position as if no 
wrongful act had occurred, without respect to the cost or consequences 
319 See Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.we.J. 
(ser. A) No. 17, at 46, 47; Mouri calls this “restitution compensation”. See 
aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as refLect-
ed In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL  383 (1994).
320 Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.we.J. (ser. 
A) No. 17, at 46, 47.
321 Draft articles on Responsibility of  States for internationally wrongful acts 
adopted by the International Law Commission also sets forth the full repa-
ration principle: “The responsible state is under an obligation to make full 
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.” See art. 
31 of  Draft articles on Responsibility of  States for internationally wrongful 
acts adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session 
(2001) UN Info page (visited on Jan. 24, 2013) <http://www.un.org/law/
ilc/texts/state_responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm>; See also L. C. A. Bar-
rera, Lack of  Definition of  Compensation in International Investment Disputes for 
Non-Expropriation Claims: Is There an Appropriate Mechanism to Determine It, 
10 Revista E-Mercatoria, 81 (2011).
322 Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.we.J. 
(ser. A) No. 17, at 46; raLPH H. foLsom et aL., InternatIonaL busIness 
transactIons - a ProbLem-orIented coursebook (3d ed. 1995).
323 See Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on state Responsi-
bility, 96 tHe amerIcan JournaL InternatIonaL Law 833, 844 (2002).
112
for the wrongdoer”.324 This principle was also the basis of the Chorzow 
decision.325 Furthermore, it is interesting to analyze issues concerning 
valuation raised by the Court and referred to by experts. Thus, the Court 
asked experts to determine the value of the property not on the date on which 
the Polish Treasury was registered as owner326, but when the Treasury de 
facto took possession of the factory.327 According to our opinion, the original 
owner, the German company, should have been entitled to compensation 
not from this date (de facto taking), but from the date when the Polish 
Treasury was registered as the owner of the factory. The reason is, that 
already following the registration of the Treasury as owner (without taking 
it de facto), the German owner could no longer dispose of the property 
(e.g., could not sell it or use it as collateral). Another remarkable issue is 
that the Court asked for the determination of the value of the property 
on a very broad basis, that is to say, including even goodwill and future 
prospects of the factory concerned.328 The Court also requested experts to 
determine financial results of the undertaking from the time of the taking 
until the time of the judgment, instead of determining the value of the 
taken property at the time of the taking along with the interest from that 
time.329 It also ordered the determination of the present value plus, among 
others, the company’s future prospects.330 Practically, the Court was of 
the opinion that there should be full compensation (what in the Court’s 
opinion equaled fair compensation), including lucrum cessans331, less the 
amount of the maintenance of the factory.332 All in all, the Court stated 
324 See id.
325 See id. at 845.
326 July 1, 1922. (Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 
P.C.we.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 21).
327 See id. at 22, 51.
328 See id. at 51.
329 See id. at 51.
330 See id. at 28.
331 Ceasing gain.
332 Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.we.J. (ser. 
A) No. 17, at 53.
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that it would fix the amount of the compensation, the conditions and form 
of payment in a future judgment. It indicated that compensation can be 
paid in the form of a lump sum, and set off might be possible; However, 
it did not make a concrete decision on the matter:333 
The Court,having heard both Parties,by nine votes to three,
(1) gives judgment to the effect that, by reason of the attitude 
adopted by the Polish Government in respect of the Oberschlesische 
Stickstoffwerke and Bayerische Stickstoffwerke Companies, which 
attitude has been declared by the Court not to have been in 
conformity with the provisions of Article 6 and the following 
articles of the Geneva Convention, the Polish Government is under 
an obligation to pay, as reparation to the German Government, 
a compensation corresponding to the damage sustained by the 
said Companies as a result of the aforesaid attitude;
(2) dismisses the pleas of the Polish Government with a view to 
the exclusion from the compensation to be paid of an amount 
corresponding to all or a part of the damage sustained by the 
Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke, which pleas are based either on 
the judgment given by the Tribunal of Katowice on November 
12th, 1927, or on Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles;
(3) dismisses the submission formulated by the Polish Government 
to the effect that the German Government should in the first 
place hand over to the Polish Government the whole of the 
shares of the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke Company, of the 
nominal value of 110,000,000 marks, which are in the hands 
of the German Government under the contract of December 
24th, 1919;
(4) dismisses the alternative submission formulated by the Polish 
Government to the effect that the claim for indemnity, in so far 
as the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke Company is concerned, 
should be provisionally suspended;
(5) dismisses the submission of the German Government asking 
for judgment to the effect that, until June 30th, 1931, no nitrated 
lime and no nitrate of ammonia should be exported to Germany, 
333  Id. at 64.
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to the United States of America, to France or to Italy, or, in the 
alternative, that the Polish Government should be obliged to 
cease working the factory or the chemical equipment for the 
production of nitrate of ammonia, etc.
(6) gives judgment to the effect that no decision is called for on 
the submissions of the German Government asking for judgment 
to the effect that the Polish Government is not entitled to set off, 
against the above-mentioned claim for indemnity of the German 
Government, its claim in respect of social insurances in Upper 
Silesia; that it may not make use of any other set-off against the 
said claim for indemnity, and, in the alternative, that set-off is 
only permissible if the Polish Government puts forward for this 
purpose a claim in respect of a debt recognized by the German 
Government or established by a judgment given between the two 
Governments;
(7) gives judgment to the effect that the compensation to be paid 
by the Polish Government to the German Government shall be 
fixed as a lump sum;
(8) reserves the fixing of the amount of this compensation for a 
future judgment, to be given after receiving the report of experts 
to be appointed by the Court for the purpose of enlightening 
it on the questions set out in the present judgment and after 
hearing the Parties on the subject of this report;
(9) also reserves for this future judgment the conditions and 
methods for the payment of the compensation in so far as concerns 
points not decided by the present judgment. [p65]
[…]
Finally, the parties reached a compromise, and the Court terminated 
the proceedings in 1929.334 Based on this case, we can say that fair or 
full compensation does not differ much from the just compensation 
standard examined in the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case. Basically, 
334 See Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern: German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia 
Cases in Encyclopedia of  Public International Law, ed.: Rudolf  Bernhardt, 
Elsevier Science B.V.: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1995, Vol. 2, 550-553 
at 551.
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both cases require, in the case of taking foreign property, in integrum 
restitutio, taking into consideration the lost profits of the owner of the 
taken property.335 In both cases, the valuation is based on fair market 
value of the taken property. In our opinion, applying these standards, 
these early cases of international law already offered strong protection of 
foreign investment. These cases also recognized that if in kind restitution 
is not possible, monetary compensation is the most practical. On the 
basis of the before-said, we can conclude that these decisions use, in fact, 
different terms for the same concept. This supports our assumption that, 
many times, terms (expressions) in international law cannot be defined 
until they are tested in practice by courts or tribunals.
5.1.3. Hull Doctrine – ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation
In 1938 the so-called Hull Doctrine came into existence, when the 
property of the citizens of the United States of America was expropriated 
in Mexico.336 The doctrine was named after the United States Secretary of 
State Cordel Hull, who, in his famous letter to the Mexican Government, 
demanded prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the agrarian 
properties owned by United States citizens, and expropriated by the 
335 For example, Sacerdoti argues that full restitution is in principle “reparation 
in the form of  monetary compensation as an alternative [to in integrum resti-
tutio] should cover all connected losses including lucrum cessans and indirect 
damages”. See gIorgIo sacerdotI, bILateraL treatIes and muLtILateraL 
Instruments on Investment ProtectIon 389 (1997).
336 See Kevin Smith, The Law of  Compensation for Expropriated Companies and the 
Valuation Methods Used to Achieve That Compensation, Law & Valuation. Spring 
2001 (visited on Apr. 5, 2012) <www.law.wfu.edu/courses/Law&value-Pal-
miter/Papers/2001/Smith.htm>; Rudolf  Dolzer, New Foundations of  the Law 
of  Expropriation of  Alien Property, tHe amerIcan JournaL InternatIonaL 
Law, July, 1981, at 558; On the issue of  expropriation in Mexico see: Patrick 
Del Duca, The Rule of  Law: Mexico’s Approach to Expropriation Disputes 
in the Face of  Investment Globalization 51 UCLA L. Rev. 35 (2003).
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Mexican Government.337 With this doctrine, new terms evolved in 
international law in the field of compensation, as this doctrine claimed 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. We can define these terms 
based on the literature dealing with the Hull doctrine. Prompt means that 
the owner of the expropriated property has to be compensated reasonably 
soon after the taking, without undue delay.338 However, in practice, it 
is rarely the case. A payment of compensation in installments, even if 
it takes years, is an accepted practice,339 provided a considerable sum of 
money is paid immediately following the expropriation.340 One of the 
problems related to prompt compensation is the lack of international 
enforcement mechanisms against states which are unwilling to pay 
the required compensation, even if it was awarded by an international 
tribunal. Adequate341 means that the compensation is based on a fair 
337 See Smith, Kevin: The Law of  Compensation for Expropriated Companies 
and the Valuation Methods Used to Achieve That Compensation. Law & 
Valuation. Spring 2001 (visited on Apr. 5, 2012) <www.law.wfu.edu/cours-
es/Law&value-Palmiter/Papers/2001/Smith.htm>.
338 See raLPH H. foLsom & mIcHaeL w. gordon, InternatIonaL busIness 
transactIons 606 (3d ed. 1995; zouHaIr a. kronfoL, ProtectIon of 
foreIgn Investment 42 (1972); W. M. Treanor, The Origins and Original 
Significance of  the Just Compensation Clause of  the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L. J. 
692, 694 (1984-1985); See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property 
in the Practice of  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands year-
book of InternatIonaL Law 53, 107 (1988).
339 Usually not more than ten years. See HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHt-
LIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer 
PosItIonen 42 (1997).
340 See HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe 
der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 42 (1997).
341 John H. Dunning argues that until the independence of  many colonies in 
the sixties the traditional rule in international law was that in case of  taking 
adequate compensation had to be paid. However, with the appeareance of  
newly indepnedent states, and with the moral support of  socialist coun-
tries, appeared a new, progressive theory, according to which adequate com-
pensation had to be paid provided that the flow of  capital and technology 
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valuation, which is basically the fair market value of the property.342 
This criterion can be equated with full compensation, which means 
that the compensation should correspond to the full value of the 
expropriated rights.343 And finally, the criterion of effectiveness means 
that the compensation should be in a realizable form,344 that is to say, 
it should be transferable in convertible currency or other form (e.g., 
gold).345 As a matter of fact, the standard laid down by the Hull doctrine 
is the refined version of the just and fair (or full) compensation standard 
theories, in our opinion. All three above-mentioned components of the 
Hull doctrine are present under the just compensation standard (laid down 
in the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case) and the fair compensation 
standard (established in the Chorzow Factory case). It is common to 
that foreign investment generates is beneficial to the developing country. 
See JoHn H. dunnIng, InternatIonaL Investment, 44 (1972). Sornaraja 
already in the seventies claimed that “there is little doubt that foreign in-
vestment does have beneficial effects on the host country.” (M. Sornarajah, 
Compensation for Expropriation, 13 JournaL of worLd trade Law, 109, 110-
13 (1979). However, we are of  the opinion, that there are exceptions in 
many cases. It would be incorrect to say that foreign direct investment is 
uniformly beneficial for the recipient country.
342 See raLPH H. foLsom & mIcHaeL w. gordon, InternatIonaL busIness 
transactIons 606 (3d ed. 1995.
343 See HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe 
der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 43 (1997); In Ame-
rican International Group case. See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking 
of  Property in the Practice of  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHer-
Lands yearbook of InternatIonaL Law 53, 105-07 (1988).
344 See raLPH H. foLsom & mIcHaeL w. gordon, InternatIonaL busIness 
transactIons 606 (3d ed. 1995).
345 Like securities, etc., that are negotiable on the stock exchange. See HeIdI 
bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe der en-
teIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 42 (1997); See also m. Pellon-
paa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of InternatIonaL Law 53, 107 
(1988).
118
all these theories that compensation should be paid reasonably soon in 
a realizable form, for the full value (including lost profits), based on fair 
market value.
The standard of the Hull Doctrine can be found today in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and in bilateral investment treaties 
concluded by the United States.346 In bilateral investment treaties, 
investors enjoy protection even exceeding the requirements of the 
Hull Doctrine, e.g., as these treaties many times prescribe interest at 
a “commercially reasonably rate”347.348 Nevertheless, this doctrine was 
regarded as international only by the United States.349 However, even 
the US abandoned it officially following the Second World War, when 
it began to propagate the just compensation doctrine. At the same time, 
the United States, as we are going to see in the part of this book dealing 
with the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States § 712, still interprets just compensation as prompt, adequate and 
effective.350 Furthermore, Brownlie also argues that it is a common opinion 
in the West that expropriation is lawful if prompt, adequate, and effective 
346 See JeswaLd w. saLacuse, tHe Law of Investment treatIes 324 (2009).
347 Art. 6 (3) of  the US Model Bilateral Treaty, US Department of  state (visited 
on June 6, 2012) <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.
pdf>.
348 See Andrew T. Guzman, Explaining The Popularity of  Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties: Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt The, 1997 Jean Monnet Working 
Papers (visited on Apr. 5, 2012) <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/
papers/97/97-12.html>.
349 “The argument that the prompt, adequate and effective formula is traditional in-
ternational law finds little support in state practice or authoritative treaties 
and monographs.” See Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of  Bilateral Investment 
Treaties in the Formulation of  Customary International Law, 14 nortHwestern 
JournaL of InternatIonaL Law and busIness 33 (1993).
350 See Kevin Smith, The Law of  Compensation for Expropriated Companies and 
the Valuation Methods Used to Achieve That Compensation. Law & Valuation. 
Spring 2001 (visited on Apr. 20, 2012) <http://www.law.wfu.edu/courses/
Law&value-Palmiter/Papers/2001/Smith.htm>.
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compensation is provided for the property.351 Contrarily to this, authors 
from developing countries argue that this doctrine is supported by the 
United States and other developed countries in order to put developing 
countries into a disadvantageous position.352 Here we would agree with 
the German author, Professor Dolzer, who claims that this doctrine was 
applied, even before the de-colonization occurred, “in rational manner 
among and against” developed, western countries.353 The above-examined 
Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case and the Chorzow Factory cases are 
good examples to support this assertion. At the same time, Dolzer admits 
that this rule is not always observed in practice (for example, sometimes 
there is no prompt payment in case of expropriation).
5.1.4. Calvo Doctrine
Concerning the issue of compensation, the majority of capital importing 
countries354 refuse the Hull Doctrine, and refer to the Calvo Doctrine 
351 The Restatement defines just compensation as compensation that is “in an 
amount equivalent to the value of  the property taken and be paid at the 
time of  taking, or within a reasonable time thereafter with interest from the 
date of  taking, and in a form economically usable by the foreign national”. 
See Restatement 712 (1) (c).
 See Ian brownLIe, PrIncIPLes of PubLIc InternatIonaL Law 535 (5th ed. 
1998); Joachim Karl, The Promotion and Protection of  German Foreign Investment 
Abroad, IcsId revIew, Spring 1996, at 3.
352 See O. A. Abede, The Doctrine of  Sovereign Immunity Under Internation-
al Commercial Law: An Observation On Recent Trends, 17 The indiAn 
journAl of inTernATionAl lAw 245, 254-55 (1977); Mohamed Khalil, 
Treatment of  Foreign Investment in Bilateral Investment Treaties, IcsId revIew, 
Fall 1992, at 339.
353 See Rudolf  Dolzer, New Foundations of  the Law of  Expropriation of  Alien Prop-
erty, tHe amerIcan JournaL InternatIonaL Law, July 1981, at 558.
354 Francesco Francioni, Compensation for Nationalization of  Foreign Property: The 
Borderland Between Law and Equity, 24 InternatIonaL and comParatIve Law 
QuarterLy 255, 255 (1975).
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instead.355 The Calvo Doctrine was named after Carlos Calvo, an 
Argentine diplomat and historian. He expressed this principle in his 
work “International Law in Theory and Practice”. According to this 
doctrine, in case of taking of foreign property, every state has to have 
the right to decide on its own future and economic development, that 
is to say, no state may be forced to pay adequate, effective and prompt 
compensation.356 The doctrine also says that foreign investors may not be 
better treated than the citizens of the expropriating state.357 The Calvo 
Doctrine also prohibits the use of diplomatic intervention as a method 
of enforcing private claims before local remedies have been exhausted. 
Hereinafter, we are going to see that this principle is reflected in many 
United Nations documents of the sixties and seventies.
In practice, the Calvo Doctrine is represented by the Calvo Clause. Such 
clauses may be part of investment contracts concluded by the host state 
and the foreign investor, and in them, the investor agrees in advance to 
submit all disputes to the local law and waives all kind of diplomatic 
protection. In practice, it means that, regardless of the outcome of the 
exhaustion of local remedies by the foreign investor, the investor will find 
himself in the same position as any other national of the host state.358 All 
disputes between the host state and the foreign investor are exclusively 
355 The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001 (visited on Sep. 12, 2012) 
<http://www.bartleby.com/65/ca/Calvo-Ca.html>.
356 See HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe 
der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 44 (1997); martIn dI-
xon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 212-13 (1993).
357 See sebastIán LóPez escarcena, IndIrect exProPrIatIon In InternatIo-
naL Law 19 (2014); HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHä-
dIgung Im faLLe der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 40 
(1997); martIn dIxon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 212-13 (1993).
358 See martIn dIxon, textbook on InternatIonaL Law 212-13 (1993); En-
cyclopaedia of  Public International Law, ed.: Rudolf  Bernhardt, Elsevier 
Science B.V.: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1995, Vol. 1, 521-523 p. 522 
F.V. Garcia-Amador Calvo Doctrine, Calvo Clause.
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reserved for the courts of the host state, ruling out any kind of international 
arbitration or adjudication. In our opinion, such clause can be detrimental 
for foreign investors and this must be the reason why the Calvo Clause is 
not widespread.359 Regarding this issue, it is interesting to mention that 
the majority of bilateral investment treaties exclude the requirement of 
exhaustion of local remedies. Paul Peter in the nineties analyzed 409 BITs, 
and found that only five of them required exhaustion of local remedies.360 
Clauses that require the exhaustion of local remedies might deter foreign 
investors, as many times foreign investors are not familiar with the local 
legal system or are mistrustful about local judiciary and other authorities. 
Furthermore, the investment recipient state might have influence on 
these institutions. Therefore, a foreign investor might prefer international 
arbitration or other international dispute settlement mechanism when 
having disputes about compensation for taken property.
5.1.5. United Nations documents – ‘appropriate’ compensation
According to certain authors, the most recognized standard in international 
law is the appropriate compensation standard.361 This view is supported 
359 Lluís Paradell argues for example that it has never attained the statues of  
a principle in customary international law. andrew newcombe LLuís Pa-
radeLL, Law and PractIce of Investment treatIes 13-14 (2009).
360 See Paul P., Exhaustion of  Local Remedies: Ignored in Most Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 44 netHerLands InternatIonaL Law revIew 233, 234 (1997).
361 See rudoLf doLzer, eIgentum, enteIgnung und entscHädIgung Im geL-
tenden vöLkerrecHt [ProPerty, exProPrIatIon and comPensatIon In 
current InternatIonaL Law] 63 (1985); O. A. Abede, The Doctrine of  Sov-
ereign Immunity Under International Commercial Law: An Observation On Recent 
Trends, 17 tHe IndIan JournaL of InternatIonaL Law 241, 245 (1977); 
P.J.we.M. de Waart, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources As a Corner-
stone for International Economic Rights and Duties. 24 netHerLands Interna-
tIonaL Law revIew 300, 304 (1977); Maarten H. Muller, Compensation for 
Nationalization: A North-South Dialogue, 19 coLumbIa JournaL of transna-
tIonaL Law 31, 35 (1981); Karol N. Gess, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
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by the fact that the huge majority of states accepted this standard in 
many international multilateral and bilateral documents. The most 
important international document in which this standard first appeared 
was the General Assembly Resolution362 1803 (on Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources) of the United Nations, passed on December 
14, 1962.363 Some authors364 are of the opinion that in the full context 
of adoption of the General Assembly Resolution 1803, the expression 
Resources, 13 InternatIonaL and comParatIve Law QuarterLy  398, 398-
99 (1964).
362 General Assembly Resolution is defined by the Dictionary of  International 
& Comparative Law as: “primary legislative product of  the United Nations 
General Assembly. Generally, they are not binding, but serve as evidence 
of  customary international law and are authoritative when they interpret 
the United Nations Charter.”. See Dictionary of  International & Compar-
ative Law, Fox, James R., Oceana Publications, Inc., 1992, at 380; Resolu-
tions of  the UN General Assembly are not listed among the formal sourc-
es of  law of  the International Court of  Justice. See art. 38 of  the Statute of  
the International Court of  Justice, ICJ Info page (visited on Dec. 14, 2012) 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstat-
ute.htm>; However, this does not mean that they cannot be considered as 
source of  international law. So-called western, developed countries tend to 
deny resolutions’ normative quality, as third world countries tend to accept 
them as sources of  international law. See Edward McWhinney, United Na-
tions Law Making 44,55,56 (1984); See P. O’Keefe, UN Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Natural Resources, 8 JournaL of worLd trade Law 239, 248-51 (1974).
363 The text of  the Resolution and an analytical study can be found in the ar-
ticle of  Karol N. Gess. See Karol N. Gess, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources, 13 InternatIonaL and comParatIve Law QuarterLy 398, 444 
(1964). For another analytical study on the issue see P. O’Keefe, UN Per-
manent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 JournaL of worLd trade 
Law 239, 239-82 (1974); andrew newcombe LLuís ParadeLL, Law and 
PractIce of Investment treatIes 27 (2009).
364 See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe 
InternatIonaL Lawyer 304 (1975); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign 
Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of  Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
38 vIrgInIa JournaL of InternatIonaL Law, 639, 646 (1998).
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appropriate compensation can only mean prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.365 They further argue that there is no doubt that this 
is a mandatory obligation under international law. Therefore, prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation has to be paid.366 On the other 
hand, there are experts who do not accept this view, and argue that 
appropriate compensation is in no case equal to prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation.367 Based on our research, we are of the opinion 
that there is still little case law to support either the former or the latter 
view with certainty. However, we would say that the standard of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation is stricter standard and offers better 
protection, regarding the compensation of investors.
In the following, we will have a brief look at two other important United 
Nations documents in which the standard of appropriate compensation 
can be found. One of them is the Declaration on the Establishment 
of a New International Economic Order.368 This is a resolution of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. This Resolution was initiated 
by a group of less developed countries following the oil crisis of 1973,369 
365 The United States of  America also held that ‘appropriate’ compensation 
could only mean ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation. See Karol N. 
Gess, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 13 InternatIonaL and 
comParatIve Law QuarterLy 398, 427 (1964).
366 See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe 
InternatIonaL Lawyer 304 (1975); Francesco Francioni, Compensation for 
Nationalization of  Foreign Property: The Borderland Between Law and Equity, 24 
InternatIonaL and comParatIve Law QuarterLy 255, 255 (1975).
367 See Francesco Francioni, Compensation for Nationalization of  Foreign Property: 
The Borderland Between Law and Equity, 24 InternatIonaL and comParatIve 
Law QuarterLy 255, 255 (1975); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Trea-
ties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of  Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 
vIrgInIa JournaL of InternatIonaL Law, 639, 647-48 (1998).
368 A/RES/3201 (S-VI), United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library (visit-
ed on Oct. 10, 2012) <http://daccess-ods.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/NR0/071/94/IMG/NR007194.pdf?OpenElement>.
369 See JoHan kaufmann, unIted natIons decIsIon makIng 81, 82 (1980).
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and was the result of a so-called pseudo-consensus, that is to say, the text 
of the Resolution was adopted without voting.370 The president of the 
General Assembly simply stated that “it is the desire of the meeting to 
adopt the text”, and the Resolution was adopted.371 The significance of 
this Resolution is in the fact that it considers unacceptable any form of 
sanction on a state that has expropriated property of foreign investors.372 
In theory, this provision is very important as it prevents investor states 
from protecting their investors through sanctions in case of expropriation 
of their property.
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (December 
12, 1974)373 is the other resolution of the United Nations General 
Assembly. This Resolution was adopted by the General Assembly with an 
overwhelming majority of the world’s countries. Only Belgium, Denmark, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom 
and the United States voted against the Resolution.374 The Resolution 
was drafted with the support of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development.375 Developing countries wished to achieve several 
goals with this document: the freedom to dispose of natural resources, 
370 See id. at 81,82,128.
371 Several developed countries were opposed to the Program for a New 
International Economic Order that was represented by this Resolution. 
See JoHan kaufmann, unIted natIons decIsIon makIng 81, 81,82,128 
(1980).
372 A/RES/3201 (S-VI), United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library (visit-
ed on Oct. 10, 2012) <http://daccess-ods.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/NR0/071/94/IMG/NR007194.pdf?OpenElement>.
373  Id.
374 See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe 
InternatIonaL Lawyer 295 (1975); Encyclopedia of  Public International 
Law, ed.: Rudolf  Bernhardt, Elsevier Science B.V.: Amsterdam, The Neth-
erlands, 1995, Vol. 1, 561-566 at 562 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann: Charter of  
Economic Rights and Duties of  States).
375 See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe 
InternatIonaL Lawyer 295 (1975).
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the right to adopt the economic system of their own will, subjection of 
foreign capital to domestic laws, and other goals.376 Brower argues that 
developing countries tried to use the United Nations for their economic 
campaign at this time.377 Provision concerning the compensation in case 
of expropriation is contained in article 2 (2) (c) of the Resolution, which 
states that in case of taking:
appropriate compensation should be paid by the state adopting 
such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and 
regulations and all circumstances that the state considers 
pertinen. 378
As we can see, the text uses the word should that lessens the obligatory 
character of this provision.379 It is more interesting, that this appropriate 
compensation is determined on the grounds of domestic legislation380, 
and there is no mentioning of international legal standards. However, the 
last part of article 2 (2) (c) which states that the expropriating state has 
the absolute right to decide which factors will be taken into consideration 
376 See id. at 296.
377 He also argues that behind this economic campaign stood partially politi-
cal, partially economic reasons. See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The 
Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe InternatIonaL Lawyer 296 (1975).
378 Art. 2 (2) (c) A/RES/3281 (XXIX), United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld 
Library (visited on Oct. 12, 2012) <http://daccessods.un.org/doc/RES-
OLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/83/IMG/NR073883.pdf?OpenElement>; 
Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe 
InternatIonaL Lawyer 305 (1975).
379 See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe 
InternatIonaL Lawyer 305 (1975).
380 According to de Waart the determination of  compensation on the grounds 
of  local law met strong opposition among western states.  See P. J. we. M. 
de Waart, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources As a Cornerstone for In-
ternational Economic Rights and Duties, 24 netHerLands InternatIonaL Law 
revIew 313 (1977).
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when determining compensation, makes it less objective.381 This rejection 
of international law and legal standards is strengthened even more by 
the next sentence of the same paragraph:
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to 
a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the 
nationalizing state and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and 
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful 
means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States 
and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means. 382
In the first part of this provision we can find the above-mentioned 
Calvo Clause. However, the second part of the same provision gives 
the opportunity to parties to mutually agree on other means of conflict 
resolution (e.g., international arbitration). The original intention of the 
working group that worked out the proposal of the Resolution was to 
make a draft that will be binding on states and be part of the “corpus 
of the international law”.383 However, some western authors question 
if it had any effect at all on international law.384 The largest investor in 
381 See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe 
InternatIonaL Lawyer 305 (1975).
382 Art. (2) (2) (c) A/RES/3281 (XXIX), United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld 
Library, (visited on Oct. 12, 2012) <http://daccessods.un.org/doc/RES-
OLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/83/IMG/NR073883.pdf?OpenElement>; 
Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe 
InternatIonaL Lawyer 305 (1975).
383 See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe 
InternatIonaL Lawyer 297 (1975).
384 See G. W. Haight, The New International Economic Order and the Charter of  
Economic Rights and Duties of  States, 9 tHe InternatIonaL Lawyer 591, 596 
(1975); For example, Petersmann suggests that the Hull Doctrine repre-
sented traditional international customary law before the Charter, and says 
that it has no practical value in the view of  recent state practice and arbi-
tration awards. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Charter of  Economic Rights 
and Duties of  States, in 1 Encyclopedia of  Public International Law 564 
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the world, the United States, argued that such a document discourages 
rather than encourages foreign investors who are so much desirable 
by investment recipient countries.385 The reason for such critic might 
be that the United States, being a large investor, wants to protect the 
interests of its own investors, and this document obviously does not 
serve this end because it is strongly influenced by the Calvo Doctrine. 
Brower argues that the biggest deficiency of the Resolution is in the lack 
of binding character - despite the original intent of the sponsors of the 
Resolution.386 Brower also criticizes the Resolution for not stating clearly 
that “economic rights and duties of states are subject to international 
law”.387 However, we agree with Brower that this Resolution still places 
moral obligations on the members of the world community as it was 
passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, an organization 
which represents the will of nations of the world.388 Andrew T. Guzman 
touches the spot when he says that the relevance of the resolutions of the 
United Nations is not establishing new standards for expropriation in 
customary international law, but rather proclaiming that the countries 
voting for these resolutions do not consider the Hull doctrine part of 
customary international law.389 Notwithstanding, it should be mentioned 
(Rudolf  Bernhardt ed.) (1995).
385 See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe 
InternatIonaL Lawyer 299 (1975).
386 This non-binding character is supported by the following two facts accord-
ing to Brower: a large number of  countries with large economic power voted 
against or many abstained and a resolution of  the General Assembly of  the 
United Nations is not a “multilateral convention or treaty, will in any event 
normally have only recommendatory force”. See Charles N. Brower & John 
B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe InternatIonaL Lawyer 301 
(1975).
387 See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, The Charter of  Economic Rights, 9 tHe 
InternatIonaL Lawyer 302 (1975).
388 See id. at 301.
389 See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining 
the Popularity of  Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 vIrgInIa JournaL of Interna-
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that these countries still sign bilateral investment protection treaties that 
require prompt, adequate and effective compensation. In spite of this, 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties has had certain effects on 
international law, as this standard was also applied in major expropriation 
cases for determining compensation.390
5.2. Issue of compensation under the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States of America § 712
The United States of America is the largest foreign direct investor in the 
world. Thus, we should examine briefly its policy regarding the issue 
of compensation in the case of taking foreign investment. Under the 
Restatement, there is an obvious requirement of compensation in case of 
taking foreign property.391 Regarding the standards of compensation, the 
Restatement accepts the standard of appropriate compensation. However, 
it supplements it with the requirement of just compensation.392 Thus, it 
requires just compensation in the case of taking. The Restatement defines 
what should be understood under just compensation:
[…] be in an amount equivalent to the value of the property 
taken and be paid at the time of taking, or within a reasonable 
time thereafter with interest from the date of taking, and in a 
form economically usable by the foreign national.393
This definition anticipates the determination of the value of the taken 
property, for what guidance is given in the Comment of the Restatement 
and the Reporters’ Notes, which states that the full value of the property 
tIonaL Law 639, 648 (1998).
390 E.g., TOPCO-Libyan case, Banco National case, Aminoil-Kuwait case. It is 
another issue, how is this standard interpreted by tribunals and courts.
391 Restatement 712 (1) (c).
392 Restatement Comm. (c) at 198.
393 Restatement 712 (1) (c).
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must be paid.394 If possible, this should be determined based on the fair 
market value of the property. When determining this fair market value, 
the going concern value of the enterprise should be taken into account 
primarily, but the Comment does not exclude other valuation methods.395 
As to the time of payment, the Restatement states that compensation 
should be paid at the time of the taking.396 It further provides that if the 
compensation is not paid at this moment, interest should be paid from 
the time of the taking.397 However, it is required that compensation is 
made, in any case, within a reasonable time398, that is to say, within 
at least a six months period.399 Defining the requirement of reasonable 
time helps avoiding disputes among the parties. The Restatement also 
tells us about the form of payment. The payment should be made in 
economically usable form for the foreign investor.400 The Comment of 
the Restatement specifies it as “convertible currency without restriction 
on repatriation”.401 Payment in bonds is also allowed under certain 
circumstances. The requirement is that such bonds bear interest at an 
economically reasonable rate and have market through which their 
equivalent in convertible currency can be realized.402
394 Comment d; Reporters’ Notes, 3; See also Lillich, Richard B.: The Valuation 
of  Nationalized Property in International Law. Charlottesville: The Uni-
versity Press of  Virginia, 1973 1,2,3,4 Bd.; Bergmann, Heidi: Die völker-
rechtliche Entschädigung im Falle der Enteignung vertragsrechtlicher Posi-
tionen. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verl. Ges., 1997; Kratovil, Robert, Harrison, 
Frank J.: Eminent Domain - Policy and Concept. California Law Review. 
Vol. 42, 1954, at 596.
395 Restatement, Reporters’ Notes 3.
396 Restatement 712 (1) (c).
397 Restatement 712 (1) (c); Comment d; Reporters’ Notes 3.
398 Restatement 712 (1) (c).
399 Reporters’ Notes 3.
400 Restatement 712 (1) (c).
401 Comment (d) of  the Restatement.
402 Id.
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Current trends in the field of international law related to our topic can be 
best examined through current case law and related academic literature. 
Thus, we are going to scrutinize above all, the case law of the Iran – 
United States Claims Tribunal and the decisions of other international 
arbitral bodies (like that of the ICSID or NAFTA arbitration) and related 
analytical works. We will try to find out what is the most accepted 
compensation standard in international law nowadays.
5.3. Issue of compensation in United States bilateral investment 
treaties
During our research, in this part of the work, we examine model investment 
treaties of the United States and bilateral investment treaties in force 
signed by the United States of America, being the largest foreign investor 
in the word during the last decades. We examine: whether these treaties 
recognize the right of contracting States to take foreign property, whether 
compensation is required by these treaties, and if yes, what is the standard 
of compensation required by these treaties. Furthermore, we look at the 
valuation standard, valuation time, time of payment and transfer, interest 
payable and transferability requirements provided for by these treaties.
First, we examine earlier generation treaties (as well as the Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty of 1992) that were signed before the text of the Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty of 1994 was used. Following this we compare 
these earlier generation treaty provisions (and the Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty of 1992) with those that were signed after 1994 (until nowadays), 
under the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 1994, and finally compare 
them with the text of the newest Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 2012.
Regarding the right of contracting States to take property of foreign 
investors, all the examined treaties recognize this right under the condition 
that such taking is done for public purpose, it is non-discriminatory, 
there is compensation (‘prompt, adequate, effective’) and due process of 
law. As we have already discussed the issue of the right of States to take 
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foreign property in the previous chapters, thus, we turn to the issue of 
compensation in the following.
Bilateral investment treaties use different standards regarding issues 
related to compensation. In the following we give an overview of different 
standards used by these treaties. Following this, we analyze different 
provisions that can be found in these treaties.
Standard of compensation
• prompt, adequate, effective 
(Art. 6 of  the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of  2012 and art. 3 of  the 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of  1992 (United States of  America); Art. 
4 (1) of  The Treaty between the United States of  America and the Argentine 
Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  
Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  The Treaty Between the United States of  America 
and the Republic of  Armenia Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States 
of  America and the Republic of  Bulgaria Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) Treaty with the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of  Investment; (After the breakup of  Czechoslovakia in 
1993, this treaty continued in effect for the successor States, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia); Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  
America and the Republic of  Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the 
Government of  the United States of  America and the Government of  the 
Republic of  Estonia for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  
Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America 
and Grenada Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection 
of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  
America and the Republic of  Kazakhstan Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between 
United States of  America and the Republic of  Kyrgyzstan Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America and the 
Government of  the Republic of  Latvia Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between 
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the United States of  America and the Republic of  Moldova Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the United States of  America and Mongolia Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  
the Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America and 
the Government of  Romania Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty with the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investment. (After the breakup of  Czechoslovakia in 1993, 
this treaty continued in effect for the successor States, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic); Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  
America and the Democratic Socialist Republic of  Sri Lanka Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  
the Treaty between the United States of  America and The People’s Republic 
of  Bangladesh Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection 
of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the Government of  the 
United States of  America and the Government of  the People’s Republic of  
the Congo Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  
Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America 
and the Republic of  Cameroon Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and the Republic of  Zaire Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty 
between the United States of  America and Jamaica Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  
the Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America and 
the Government of  the Republic of  Lithuania for the Encouragement of  
Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 4 (1) of  the Treaty between the 
United States of  America and the Republic of  Panama Concerning the 
Treatment and Protection of  Investment; Art. 7 (1) of  the Treaty between 
the United States of  America and the Republic of  Poland Concerning 
Business and Economic Relations; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the 
United States of  America and the Republic of  Senegal Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic of  Tunisia 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; 
Art. 3 (1) (2) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and 
the Republic of  Turkey Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
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Protection of  Investments.; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of  Investment.
• prompt, just, effective 
(Art. 3 (2) (3) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and 
the Kingdom of  Morocco Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of  Investments.)
Valuation standard
• fair market value 
(All the treaties, except those concluded with the Kingdom of Morocco, Panama 
and Tunisia. The provision on ‘fair market value’ can be found in the same articles 
where the provision on ‘compensation’ standards can be found, see supra.)
• full value 
(Art. 3 (2) (3) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and 
the Kingdom of  Morocco Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of  Investments; Art. 4 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and the Republic of  Panama Concerning the Treatment 
and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and the Republic of  Tunisia Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of  Investment.)
Valuation time
• immediately before the expropriatory action was taken or became 
known 
(All the treaties examined, except the one concluded with the Kingdom of  
Morocco.)
• value on the date of the expropriation 
(Art. 3 (2) (3) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the 
Kingdom of  Morocco.)
Time of payment and transfer
• without delay 
(Art. 3 of  the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of  1992 (United States of  
America); Art. 4 (1) of  The Treaty between the United States of  America 
and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of  Investment. art. 3 (1) of  The Treaty Between the 
United States of  America and the Republic of  Armenia Concerning the 
134
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; art. 3 (1) of  
the Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic of  
Bulgaria Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  
Investment.; Art. 3 (1) Treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment 
(After the break-up of  Czechoslovakia in 1993, this treaty continued in 
effect for the successor States, the Czech Republic and Slovakia); Art. 3 
(1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic 
of  Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection 
of  Investment.; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the Government of  the 
United States of  America and the Government of  the Republic of  Estonia 
for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment.; Art. 
3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and Grenada 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment.; 
Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the 
Republic of  Kazakhstan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of  Investment.; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between United 
States of  America and the Republic of  Kyrgyzstan Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment.; Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America and the 
Government of  the Republic of  Latvia Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between 
the United States of  America and the Republic of  Moldova Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the United States of  America and Mongolia Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  
the Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America and 
the Government of  Romania Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty with the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of  Investment. (After the break-up of  Czechoslovakia in 
1993, this treaty continued in effect for the successor States, Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic); Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  
America and the Democratic Socialist Republic of  Sri Lanka Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment.; Art. 3 (1) 
of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic of  
Cameroon Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  
Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America 
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and Jamaica Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  
Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the Government of  the United 
States of  America and the Government of  the Republic of  Lithuania for 
the Encouragement of  Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 4 (1) 
of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic of  
Panama Concerning the Treatment and Protection of  Investment; Art. 7 
(1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic 
of  Poland Concerning Business and Economic Relations; Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic of  Senegal 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; 
Art. 3 (1) (2) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and 
the Republic of  Turkey Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investments; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of  Investment.)
• promptly 
(Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and The 
People’s Republic of  Bangladesh Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the 
Government of  the United States of  America and the Government of  the 
People’s Republic of  the Congo Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (2) (3) of  the Treaty between the 
United States of  America and the Kingdom of  Morocco Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investments.)
Interest
• at commercially reasonable rate from the date of expropriation 
(Art. 6 of  the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of  2012 (United States of  
America); Art. 4 (1) of  The Treaty between the United States of  America 
and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investment; art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty Between the United States 
of  America and the Republic of  Armenia Concerning the Reciprocal En-
couragement and Protection of  Investment; art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between 
the United States of  America and the Republic of  Bulgaria Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) Treaty 
with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal En-
couragement and Protection of  Investment (After the break-up of  Czecho-
slovakia in 1993, this treaty continued in effect for the successor States, the 
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Czech Republic and Slovakia); Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and the Republic of  Ecuador Concerning the Encour-
agement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty 
between the Government of  the United States of  America and the Govern-
ment of  the Republic of  Estonia for the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of  Investment.; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States 
of  America and Grenada Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States 
of  America and the Republic of  Kazakhstan Concerning the Encourage-
ment and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty be-
tween United States of  America and the Republic of  Kyrgyzstan Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  
the Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America and 
the Government of  the Republic of  Latvia Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between 
the United States of  America and the Republic of  Moldova Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the United States of  America and Mongolia Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America and the 
Government of  Romania Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty with the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection 
of  Investment (After the break-up of  Czechoslovakia in 1993, this treaty 
continued in effect for the successor States, Slovakia and the Czech Repub-
lic); Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the 
Democratic Socialist Republic of  Sri Lanka Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between 
the United States of  America and Jamaica Concerning the Reciprocal En-
couragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 4 (1) of  the Treaty between 
the United States of  America and the Republic of  Panama Concerning the 
Treatment and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between 
the United States of  America and the Republic of  Senegal Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment.)
• at a commercially reasonable rate, such as LIBOR plus an appro-
priate margin, from the date of expropriation 
(Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and Ukraine 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; 
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Art. 7 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the 
Republic of  Poland Concerning Business and Economic Relations; Art. 3 
(1) of  the Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America 
and the Government of  the Republic of  Lithuania for the Encouragement 
of  Reciprocal Protection of  Investment.)
• at a rate equivalent to current international rates from the date of 
expropriation 
(Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and The 
People’s Republic of  Bangladesh Concerning the Reciprocal Encourage-
ment and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the 
Government of  the United States of  America and the Government of  the 
People’s Republic of  the Congo Concerning the Reciprocal Encourage-
ment and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the 
United States of  America and the Republic of  Cameroon Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic of  Zaire 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment.)
• payment for delay as may be considered appropriate under inter-
national law 
(Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the 
Arab Republic of  Egypt Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investments.)
• an amount which would put the investor in a position no less fa-
vorable than the position in which he would have been, had the 
compensation been paid immediately on the date of expropriation 
(Art. 3 (1) (2) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and 
the Republic of  Turkey Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investments.)
Transferability
• freely transferable 
(All of  the examined treaties, except those concluded with Morocco and 
Tunisia.)
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The Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 1992 requires payment 
of ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation.403 Regarding the 
standard of compensation this requirement is present in almost all 
the treaties examined during the first phase of our research (examined 
treaties were those signed before 1994 during this first phase), that is to 
say, the treaties more or less follow in their wording the Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty of 1992.404 The only exception is the bilateral 
investment treaty concluded with Morocco, that uses the following 
403 Art. 3 of  the 1992 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (United States of  Amer-
ica) states: “Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of  
the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory action was 
taken or became known, whichever is earlier; be calculated in a freely usable 
currency on the basis of  the prevailing market rate of  exchange at the time; 
be paid without delay; include interest at a commercially reasonable rate from 
the date of  expropriation; be fully realizable; and be freely transferable.”
404 Art. 4 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the Ar-
gentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protec-
tion of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  The Treaty Between the United States of  
America and the Republic of  Armenia Concerning the Reciprocal Encour-
agement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between 
the United States of  America and the Republic of  Bulgaria Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) 
Treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Recip-
rocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment. (After the breakup 
of  Czechoslovakia in 1993, this treaty continued in effect for the successor 
States, the Czech Republic and Slovakia); Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between 
the United States of  America and the Republic of  Ecuador Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) 
of  the Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America 
and the Government of  the Republic of  Estonia for the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between 
the United States of  America and Grenada Concerning the Reciprocal En-
couragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty be-
tween the United States of  America and the Republic of  Kazakhstan Con-
cerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Art. 
3 (1) of  the Treaty between United States of  America and the Republic 
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language: “[…] each Party shall pay promptly just and effective 
of  Kyrgyzstan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection 
of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the Government of  the 
United States of  America and the Government of  the Republic of  Latvia 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; 
Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the 
Republic of  Moldova Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Pro-
tection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States 
of  America and Mongolia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the Govern-
ment of  the United States of  America and the Government of  Romania 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; 
Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Con-
cerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment (Af-
ter the breakup of  Czechoslovakia in 1993, this treaty continued in effect 
for the successor States, Slovakia and the Czech Republic); Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the United States of  America and the Democratic Social-
ist Republic of  Sri Lanka Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and the People’s Republic of  Bangladesh Concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) 
of  the Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America 
and the Government of  the People’s Republic of  the Congo Concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) 
of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic of  
Cameroon Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  
Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America 
and the Republic of  Zaire Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and Jamaica Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the Gov-
ernment of  the United States of  America and the Government of  the 
Republic of  Lithuania for the Encouragement of  Reciprocal Protection of  
Investment; Art. 4 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  Amer-
ica and the Republic of  Panama Concerning the Treatment and Protec-
tion of  Investment; Art. 7 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  
America and the Republic of  Poland Concerning Business and Economic 
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compensation to the nationals or companies of the other Party.”405 Here, 
the difference regarding the standard of compensation is only that this 
treaty requires ‘just’ instead of ‘adequate’ compensation. However, it 
should be mentioned that the relevant commentary of the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 712 (see supra) 
finds the two standards to be substitutable. Above, when examining 
the ‘just’ compensation standard in the Norwegian Shipowners’ case, 
we found that the court has defined ‘just’ compensation requirement 
as “a complete restitution of the status quo ante” (see supra). In the same 
sub-chapter of this work we concluded that the ‘adequate’ requirement 
is fulfilled if the compensation is based on a fair valuation, and that 
this criterion can be equated with ‘full’ compensation, meaning that 
the compensation should correspond to the full value of expropriated 
rights (see supra). We also found that following the Second World War 
the United States propagated the ‘just’ compensation standard (see 
supra). Therefore, we assume that, at least the American party to the 
treaties, considers ‘adequate’ standard to be substitutable with ‘just’ 
standard, and the reason for using in the treaty concluded with Morocco 
the latter standard might be some kind of compromise between the 
parties. However, not being familiar with the history of drafting of 
this treaty, we can only speculate. It should be also mentioned that 
the treaty signed with Egypt uses words ‘freely realizable’ instead of 
Relations; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America 
and the Republic of  Senegal Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and the Republic of  Tunisia Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) (2) of  the Treaty 
between the United States of  America and the Republic of  Turkey Con-
cerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investments; 
Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and Ukraine 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment.
405 Art. 3 (2) (3) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and 
the Kingdom of  Morocco Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of  Investments.
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‘effective’, however we are on the opinion that basically in their content 
they have the same meaning.406
Similarly, almost all of the treaties use the ‘fair market value’ (before the 
expropriation became known) as valuation standard.407 There are only 
three exceptions that use as valuation standard the expression ‘full value’. 
These are treaties concluded with Morocco, Panama and Tunisia.408 
Regarding the time of valuation all the treaties concluded, except 
one, provide that the value of the property “immediately before the 
expropriatory action was taken or became known” should be calculated. 
Here the value of the property before the taking became publicly know 
would be taken into account, that is to say, we can interpret this provision 
as valuing the property on the value not affected by the taking. This 
offers an objective and fair valuation in our opinion. However, the Treaty 
concluded with Morocco provides only for value “on the date of the 
expropriation” should be the base for valuation.409 If the expropriation 
becomes publicly known on the same date, it can practically make 
‘useless’ the whole provision in our opinion, as a property that is under 
expropriation has practically no market value (it cannot be alienated). 
For example, if the value of the expropriated company is determined 
based on the market value of its shares on the date of expropriation, 
406 We defined the ‘effective’ criterion as meaning that the compensation 
should be in a realisable form. See supra.
407 The provision on ‘fair market value’ can be found in the same articles 
where the provision on compensation standards can be found, see supra.
408 Art. 3 (2) (3) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and 
the Kingdom of  Morocco Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of  Investments; Art. 4 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and the Republic of  Panama Concerning the Treatment 
and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and the Republic of  Tunisia Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of  Investment.
409 Id.
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and such market value is already influenced by the information that 
the company will be expropriated the same day, and not the opening 
price of its shares is taken into consideration. Another interesting issue 
is the provision that is contained in some of the treaties that states that 
”occurrence of the events that constituted or resulted in the expropriatory 
action” should not affect the value of the property.410 This provision is 
important, because many times first the event (e.g., revolution, coup) 
occurs and only after that is foreign property expropriated. Therefore, 
valuing the property on its value before such event occurs can assure 
better compensation for the investor.
Regarding time of payment and transfer, the majority of agreements 
state that it has to be paid ‘promptly’ and add words ‘without delay’. 
However, there are some exceptions, that is to say, some of the treaties do 
not mention any other requirement than that of ‘prompt’ payment.411 We 
are of the opinion that there should be no practical difference between 
410 Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the Repub-
lic of  Senegal Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  
Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America 
and the Arab Republic of  Egypt Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of  Investments; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and the People’s Republic of  Bangladesh Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment’ Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America and the 
Government of  the People’s Republic of  the Congo Concerning the Recip-
rocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty 
between the United States of  America and the Republic of  Zaire Concern-
ing the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment.
411 Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the 
Arab Republic of  Egypt Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investments; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and the People’s Republic of  Bangladesh Concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  
the Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America and 
the Government of  the People’s Republic of  the Congo Concerning the 
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the provisions. 
Regarding interest on late payment, many different solutions can be 
found in these treaties. One is “interest at a commercially reasonable 
rate from the date of expropriation.”412 Another is “current interest from 
the date of the expropriation at a rate equivalent to current international 
rates”413 These definitions are very vague, however, at least they state 
from what point of time shall be the compensation counted. Some 
provide for ‘commercially reasonable’ rate, without specifying the 
starting point of payment of such interest.414 This is in our opinion not 
the best solution as it can lead to disagreements later. Others provide 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic of  Zaire 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; 
Art. 3 (2) (3) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and 
the Kingdom of  Morocco Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of  Investments; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United 
States of  America and the Republic of  Tunisia Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of  Investment. 
412 Argentine, Armenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ecuador, Estonia, 
Grenada, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, 
Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Senegal.
413 Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the 
People’s Republic of  Bangladesh Concerning the Reciprocal Encourage-
ment and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the 
Government of  the United States of  America and the Government of  the 
People’s Republic of  the Congo Concerning the Reciprocal Encourage-
ment and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the Treaty between the 
United States of  America and the Republic of  Cameroon Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment; Art. 3 (1) of  the 
Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic of  Zaire 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment.
414 Art. 4 (1) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and the Re-
public of  Panama Concerning the Treatment and Protection of  Investment.
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for similar standards, specifying that LIBOR415 rate should be applied 
“plus an appropriate margin”.416 There is a treaty, the one concluded 
with Egypt that provides for some kind of lump sum in case of delay in 
payment that should be “appropriate under international law”, what is 
also very vague. A bit less vague is the provision that can be found in the 
agreement concluded with Turkey, that states “an amount which would 
put the investor in a position no less favorable than the position in which 
he would have been, had the compensation been paid immediately on 
the date of expropriation.” Treaties with Morocco and Tunisia contain 
no provision regarding late payment, that can place the investor whose 
property is expropriated into very disadvantageous position if the State 
pays late and there is a considerable devaluation of the currency in which 
the payment is made or the investor needs the funds for its operations.
Regarding form of payment, the majority of treaties provide for effective, 
fully realizable and freely transferable compensation at the “prevailing 
market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.”417 However, these 
provisions do not specify what market rate should be used. The market 
rate in the expropriating country, or in the investor’s country, or the 
market rate on the world foreign exchange market or maybe somewhere 
else? Some specify this, like the treaty concluded with Cameroon, when 
415 LIBOR is the most widely used benchmark or reference rate for short-
term interest rates. It stands for the London Interbank Offered Rate and 
is the rate of  interest at which banks borrow funds from other banks, 
in marketable size, in the London interbank market. See British Bankers’ 
Association (visited on Feb. 22, 2005) <http://www.bba.org.uk/bba/jsp/
polopoly.jsp?d=141>.
416 Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine.
417 Argentine, Armenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ecuador, Estonia, 
Grenada, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, 
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, PR Congo, Jamaica, Lithuania, Poland (however, 
it adds “rate of  exchange for commercial transactions”), Senegal, Zaire 
(without “fully realisable”), Egypt (without “effective”) However, as above 
mentioned effective can be equated with freely realisable.
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providing for exchange rate generally used by International Monetary 
Fund. Some do not specify criteria for exchange, only provide that the 
compensation has to be ‘effective’ and ‘freely transferable’.418 Treaties 
concluded with Morocco and Tunisia contain only the ‘effective’ criteria.
In sum, we can conclude that the greatest deficiency of these treaties 
is that they do not define what should be understood on ‘fair market 
value’. It is understandable that there is such a great variety of different 
investments in various fields that it would be very difficult to lay down 
certain specified conditions for the determination of the fair market value 
in each case. However, a solution could be to determine in these treaties 
an international body (e.g. arbitral or some association of accountants or 
other professionals) that will be authorized to determine what should be 
“fair market value” of the taken investment, and such decision should 
be binding for both parties.
Another problem is that the majority of these treaties provide for ‘before’ 
the expropriation, however if it was preceded with a special event, like 
revolution, the effect of such event is not taken into account. Thus, our 
suggestion would be to complete these treaties with provision that will 
insure that any prior relevant event that had significant influence on the 
value of the investment be taken into account, that is to say, the value 
before such relevant event happened and not just before the taking should 
be taken into consideration when determining compensation. Furthermore, 
we find it a problem that when these treaties use the wording “freely usable 
currency” they do not specify where. In the expropriating country, in the 
home country of the investor or in the world? It is also not specified at 
what place should be counted the “prevailing market rate of exchange”? 
And when these treaties talk about interest rate, what do they understand 
under “commercially reasonable” rate? These issues should be clarified 
avoiding future disputes. In our opinion, these problems can be very easily 
solved by inserting a provision that refers to an internationally recognized 
418 Treaties concluded with Panama, Turkey and Ukraine.
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financial institution (e.g. freely usable currency that is traded at London 
Currency Exchange, rate of exchange that of the day of expropriation).
Here, in the second part of our research we examine bilateral investment 
treaties concluded following the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 
1994. This Treaty, regarding the standard of compensation requires 
‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation paid without delay. 
The determination of the value of the taken property shall be based 
on the fair market value of the taken property immediately before the 
expropriatory action was taken and it should not be affected by the fact 
that the expropriation became known before the date of expropriation. 
The Model Treaty also provides that the compensation is “fully realizable 
and freely transferable”. As we can see these provisions follow the old 
pattern. However, there are more detailed provisions on the issue of 
protection against denomination, thus, it states that:
If the fair market value is denominated in a freely usable 
currency, the compensation paid shall be no less than the fair 
market value on the date of expropriation, plus interest at a 
commercially reasonable rate for that currency, accured from 
the date of expropriation until the date of payment.
If the fair market value is denominated in a currency that is 
not freely usable, the compensation paid – converted into the 
currency of payment at the market rate of exchange prevailing 
on the date of payment – shall be no less than
(a) the fair market value on the date of expropriation, converted 
into freely usable currency at the market rate of exchange 
prevailing on that date, plus
(b) interest, at a commercially reasonable rate for that freely 
usable currency, accrued from the date of expropriation until 
the date of payment.419
419 Art. 6 of  the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of  2012 (United States of  
America).
147
The research has showed that this text was followed in always all the 
treaties concluded after 1994.420
The fact that a uniform text was followed after 1994 shows the commitment 
and at the same time economic strength of the United States to assure 
either safe environment for their investors, or not to conclude at all any 
treaty. However, not having access to the documents of the negotiations 
(bargaining procedure) processes of concluding United States bilateral 
investment treaties with other countries, we can only speculate. 
420 Art. 3 (1) – (4) of  the Treaty between the United States of  America and 
the Government of  the Republic of  Albania Concerning the Encourage-
ment and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Treaty Between the Gov-
ernment of  the United States of  America and the Government of  the 
Republic of  Azerbaijan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of  Investment; Treaty Between the Government of  the Unit-
ed States of  America and the Government of  the Republic of  Bolivia 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; 
Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America and the 
Government of  the Republic of  Croatia Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Treaty between the Government 
of  the United States of  America and the Government of  the Republic of  
Georgia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  In-
vestment; Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  Amer-
ica and the Government of  the Republic of  Honduras Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment; Treaty between 
the Government of  the United States of  America and the Government of  
the Hashemite Kingdom of  Jordan Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of  Investment. However, there is a slight difference 
in the Treaty between the Government of  the Republic of  Trinidad and 
Tobago the Government of  the United States of  America Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment. In this treaty 
provisions related to expropriation are placed into art. 4 (2), and it states 
that “Compensation shall be paid without delay and be equivalent to the 
fair market value of  the expropriated investment immediately before the 
expropriatorv action was taken or became known, whichever is earlier; and 
be fully realizable and freely transferable.“
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The latest Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 2012 also provides for 
‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation. Such compensation should 
represent the ‘fair market value’ of the taken property before the expropriation 
took place and be paid without delay. The compensation has to be also 
‘fully realizable’ and ‘freely transferable’ according to the Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty 2012. It also provides for “interest at a commercially 
reasonable rate for the currency” from the date of taking until the date 
of payment of the compensation.421 However, this new model treaty does 
not offer any solution to the problems we have discussed supra in this part.
We can conclude that the United States of America is very consistent 
regarding the issue of compensation in case of taking of the investments of 
its investors, that is to say their protection in its bilateral investment treaties. 
We have seen that it deviated from its model treaties only in few cases.
5.4. Compensation for the taken property: case law
5.4.1. The case law of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal
The work of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal represents one 
of the most important body of international case law on the issue of 
compensation for expropriated foreign property.422 We give as detailed 
421 Art. 6 of  the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2012 (visited Dec. 16, 
2018) <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf>.
422 However, it should be mentioned that some authors, like Sornarajah, are 
of  the opinion that the decisions of  the Tribunal should not have binding 
precedential value because such bodies and their decisions are usually result 
of  political agreements in his opinion. See m. sornaraJaH, tHe PursuIt of 
natIonaLIzed ProPerty 202 (1986); m. sornaraJaH, InternatIonaL Law 
of foreIgn Investment 380 (1994). As opposed to Sornarajah, based on 
our research regarding international case law and academic writings related 
to investment protection, we agree with Lillich and Magraw who argue 
that decisions like those of  the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal are 
observed and invoked by international lawyers. See rIcHard b. LILLIcH et 
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analysis as possible on the work of the Tribunal in this field.423 However, 
first let us see in brief the background and the history of the establishment 
of the Tribunal. In 1979, following the Iranian revolution and the ‘hostage 
crisis’, the Government of the United States froze Iranian assets worth 
over USD 12 billion.424 With the mediation of Algeria, the parties (the 
United States and Iran) agreed to adhere to two accords made by the 
Algerian Government (General Declaration425 and Claims Settlement 
aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: Its contrIbutIon to tHe 
Law of state resPonsIbILIty 37 (1998).
 On the work of  the Tribunal see generally: davId d. caron & JoHn r. crook 
eds., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL and tHe Process of In-
ternatIonaL cLaIms resoLutIon (2000); rIcHard b. LILLIcH et aL., tHe 
Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: Its contrIbutIon to tHe Law of 
state resPonsIbILIty (1998); aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of 
exProPrIatIon as refLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trI-
bunaL (1994); HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im 
faLLe der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen (1997); M. Pel-
lonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal 19 Netherlands Yearbook of  International Law 53 (1988); 
JoHn a. westberg, InternatIonaL transactIons and cLaIms InvoLvIng 
government PartIes: case Law of tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbu-
naL (1991); kHan ratmatuLLaH, tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: 
controversIes, cases, and contrIbutIon (1990). george H. aLdrIcH, tHe 
JurIsPrudence of tHe Iran –unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL (1996).
423 On the establishment, work and procedures of  the Tribunal see davId d. 
caron & JoHn r. crook eds., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL 
and tHe Process of InternatIonaL cLaIms resoLutIon (2000). 
424 See rIcHard b. LILLIcH et aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: 
Its contrIbutIon to tHe Law of state resPonsIbILIty 2-8 (1998).
425 Declaration of  the Government of  the Democratic and Popular Republic 
of  Algeria (General Declaration), 19 January 1981 in Iran – unIted states 
cLaIms trIbunaL rePorts, 1 (Pirrie, S. R. ed.), 3-8 (1985). See also rIcHard 
b. LILLIcH et aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: Its contrI-
butIon to tHe Law of state resPonsIbILIty 11-13 (1998). 
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Declaration426).427 These documents established a tribunal that aimed 
to settle disputes between the parties.428 This Tribunal applied at least 
five different sources of international law: (1) the Claims Settlement 
Declaration (and other agreements related to the Algiers Accords),429 (2) 
the Treaty of Amity (Treaty) between Iran and the United States,430 (3) 
other international agreements (as subsidiary means431),432 (4) customary 
426 Declaration of  the Government of  the Democratic and Popular Republic 
of  Algeria Concerning the Settlement of  Claims by the Government of  
the United States of  America and the Government of  the Islamic Republic 
of  Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration), 19 January 1981 in Iran – unIted 
states cLaIms trIbunaL rePorts, 1 (Pirrie, S. R. ed.), 9-12 (1985). 
427 See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as re-
fLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL 1-6 (1994); See 
rIcHard b. LILLIcH et aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: Its 
contrIbutIon to tHe Law of state resPonsIbILIty 11-13 (1998). 
428 As the General Declaration formulates: “to terminate all litigation as be-
tween the government of  each party and the nationals of  the other, and 
to bring about the settlement and termination of  all such claims through 
binding arbitration”. See Declaration of  the Government of  the Demo-
cratic and Popular Republic of  Algeria (General Declaration), 19 January 
1981- General Principles B. in Iran – unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL 
rePorts, 1 (Pirrie, S. R. ed.), 3 (1985); See also rIcHard b. LILLIcH et aL., 
tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: Its contrIbutIon to tHe Law 
of state resPonsIbILIty 13-22 (1998).
429 E.g., in cases Islamic Republic of  Iran v. United States, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 251,266 (1984-we) and Sedco v. National Iranian Oil Company, 15 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 23 (1987-II).
430 E.g., in case Amoco International Financial Corp. v. Islamic Republic of  
Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 223 (1987-II).
431 See rIcHard b. LILLIcH et aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: 
Its contrIbutIon to tHe Law of state resPonsIbILIty 27 (1998).
432 E.g., like interpreting the 1930 Hague Convention Concerning certain 
questions relating to the conflict of  nationality laws. See also rIcHard b. 
LILLIcH et aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: Its contrIbu-
tIon to tHe Law of state resPonsIbILIty 27 (1998).
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international law433 and (5) general principles of law434.435 Regarding the 
applicable law, in the opinion of Mouri, the Tribunal was hesitant to 
establish it, except in a few cases.436 Bergmann, a German scholar, opines 
that the basis of the decisions of the Tribunal was not the international law, 
but primarily the Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran.437 
Moreover, Mouri argues that the Tribunal was generally of the opinion 
that, regarding the standard of compensation, in the early stages of the 
Tribunal’s work, the international law was applied. However, later there 
were many awards which found that the Treaty of Amity is the applicable 
lex specialis.438 In some cases, the Tribunal even took the standpoint, 
that the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions are not directly 
binding upon states, thus, generally are not evidence of customary law.439 
Furthermore, they set “ambiguous” standards concerning the amount of 
compensation.440 The Tribunal also rejected, as guidance for customary 
international law, the settlement practices of states and investors (or other 
states) in the case of investment disputes.441 The reason for this might 
433 E.g., in case Amoco International Financial Corp. v. Islamic Republic of  
Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 223 (1987-II).
434 E.g., in case Pomeroy v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
372, 380 (1983-we).
435 See rIcHard b. LILLIcH et aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: 
Its contrIbutIon to tHe Law of state resPonsIbILIty 27 (1998).
436 See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as re-
fLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL 296 (1994).
437 See HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe 
der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 64 (1997).
438 See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as refLect-
ed In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL 297, 301, 306 (1994).
439 In Sedco case. See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the 
Practice of  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook 
of InternatIonaL Law 53, 110-11 (1988).
440 See id.
441 See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of Interna-
tIonaL Law 53, 111 (1988). 
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be that such settlements are usually the result of bargaining and are not 
based on legal norms and procedures. The Tribunal mostly relied on legal 
writing and judicial and arbitral precedents.442 On the other hand, Matti 
Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice argue that the Treaty of Amity was regarded 
as the lex specialis to be followed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal maybe 
wanted to avoid the uncertainty of international law and to have a firm 
legal framework for its decisions, an international instrument that is 
accepted by all the parties involved in the dispute. At the same time, we 
might presume that the Tribunal did not want to deprive its decisions 
of international recognition, and therefore it obviously found that its 
decisions are in line with international law and standards. For example, 
concerning expropriation issues, the Tribunal did not conceive Treaty 
standards different from the standards of customary international law.443
The Tribunal was not unanimous concerning the issue of the standard 
of compensation.444 Accordingly, concerning the issue of the standard of 
compensation, awards were either based on international law or on the Treaty 
of Amity. The former, delivered on the basis of international law, can be further 
categorized: awards that applied the standard of appropriate compensation445
442 See id. at 112.
443 See rIcHard b. LILLIcH et aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: 
Its contrIbutIon to tHe Law of state resPonsIbILIty 187, 208 (1998).
444 See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as re-
fLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL 351 (1994); 
rIcHard b. LILLIcH et aL., tHe Iran-unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL: Its 
contrIbutIon to tHe Law of state resPonsIbILIty 325-327 (1998).
445 Mouri is of  the opinion that “the term appropriate denotes that the stand-
ard should strike a balance between the interests of  the expropriating and 
expropriated parties and be able to fairly, justly, equitably or appropriately 
evaluate the circumstances pertinent to each particular case, which auto-
matically brings into play the points of  view of  the expropriating States, 
together with their expectations”. See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIon-
aL Law of exProPrIatIon as refLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. 
cLaIms trIbunaL 364 (1994). 
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 and those that applied the full compensation446 standard.447
For example, in the Sola Tiles award448, the Tribunal applied the 
appropriate compensation standard. In 1982 Sola Tiles, Inc., owner of Simat 
Ltd. (incorporated in Iran in 1975), filed a claim against the Government 
of Iran for damages and it asked for compensation of USD 3.2 million 
(including lost profits and goodwill) that arose from the expropriation 
of the assets of Simat Ltd.449 Simat Ltd. was importing and reselling 
ceramic tiles.450 The Israeli owner of Simat Ltd. established and registered 
Sola Tiles, Inc. in California in May 1979 with two American citizens.451 
On May 25, 1979 all the assets of Simat Ltd. were transferred to Sola 
Tiles, Inc.452 The claimant alleged that from June 1979 “various steps 
were taken by the local Provisional Revolutionary Committee [of Iran] 
to interfere with the business of Simat”. According to the claimant, the 
interference eventually amounted to taking of control and expropriation 
of the company’s assets.453 Iran denied the expropriation and at the 
same time disputed the valuation submitted by the claimant.454 The 
Tribunal accepted the argument of the claimant that its assets were 
expropriated. Regarding the issue of valuation, the Tribunal was of the 
446 Mouri further states that “the term[s] … full [is] usually looked at from the 
point of  view of  the price or the value that is required by the owner to 
replace the property taken.” See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law 
of exProPrIatIon as refLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms 
trIbunaL 364 (1994).
447 See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as re-
fLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL  363 (1994).
448 Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 14 Iran– U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 235 
(1988).
449  Id. para. 1 and 3.
450  Id. para. 2.
451  Id. para. 4.
452  Id. para. 5.
453  Id. para. 3.
454  Id. para. 7.
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opinion that the compensation should be based on the fair market value 
of the company.455 Regarding the valuation method, the Tribunal opined 
that valuation should not be based only on the going concern value, but 
other circumstances should also be taken into account. The reason for 
this was an evidentiary problem, namely, the claimant had difficulties 
to access the complete documentation related to its property. First, 
the Tribunal took into consideration the estimation of physical assets 
and accounts receivable of Simat by business partners who wanted to 
acquire part of the company shortly before the revolution.456 Actually, 
the opinion of these business partners was the starting point for the 
Tribunal’s own assessment.457 The Tribunal gave estimate of physical 
assets, accounts receivable and the expropriated cash.458 The claimant 
claimed compensation also for the goodwill and lost future profits of 
the company.459 However, the Tribunal, when deciding this issue, took 
into consideration the changed (deteriorated) business environment 
in Iran - that affected also newly established businesses - and decided 
not to award lost future profits or goodwill.460 The Tribunal called the 
compensation awarded “a global assessment of the compensation due, 
representing the value of Simat’s business“.461 The Tribunal also awarded 
interest. Although, there are many decisions of the Iran – United States 
Claims Tribunal in which the Tribunal awarded interest, this award 
is important because it explicitly tells us what standards and methods 
were used for the calculation of the awarded interest. The interest was 
calculated at a rate:
based approximately on the amount that it would have been 
able to earn had it had the funds available to invest in a form 
455  Id. para. 52.
456  Id. para. 54-56.
457  Id. para. 57.
458  Id. para. 60.
459  Id. para. 61.
460  Id. para. 62-64.
461  Id. para. 65.
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of commercial investment in common use in its own state. 
Six-month certificates of deposit in the United States are 
such a form of investment for which average interest rates are 
available from an authoritative official source, the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin.462
According to the award, the respondent had to pay to the claimant 
USD 625,000 plus simple interest at the rate of 10.75 percent per 
annum from January 1, 1980 up to and including the date on which 
the escrow agent instructed the depositary bank to effect payment out 
of the security account, plus costs of USD 20,000.463 In this case, the 
Tribunal stated that appropriate compensation standard has a widespread 
use, noting, at the same time, that in its opinion the word appropriate 
in fact means adequate.464
A good example of an award requiring full compensation is the American 
International Group, Inc.465 case. In 1979 all insurance companies 
operating in Iran were nationalized by a special law on nationalization 
of insurance companies. One of these was the Iran America Insurance 
Corporation which was organized under the laws of Iran in 1974. 
American International Life Insurance Company, a company incorporated 
in Delaware, and three other companies, wholly owned subsidiaries of 
American International Group, Inc., had 35 percent of shares in Iran 
America. American International Group, Inc. claimed compensation 
for the taken investment (USD 39 million). Regarding the issue of 
valuation, the Tribunal was of the opinion that it should be based on 
the fair market value of the business interest in the company of the 
claimant on the date of the nationalization. However, the problem that 
the Tribunal faced when it wanted to determine the fair market value 
462  Id. para. 66.
463  Id. para. 68.
464  Id. para. 44-49.
465 American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of  Iran (Award 
No. 93-2-34) IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 96.
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was that there was no active market for the shares of Iran America. The 
Tribunal concluded that, in such case, the best solution is to value the 
company as a going concern, taking into consideration all the relevant 
factors, like the opinion of independent appraisers, prior changes in the 
“general political, social and economic conditions” that might have affect 
on the business prospects of the company. It took into consideration not 
only the net book value of the company, but also the goodwill and future 
prospects and profits (had the company been allowed to continue its 
business under its former management). Based on all these factors, the 
Tribunal made an approximation of the value of the company.466 The 
Tribunal awarded USD 7.1 million plus ‘simple interest’ at the annual 
rate of 8.5 percent from the date of the expropriation up to and including 
the date on which the escrow agent instructed the depositary bank to 
effect payment of the award.467 In an interlocutory award, the Tribunal 
concluded that, before the Second World War, customary international 
law required full compensation, that is to say, “compensation equivalent 
to the full value of the property taken”. However, the Tribunal, at the 
same time, admitted that, since then, this standard has been challenged 
by many countries and legal commentators.468
The first award to support the premise that standard of compensation, 
as established in the Treaty of Amity, has to prevail as lex specialis was 
466  Id.
467 See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as re-
fLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL 371 (1994).
468 This is supported for example by lump sum agreements concluded, where 
compensation usually amounted only to the half  value or even less of  the 
property taken, and by United Nations Resolutions of  the sixties and sev-
enties. See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of Inter-
natIonaL Law 53, 104-05 (1988).
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in the INA Corporation469 case.470 Following the Iranian revolution 
Iran took (with the law on nationalization of insurance companies) 
the stake of INA Corporation in Sharg insurance company registered 
in Iran. INA claimed USD 285,000 representing what it alleged to 
be the “going concern value of its shares”, together with interest at 17 
percent. The Tribunal stated that the claimant is entitled to the fair 
market value of its shares in Sharg.471 The Tribunal found that the price 
INA paid in an arm’s length transaction for the shares one year before 
the nationalization represented the fair market value of the shares of 
Sharg as a going concern. The claimant, because of the relatively small 
amount of the claim, did not claim compensation for future profits (the 
valuation by experts would have been too costly having in mind the 
small amount of the claimed compensation), and the Tribunal accepted 
this. The Tribunal obliged Iran to pay USD 285,000 together with 
simple interest thereon at 8.5 percent per annum from the date of the 
expropriation up to and including the date of the award.472 This case 
also shows that the Tribunal accepted, as one of valuation methods, the 
going concern valuation method.
The Treaty of Amity itself contains the standard of just compensation, which is 
defined by the Treaty as “full equivalent of the property taken”. The Tribunal 
applied a wide property concept, meaning that, when determining the value 
of the property, the Tribunal took into consideration also the goodwill and the 
469 INA Corporation v. Islamic Republic of  Iran (Award No. 184-161-1) 8 
IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 373.
470 See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as re-
fLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL 378 (1994).
471 The Tribunal in this case defined fair market value as “the amount which a 
willing buyer would have paid to a willing seller for the shares of  a going 
concern, disregarding any diminution of  value due to the nationalisation 
itself  or the anticipation thereof, and excluding consideration of  events 
thereafter that might have increased or decreased the value of  the shares”.
472 INA Corporation v. Islamic Republic of  Iran (Award No. 184-161-1) 8 
IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 373.
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future profitability (or expected profits) of the taken enterprise473.474 Hence, 
the Tribunal applied in many instances the standard of just compensation, 
interpreting it as full equivalent of the property taken.475 Good examples are 
cases like the case of Thomas Earl Payne476 and Phelps Dodge Corporation.477
In the former case, the claimant, Payne (American citizen) had ownership 
interest in Irantronics and Berkeh companies. These companies were 
dealing with electronic equipment and they were incorporated in Iran.478 
In 1980 the management of the company was taken over by a manager 
appointed by the Minister of Commerce of Iran.479 The claimant claimed 
compensation of USD 7.2 million for his ownership interests in Irantronics 
and Berkeh, plus interest and costs.480 The Tribunal applied the standard 
of just compensation, meaning compensation for the full equivalent of the 
taken property, based on its fair market value.481 The Tribunal established 
473 See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of Interna-
tIonaL Law 53, 58 (1988).
474 See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as re-
fLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL 378 (1994); 
However, see: art. 4 (2) of  the Treaty of  Amity, Economic Relations, and 
Consular Rights, signed on 15 August 1955 and entered into force on 16 
June 1957 between Iran and the United States of  America. 8 U.S.T. 899, 
284, U.N.T.S. No. 4132, at 933. 
475 See aLLaHyar mourI, tHe InternatIonaL Law of exProPrIatIon as re-
fLected In tHe work of tHe Iran – u. s. cLaIms trIbunaL 380-81 (1994).
476  Payne v. Iran, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1986).
477  Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 121 (1986). 
478  Payne v. Iran, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1986), para. 3-5.
479 Id. para. 8.
480 Id. para. 1 and 2.
481 Id. para. 29-30. The Tribunal defined fair market value as “amount which 
a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller for the shares of  a going 
concern, disregarding any diminution of  value due to the nationalization 
itself  or the anticipation thereof, and excluding consideration of  events 
thereafter that might have increased or decreased the value of  the shares”.
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that, at the time of the taking, the two companies were going concerns. 
Thus, it valued their shares on the fair market value basis. However, it 
took into consideration the effects of the revolution prior to the taking 
of the companies on the value of their shares, debts and tax liabilities.482 
The Tribunal awarded USD 900,000 plus simple interest at the rate 
of 11.25 percent per annum, calculated from the date of expropriation 
up to and including the date on which the escrow agent instructed the 
depositary bank to effect the payment out of the security account.483
In the latter case, the claimant, Phelps Dodge Corporation, a company 
from New York, became one of the founders of an Iranian company, 
SICAB. SICAB was established to manufacture wire and cable products 
in Iran.484 Following the revolution, SICAB was expropriated, and Phelps 
Dodge claimed damages (USD 7.5 million) plus interest and costs.485 When 
determining the compensation, the Tribunal has accepted the standard of 
just compensation which should be counted on the basis of full equivalent 
of the taken property.486 However, based on the factual evidence presented 
to the Tribunal by the parties (SICAB without the support of the service 
companies like Phelps Dodge would have had no business prospects), the 
Tribunal refused to value the company as going concern (that is to say, it 
refused to value goodwill and future profits). It decided that the claimant, 
Phelps Dodge, is entitled to compensation that equals its investment and 
not more.487 The Tribunal awarded USD 2,437,860 and “simple interest” 
at the rate of 11.25 percent per annum to the claimant, from the date of 
expropriation up to and including the date on which the escrow agent 
instructed the depositary bank to effect payment out of the security account.488
482  Id. para. 31.
483  Id. para. 42.
484 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 121 (1986), para. 
1-4.
485  Id. para. 29.
486  Id. para. 28-29.
487  Id. para. 30-31.
488  Id. para. 34.
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In both of the previous cases, the Tribunal scrutinized profoundly all 
the facts of the cases to determine the just compensation, that is to say, 
the full equivalent of the taken property based on its fair market value. 
In our opinion, it follows that there cannot be a uniform formula for 
determining just compensation. Such compensation is determined by 
taking into account all the circumstances of single cases.
Examining the latest award of the Tribunal in the Frederica Lincoln Riahi 
v. the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran case, we can say that, in 
this award, the Tribunal invoked all the above mentioned milestone cases 
before reaching the final award.489 In this case Frederica Lincoln Riahi 
filed a claim in 1982 against the Government of Iran in which she sought 
compensation for equity interests in a number of companies expropriated 
in 1980 by Iran.490 Concerning the time when the claim is considered to 
have arisen, the Tribunal held that in its previous decisions it had been 
established that an expropriation claim is considered to arise on the date 
of the taking.491 The claimant based some of its claims on de facto taking 
by the Government, that is to say, on creeping expropriation of Riahi’s 
property.492 Therefore the Tribunal has also argued that:
In situations where the alleged expropriation is carried out 
through a series of measures interfering with the enjoyment 
of the claimant’s property rights, the cause of action is deemed 
to have arisen on the date when the interference, attributable 
to the state, ripens into an irreversible deprivation of those 
rights, rather than on the date when those measures began. 
The point of time at which interference ripens into a taking 
489 Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. The Government of  the Islamic Republic of  
Iran, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. cite: IRAN FINAL AWARD 600-485-1, 
signed February 27, 2003, filed February 27, 2003.
490  Id. para. 1 and 2.
491  Id. para. 42.
492  Id. para. 343.
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depends on the circumstances of each case and does not require 
the transfer of legal title.493 
Regarding the standard of compensation, in the Frederica Lincoln Riahi 
case, the Tribunal referred to previous decisions in which it had stated 
that, according to the Treaty of Amity and customary international law, 
taking requires compensation equal to the full equivalent of the value of 
the interests in the property taken.494 Concerning valuation standard, in 
this case, the Tribunal invoked previous decisions, such as establishing 
that the valuation of the expropriated property should be made on the 
basis of the fair market value. This was defined in the INA case as:
[T]he amount which a willing buyer would have paid a 
willing seller for the shares of a going concern, disregarding 
any diminution of value due to the nationalisation itself or 
the anticipation thereof, and excluding consideration of events 
thereafter that might have increased or decreased the value 
of the shares.495 
The Tribunal stated, on the other hand, that “prior changes in the general 
political, social and economic conditions which might have affected the 
enterprise’s business prospects as of the date the enterprise was taken 
should be considered”.496 Here, the Tribunal considered the effects of 
the Islamic Revolution, and acknowledged the possible influence of 
the turbulence on the economy, that is to say, on share prices of the 
company.497 Since the shares were not traded freely on an active and 
free market, the Tribunal used different methods to determine the 
price that a reasonable buyer would be willing to pay for the company’s 
493  Id. para. 344.
494  Id. para. 394.
495  Id.
496  Id.
497  Id. para. 393-394.
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shares in a free-market transaction.498 In the opinion of the Tribunal, 
the company was a profitable, ongoing business at the time of the 
expropriation, and therefore it decided to value it as a going concern.499 
At this point, the Tribunal referred to the Amoco case, where it was 
held that “a going concern value encompasses not only the physical and 
financial assets of the undertaking”, but, also the “intangible valuables 
which contribute to its earning power”, like: contractual rights, goodwill 
and commercial prospects.500 The Tribunal also noted that it is a settled 
rule of international law that compensation for speculative or uncertain 
damage cannot be awarded.501
Based on our research and some of the most important cases of the 
Tribunal discussed above, we can support the opinion of scholars like 
Pellonpaa, Fritzmaurice and Bergmann who concluded, on the bases 
of the case law, that the general tendency in the decisions of the Iran 
Claims Tribunal is to award compensation not only for the lost material 
property, but, in many cases, also for the lost future profits.502 In addition, 
Pellonpaa and Fritzmaurice state that the standard of full compensation 
is still the rule of customary international law.503
Regarding valuation methods504, as we can see from the cases examined, 
the Tribunal applied various methods. One of the most widely used 
498  Id. para. 447.
499  Id. para. 448.
500  Id. para. 448-454.
501  Id. para. 450.
502 See HeIdI bergmann, dIe vöLkerrecHtLIcHe entscHädIgung Im faLLe 
der enteIgnung vertragsrecHtLIcHer PosItIonen 68 (1997); See m. Pel-
lonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of InternatIonaL Law 
53, 123-26 (1988).
503  See id.
504 Valuation method is the technique of  determining the value of  the taken 
property.
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methods was the valuation based on fair market value on the date of 
taking in cases when the foreign investors’ equity interest in an enterprise 
was taken.505 Fair market value was defined as “the price that a willing 
buyer would pay to a willing seller in circumstances in which each had 
good information, each desired to maximise his financial gain, and 
neither was under duress or threat”.506 Another important valuation 
method in the practice of the Tribunal’s work was the valuation as going 
concern.507 This was defined as the full value of the property, business 
or rights in question as an income-producing asset. It also includes lost 
future profits and goodwill as we could see above.508 However, in some 
cases, other methods were also employed, such as discounted cash flow509 
505 See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of Interna-
tIonaL Law 53, 131 (1988).
506 See id.
507 See id. at 134. Going concern is defined by Encarta World English Dictio-
nary as “a business that is operating successfully and is likely to continue 
to do so, especially when considered as an asset to which a value can be 
assigned”. (visited on Nov. 22, 2013) <http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/
features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=561547195>.  Investor-
swords dictionary defines it as: “The idea that a company will continue to 
operate indefinitely, and will not go out of  business and liquidate its assets. 
For this to happen, the company must be able to generate and/or raise 
enough resources to stay operational.” (visited on Nov. 22, 2013) <http://
www.investorwords.com/cgi-bin/getword.cgi?2189>.
508 See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of Interna-
tIonaL Law 53, 134 (1988).
509 According to Investopedia Dictionary discounted cash flow is a valuation 
method used to estimate the attractiveness of  an investment opportunity. 
It uses future free cash flow projections and discounts them to arrive at 
a present value, which is used to evaluate the potential for investment. 
Most often discounted by the weighted average cost of  capital. If  the value 
arrived at through discounted cash flow analysis is lower then the current 
cost of  the investment, the opportunity may be a good one. Investope-
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method of valuation, methods based on liquidation value510, net book 
value511 and replacement value512.513
As to the form of payment, effectiveness of payment was insured for claimants 
by the practice of the Tribunal. The Algerian Declaration established so-
called ‘security accounts’ from which payments can be made to successful 
claimants in United States dollars.514 Concerning the time of payment, the 
practice of the Tribunal suggests that prompt payment is not a condition 
of the legality of the taking, however, in general, it was of the opinion that 
the compensation should be paid at the time of the taking or it should be 
accompanied with interest from the time of the taking.515
dia Dictionary (visited on Oct. 5, 2013) <http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/d/dcf.asp>.
510 According to Investorwords Dictionary, liquidation value is the estimated 
amount of  money that an asset or company could quickly be sold for, such as 
if  it were to go out of  business. If  the liquidation value per share for a compa-
ny is less than the current share price, then it usually means that the company 
should go out of  business (or that the market is misvaluing the stock), al-
though this is uncommon. Investorwords Dictionary (visited on Oct. 5, 2013) 
<http://www.investorwords.com/2836/liquidation_value.html>.
511 According to Investorwords Dictionary the net value of  an asset equals to its 
original cost (its book value) minus depreciation and amortization. Inves-
torwords Dictionary (visited on Oct. 5, 2013) <http://www.investorwords.
com/2836/net_value.html>.
512 According to Investorwords Dictionary replacement value is the value 
of  an asset as determined by the estimated cost of  replacing it. Investor-
words Dictionary (visited on Oct. 5, 2013) <http://www.investorwords.
com/4184/replacement_value.html>.
513 See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of Interna-
tIonaL Law 139, 149, 160, 163 (1988).
514 Art. 6 and 7 of  the Declaration of  the Government of  the Democratic 
and Popular Republic of  Algeria (General Declaration), 19 January 1981 in 
Iran – unIted states cLaIms trIbunaL rePorts, 1 (Pirrie, S. R. ed.), 5-6 
(1985).
515 See m. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of  Property in the Practice of  the 
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We are of the opinion that the Tribunal tried to compensate the investors 
as much as possible for their taken property, regardless of what term 
was used for the standard of compensation.516 Comparing the standard 
of compensation in the case law of the Iran – United States Claims 
Tribunal to the standard used in other international cases examined 
in this work, it can be said that the Tribunal offers a high standard of 
compensation, protecting investors who lost their property in Iran. At 
the same time, it should be noted that, many times, the Tribunal based 
its valuation on approximation of the value. The reason for this might 
be a tendency in the decisions of the Tribunal, according to which it 
tries to take into consideration all the circumstances that had effect on 
the taking of the property.
5.4.2. ICSID case law
There are many ICSID arbitration cases related to expropriation of 
foreign investments. Because of lack of space, we examine only the most 
important of these cases, where the issue of compensation was raised. 
One of these is the Compania del Desasarrollo v. the Republic of Costa 
Rica, where the claimant, a company incorporated in the Republic of 
Costa Rica with majority ownership of United States citizens, initiated 
arbitration in 1995 against the Republic of Costa Rica, related to an 
expropriation dispute.517 The dispute was about the amount of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 netHerLands yearbook of Interna-
tIonaL Law 53, 131 (1988).
516 Whenever it was possible, it valued the companies taken as going concern 
taking into account the goodwill and the lost future profits. It based its 
valuation on the fair market value of  the taken property.
517 Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of  Costa Rica, 
para. 1. (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1). The award can be found at: ICSID 
Info page, ICSID Cases (visited on Jan. 24, 2013 <http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/cases/santaelena_award.pdf>. See also carLos JIménez PIernas 
(ed.), tHe LegaL PractIce In InternatIonaL Law and euroPean commu-
nIty Law, 221 (2007).
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compensation for the expropriated property of the company. Costa 
Rica in 1978 expropriated a coastline property, bought by the claimant 
earlier for developing tourist resort, invoking environmental reasons. It 
offered as compensation for the expropriation USD 1.9 million, however 
the company did not accept it.518 This was followed by long proceedings 
in front of Costa Rican Courts without any success.519 Costa Rica was 
not willing to refer the matter to international arbitration until it was 
forced by the United States to do so (the United States threatened with 
non-approval of international financial aids to the country).520 Finally, 
the issue was brought to ICSID arbitration. The claimant estimated 
that USD 41.2 million is the fair and full (based on fair market value) 
compensation for the property,521 while the respondent’s estimation of 
current fair market value was USD 2.9 million.522 The respondent also 
took into consideration the ’current’ environmental regulations (entered 
into force after the expropriation) that restricted the use of the property 
for commercial purposes.523 The claimant contested that the arbitral 
Tribunal take into account, when estimating the value of the property, 
any regulation that entered into force after the expropriation decree was 
issued.524 Thus, the central issue of the arbitration was to decide the 
amount of compensation to be paid to Compania del Desarrollo.525 The 
arbitral Tribunal agreed with the parties that fair market value on the 
date of expropriation of the property should be paid as compensation.526 
Thus, the Tribunal was of the opinion that “full compensation for the fair 
market value of the property, i.e., what a willing buyer would pay to a 
518 Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of  Costa Rica, 
para. 3, 15-17.
519  Id. para. 19-26.
520  Id. para. 22-26.
521  Id. para. 29.
522  Id. para. 35.
523  Id.
524  Id. para. 37.
525  Id. para. 54.
526  Id. para. 70.
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willing seller” has to be paid.527 However, it stated that the environmental 
character of the expropriation does not affect the compensation.528 Even 
so, the Tribunal had to establish the exact date of the expropriation first. 
Regarding this issue, the Tribunal examined different definitions of de 
facto expropriation,529 since it was of the opinion that a property had 
been expropriated when the effect of the measures taken by the state “has 
been to deprive the owner of title, possession or access to the benefit and 
economic use of his property”.530 Finally, the Tribunal concluded that, 
notwithstanding that the claimant remained in the possession of the 
property, the expropriation occurred on the date when the expropriating 
governmental decree was issued.531 Therefore, the value of the property 
on this date was taken into consideration.532 As there were only two 
appraisals available to the Tribunal (one from each party from 1978), 
it made an approximation based on these valuations, and came to the 
value of USD 4.1 million.533 This was corrected with the interest counted 
from the time of the expropriation. Moreover, the Tribunal did not 
want to use full compound interest534, because the claimant remained 
in possession. At the same time, as the claimant could use neither the 
property for development purposes, nor the amount of compensation for 
527  Id. para. 73.
528  Id. para. 71.
529  See supra the notion of  creeping expropriation.
530  Id. para. 77.
531  May 5, 1978. Id. para. 80.
532  Id. para. 83.
533  Id. para. 90.
534 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines the term as “interest com-
puted on the sum of  an original principal and accrued interest” (visited on 
Mar. 12, 2013) <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictio-
nary&va=compound+interest>; Money Glossary defines it as: “interest 
rate in which the interest is calculated not only on the initial principal but 
also the accumulated interest of  prior periods.” (visited on Mar. 12, 2013) 
<http://www.moneyglossary.com/?w=Compound+Interest>.
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a long time, the Tribunal did not want to award simple interest either.535 
Consequently, the Tribunal awarded compound interest “adjusted by 
taking into account all the relevant factors”,536 and thus, the final amount 
was USD 16 million.537
In another case, Tecmed, a company with registered seat in Spain, claimed 
compensation from the Mexican Government for expropriation.538 
The claimant’s claim, that is to say, the estimated market value of the 
investment was USD 52 million, based on discounted cash flow calculation 
method.539 The respondent objected this method, because in its opinion 
the investment operated for too short period of time as going business, and 
it requested the calculation of damages based on “the investment made, 
upon which the investment’s market value would be determined”.540 The 
Tribunal also took into consideration the money paid for the investment 
at the tender, USD 4 million.541 After the examination of the facts, the 
Tribunal also concluded that, because of the short period of operation of 
535 Compania del Desarrollo para. 105.
536 Id. para. 106.
537 Id. para. 107.
538 Award in Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican 
States (Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2). ICSID web page (visited on March 16, 
2013) <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/laudo-051903%20-Eng-
lish.pdf>, para. 183.
539 Id. under para. 185. Home Glossary defines ‘discounted cash flow’ as:  “A 
method to estimate the value of  a real estate investment, which emphasizes 
after-tax cash flows and the return on the invested dollars discounted over 
time to reflect a discounted yield. The value of  the real estate investment 
is the present worth of  the future after-tax cash flows from the invest-
ment, discounted at the investor’s desired rate of  return.” (visited on Jan. 
25, 2013) <http://www.yourwebassistant.net/glossary/d7.htm#discount-
ed_cash_flow >.
540 See id.; However, the respondent did not miss to challenge the result of  
the discounted cash flow method with the estimation of  its own expert 
witnesses between USD 1,8 and 2,1 million. See id.
541 Id. para. 186.
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the investment and the lack of objective data, the discounted cash flow 
calculation method should be disregarded.542 The agreement between 
the parties, on which the arbitration was based, stated in its article 5.2. 
that in the case of expropriation:
[C]ompensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value 
of the expropriated investment immediately before the time 
when the expropriation took place, was decided, announced 
or made known to the public […] valuation criteria shall be 
determined pursuant to the laws in force applicable in the 
territory of the Contracting Party receiving the investment.543
Therefore, the Tribunal examined the Mexican law on expropriation 
that stated that the compensation shall indemnify for the “commercial 
value of the expropriated property, which in the case of real property 
shall not be less than the tax value”.544 The Tribunal interpreted this 
requirement as compensation based on the market value.545 When 
determining the value of the expropriated investment, the starting point 
for the Tribunal was the price for which the investment was acquired at 
the tender.546 Besides, it also considered additional investments made 
by the claimant,547 and net income of the investment for one additional 
year.548 This latter, basically covered managerial and organizational skills 
and goodwill.549 Finally, the Tribunal awarded USD 5.5 million.550 The 
542 Id.
543 Id. para. 187.
544 Id.
545 Id. 188.
546 Id. para. 191; Neither the respondent nor the claimant challenged this 
method for determining the fair market value.
547 However, it is a procedural matter. It should be mentioned that the court 
recognised as additional investment only investments that were supported 
by documentary evidence. See id. para. 195.
548 Id. para. 194.
549 Id.
550 Id. para. 201.
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award required effective and full payment.551 It also prescribed compound 
interest (at annual rate of 6 percent) until the payment from the date 
of the expropriation (this is actually the date on which the license to 
operate should have been prolonged)552.553
In MNSS B.V. and Recupero Credito Acciaio N.V. v. Montenegro case,554 
Zeljezara Niksic AD Niksic (ZN) was Montenegro’s sole arc furnace 
steel mill, originally state-owned, and considered one of the largest 
manufacturing companies of Montenegro. It was privatized in 2006, when 
MN Specialty Steel Ltd. (MN) successfully bided for 66.7008 percent 
of the share capital of ZN. Later in that year, MN signed the shares sales 
agreement with the relevant government actors. Under this agreement, 
MN was obliged to make a series of investments. In particular, MN 
agreed to invest an aggregate amount of €114 million, in a 5-year period 
from the closing of the privatization agreement, with a minimum annual 
investment amount set by the parties (€14 million in 2007, €20 million in 
2008, €40 million in 2009, €20 million in 2010 and €20 million in 2011). 
However, it appeared that ZN struggled to meet its obligations after the 
2006 privatization, as production volumes were increased, without adequate 
working capital funding. This constrained ZN’s ability to improve the 
steel mill’s functioning. These difficulties led to MN selling its shares in 
ZN to one of the Claimants, MNSS B. V. (MNSS), a private company 
constituted under the laws of the Netherlands. This was done under a Share 
Purchase Agreement (SPA), for an aggregate consideration of €16,651,799 
of which €2,023,597 was attributed to the ZN shares, and €14,628,202 to 
the assigned MN assets. The consideration of the SPA was satisfied through 
a cash payment of €7,050,000 from MNSS to MN, the assumption by 
MNSS of MN’s long-term loan obligation to Prva Banka in an amount 
551 Id.
552 Id. para. 39.
553 Id. 201.
554 See Investment Policy Hub (visited on Dec. 11, 2018) <http://investment-
policyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/494>.
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of ca. €1.9 million, and the issuance of a 19% shareholding of MNSS by 
MN. A few days before this agreement took place, the Government of 
Montenegro amended the original privatization agreement in relation to 
the timing and amounts of required capital expenditure to be invested. 
In relation to this, MN assigned its rights under this agreement to MNSS 
in 2008. Besides this equity investment, MNSS made five loans to ZN 
between 2008 and 2011.
In 2009, MNSS assigned its outstanding loan claims under its first loan 
to the other Claimant, Recupero Credito Acciaio N.V (RCA), a private 
company constituted under the laws of Curaçao. The maturity date of the 
first loan was extended twice, first as part of a ZN refinancing plan approved 
by the Montenegro government, and secondly, as part of a restructuring 
plan. Before the agreement between MN and MNSS, MN and ZN had 
used Prva Banka. MNSS continued to use this Bank in relation to its 
obligations under the privatization agreement and for other purposes.
However, this bank suffered a liquidity crisis in 2007, which only worsened 
with the financial crisis in 2008. This led to Prva Banka delaying the 
honoring of MNSS payment orders between July 2008 and October 2009.
In June 2009, Prva Banka, MNSS and ZN signed a refinancing protocol 
for the Bank, whereby the Bank would pay €2.5 million to ZN’s creditor 
(CVS) from MNSS’ CAPEX555 account by 23 June 2009, but in return 
Prva Banka was entitled to apply the balance of the funds in ZN’s account 
(following the transfer of those funds from MNSS’ investment account to 
ZN’s account) towards the full repayment of ZN’s loans with Prva Banka.
Later, in July 2009, the Montenegro government (the Respondent of 
the case) and MNSS agreed to a refinancing protocol and amending 
the original privation agreement. The Respondent agreed to provide a 
guarantee for a €25 million loan to ZN by a commercial bank, including 
the guarantee of a €3.5 million short-term loan, and to reduce MNSS’ 
555 Capital expenditure.
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investment obligations for 2009 and 2010. MNSS agreed to grant a loan 
facility of €10 million to ZN conditional on ZN obtaining such loan 
from a commercial bank. Later in July, ZN obtained such a short-term 
loan from BlueBay Multi-Strategy Investments, which was guaranteed 
by the Respondent. However, in 2009, ZN defaulted on this loan, 
forcing the Respondent to pay the outstanding amount. In relation to 
this, MNSS had earlier agreed with the Respondent to reimburse it, if 
BlueBay would call the guarantee, or it would transfer 25 percent of its 
ZN shares. MNSS opted to do the latter, and in January 2010, MNSS 
transferred 25 percent of its ZN shares to the Respondent.
However, problems at ZN escalated further during 2010, as in autumn 
and later in December, the workers occupied the ZN’s management 
building and even physically assaulted the Chief Executive Officer. This 
situation was further worsened by the difference of opinion between MNSS 
and the Respondent about how to handle ZN’s worsening situation, as 
MNSS’ proposals were rejected. Finally, the Respondent acquiesced to 
MNSS’ wish to reduce the number of workers employed in the steel 
mill, if MNSS would make the agreed minimum investment in 2011. 
MNSS was only prepared to invest a much lower amount. In fact, the 
Respondent later informed MNSS that it was in breach of the original 
privatization agreement, because it failed to present the performance 
bond for 2011, and didn’t pay the workers’ salaries for several months. 
During 2011, ZN’s situation further worsened by lack of cooperation 
between MNSS and Respondent, a strike by the workers, and finally 
a bankruptcy petition of ZN by the workers’ unions (the Respondent 
provided financial aid to these unions). The petition was successful, and 
ZN was declared bankrupt, and its assets were sold in 2012 April.556
After analyzing the facts, let us move on to the actual proceedings of 
the case. The two Claimants, MN Specialty Steel Ltd. (MNSS) and 
556 See Investment Policy Hub (visited on Dec. 11, 2018) <http://investment-
policyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/494>.
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Recupero Credito Acciaio N.V (RCA), originally initiated two arbitration 
proceedings under the Additional Facility of ICSID, for breaches of the 
2002 Netherlands-Yugoslavia BIT, and for breaches of the Montenegrin 
Foreign Investment Laws 2000 and 2011. However, the parties agreed 
to consolidate the two proceedings into one. As the first step of these 
consolidated proceedings, the Respondent raised six objections in total 
to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. These were the following: 1) Tribunal 
lacks jurisdiction because of the express waiver of jurisdiction in the 
original privatization agreement, 2) lack of jurisdiction because the 
Respondent has not consented to the Additional Facility Arbitration in its 
two foreign investment laws, 3) the Dutch nationality of the Claimants 
has been fabricated while the present dispute had already arisen, 4) 
MNSS’ shares of ZN, MNSS’ loans to ZN and RCA’s assigned loan 
from MNSS do not qualify as investments, 5) these alleged investments 
were not in accordance with host State law, and 6) Claimants did not 
exhaust local remedies before turning to arbitration.
The Claimants responded by stating that as RCA was not part of the 
privatization agreement, it could have not waived its rights. Furthermore, 
the relevant clause in itself was argued to be not a waiver of jurisdiction, 
and in fact, MNSS could not waive its rights under the BIT. They also 
disputed the interpretation of the 2000 and 2011 foreign investment 
laws. As to the accusation of being shell companies, the Claimants argued 
that they qualify as investors under the BIT, and that the Respondent 
is conflating the nationality of individuals with the nationality of 
corporations, which is contrary to the principles of international law. In 
relation to the fourth objection, the Claimants stated that their investment 
meets the Salini test557 for defining a protected investment under the 
557 Salini test, which defines an investment as having four elements: (1) a con-
tribution of  money or assets (2) a certain duration (3) an element of  risk 
and (4) a contribution to the economic development of  the host state. See 
Chicago Journal of  International Law (visited on Dec. 12, 2018) <http://
chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol15/iss1/13/>.
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ICSID Convention, and that the definition of investment in the BIT is 
very broad. For the fifth objection, Claimants pointed it out that there is 
no requirement of legality under the BIT that would affect the exercise 
by the Tribunal of its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Respondent had 
a long-standing acceptance of the Claimant’s investments, which thus 
precludes the use of the legality requirement to defeat the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. Finally, the Claimants noted that the sixth objection is not 
applicable, as there is no pre-condition for a claimant to have to exhaust 
local remedies before being able to have recourse to an arbitration against 
a State that had previously given its consent, based on previous decisions.
Ultimately, the Tribunal rejected most the Respondent’s objections, but 
accepted that MNSS validly waived its rights under the BIT to pursue 
contractual claims. Furthermore, based on the correct translation of 
the domestic 2000 and 2011 foreign investment laws, the Tribunal also 
found that it has no jurisdiction under those laws.
In relation to the alleged breaches of the BIT, the following claims have 
been made by the Claimants:
“(i) not to impair the operation, management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment or disposal by the Claimants of their investment 
(BIT Article 3(1)); (ii) to accord fair and equitable treatment 
(BIT Article 3(1)); (iii) to provide most constant protection 
and security (BIT Article 3(1)); (iv) to accord the most-favored-
nation treatment (BIT Article 3(2)); (v) to ensure free transfer of 
payments (BIT Article 5(1)); and (vi) not to expropriate except 
under the conditions set forth in the BIT (BIT Article 6(1))”558
These allegations are based on the following actions and omissions of 
the Respondent: the Respondent’s actions in relation to Prva Bank, 
its refusal to reduce the headcount, its funding of the labor union, its 
558 See Page 77 of  the Award. Investment Policy Hub (visited on Dec. 11, 
2018) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/494>.
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refusal to allow scrapping of old equipment, the bankruptcy proceedings 
of ZN, its refusal to allow a debt-equity swap, its refusal to consent to 
the financing of ZN, its refusal to allow withdrawals from ZN’s special 
account, its forced evictions of ZN’s management, the Respondent’s 
breach of obligation to maintain a stable legal and business environment 
and its discrimination against MNSS.
The Tribunal made the following decisions on these claims. It stated that 
the Respondent failed to ensure the protection of persons and property, 
but it didn’t grant any compensation, as the Claimants didn’t manage 
to show they suffered damages as a result. The Tribunal also dismissed 
the claim that the Respondent’s failure to warn MNSS of the financial 
condition of Prva Banka breached the Respondent’s obligations of fair and 
equitable treatment and non-impairment of the Claimants’ investment.
Furthermore, the Tribunal decided to dismiss all other claims on the 
merits, because they fall outside its jurisdiction. As for the costs, the 
Tribunal declared that each party shall pay for its own costs, and that 
the Claimants shall pay for the fees and expenses of the Tribunal and 
the ICSID Secretariat.
These cases confirmed that the fair market value standard is used and 
applied in practice. On the basis of these cases, we can also conclude that 
the principle of restitutio in integrum, in the case of taking foreign property, 
is accepted by international tribunals like the ICSID. In our opinion, ICSID 
offers an effective way to the investors to get fair (here we use the term 
subjectively) compensation based on fair market value of the property taken.
5.4.3. NAFTA case law
The North American Free Trade Agreement does not say explicitly that 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation is required when foreign 
property is taken, however, with its provisions, it covers indirectly this 
standard. According to the Agreement, “compensation shall be paid 
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without delay and be fully realizable”.559 The Agreement also guarantees 
free transferability of the compensation, immediately on payment.560 
It contains an explicit formula - fair market value - for determining 
compensation:
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation 
took place (“date of expropriation”), and shall not reflect any 
change in value occurring because the intended expropriation 
had become known earlier. Valuation criteria shall include 
going concern value, asset value including declared tax value 
of tangible property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to 
determine fair market value.561
The Agreement also makes precise provisions on the interest rates 
related to late payment, that is to say, for the period between the date 
of the expropriation and the payment date (because of the requirement 
of prompt payment). It provides that if the payment of compensation 
is done in G7562 currency, the compensation has to bear a commercially 
reasonable rate from the date of the expropriation until the date of the 
actual payment.563 If the payment is done in other than G7 currency, 
the Agreement provides the following, regarding the issue of the interest 
to be paid:
559 Art. 1110 (3) of  the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA Sec-
retariat Info page (visited on Apr. 5, 2013) <http://www.nafta-sec-alena.
org/english/index.htm>.
560 Id. art. 1110 (6).
561 Id. art. 1110 (2).
562 G7 is abbreviation for “Group of  Seven”. It is the group of  seven most in-
dustrialized countries of  the world: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. Source: Encarta World English 
Dictionary (visited on May 20, 2013) <http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/
features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=561533263>.
563 Id. art. 1110 (4) (5).
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[…] the amount paid on the date of payment, if converted into 
a G7 currency at the market rate of exchange prevailing on 
that date, shall be no less than if the amount of compensation 
owed on the date of expropriation had been converted into that 
G7 currency at the market rate of exchange prevailing on that 
date, and interest had accrued at a commercially reasonable 
rate for that G7 currency from the date of expropriation until 
the date of payment.564
For example, in the Metalclad case the Tribunal stated that on the basis 
of its provisions,565 NAFTA clearly supports the inclusion of interest in 
an award.566 In this case, the Tribunal proceeded from the assumption 
that the investor completely lost its investment.567 Both parties accepted 
to calculate the compensation on the basis of the fair market value 
standard.568 However, they offered different methods for the calculation 
of this value. Metalclad suggested two alternative methods for the 
calculation of the compensation. One was the discounted cash flow 
analysis of future profits to establish the fair market value.569 By this 
approach, Metalclad came up with an amount of USD 90 million.570 
The other one was the valuation of the actual investment made by the 
company.571 Under this, it reached approximately USD 20 to 25 million. 
Mexico objected to the discounted cash flow method, claiming that it 
was not applicable because the expropriated company was not a going 
564 Id. art. 1110 (4) (5).
565 Id. art. 1135 (1). 
566 Metalclad case para. 128.
567 It should be noted that damages were sought under NAFTA art. 1105, 
however the court stated that counting damages (compensation) under the 
provisions of  art. 1110 would be the same. Id. para. 113.
568 Id. para. 114-116.




concern.572 However, it offered a method of market capitalization,573 
that would result between USD 13 to 15 million.574 At the same time, 
Mexico agreed with the second method proposed by Metalclad, however, 
referring to it as “direct investment value approach”, and reaching only 
between USD 3 to 4 million.575 The Tribunal rejected the first method 
suggested by the claimant. The investment was never operative, and 
therefore the Tribunal found that the application of the discounted cash 
flow analysis would not be appropriate. In the opinion of the Tribunal, 
for the application of this method, it is needed that the company operates 
for a sufficiently long period that gives appropriate basis for determining 
the estimated future profits, subject to discounted cash flow analysis.576 
In such case, the value of the goodwill of the company also has to be 
taken into consideration.577 However, in the opinion of the Tribunal, 
this was not the case with Metalclad investment.578 Thus, the Tribunal 
used the second method offered by the parties, that is to say, the fair 
market value method. When considering the issue of lost profits, it was 
of the opinion that they can be awarded, however the claimant had the 
burden of proof, that is to say, it had to provide a realistic estimate of lost 
profits.579 The Tribunal also emphasized that, when making the award, 
it accepted the principles of the Chorzow Factory case, that is to say, 
that the award has to reestablish the status quo ante.580 Regarding the 
572 Id. para. 116.
573 Money Glossary defines it as: “The total dollar value of  all outstanding 
shares. Computed as shares times current market price.” (visited on Jan. 8, 
2013) <http://www.moneyglossary.com/?w=Market+capitalization>; See 
also Bloomberg Financial Glossary (visited on Jan. 8, 2013) <http://www.
bloomberg.com/analysis/glossary/bfglosm.htm#market_capitalization>.
574 Metalclad case para. 116.
575 Id. para. 117.
576 Id. para. 119-121.
577 Id. para. 120.
578 Id. para. 121.
579 Id. para. 122.
580 Id.
179
issue of interest, the Tribunal was of the opinion that interest should 
be part of the compensation and it should be counted from the date 
when the state became “internationally responsible” for the taking.581 In 
this particular case, from the date on which Metalclad’s application for 
construction permit was “wrongly denied”.582 The court determined a six 
percent per annum interest rate.583 Thus, the Tribunal finally awarded 
USD 16.6 million plus interests to Metalclad.584
Another interesting ICSID case is the S. D. Mayers case, in which, in 
contrast to the previous case, the Tribunal did not find that the regulation 
(i.e., the export ban) amounted to expropriation. In addition, the Tribunal 
refused to apply to breaches of article 1102 (“national treatment”) and 
article1105 (“minimum standard of treatment”) the principles laid down 
in article 1110 of NAFTA concerning expropriation.585 In the opinion of 
the Tribunal, standard of article 1110 of NAFTA, like that of fair market 
value, was “expressly attached […] to expropriations” by the drafters of 
NAFTA.586 Furthermore, it was of the opinion, that in cases that do not 
involve expropriation, drafters intentionally left it open to tribunals to 
determine compensation standards.587 In such cases, tribunals have to 
take into consideration “the specific circumstances of the case,” principles 
of international law and the provisions of NAFTA.588 The Tribunal 
did not exclude theoretically the applicability of the fair market value 
standard; however, it was of the opinion that it was not applicable for 
this very case.589 It stated that the suitable international law standard 
581 Id. para. 128.
582 Id.
583 Id.
584 Id. para. 131.
585 S. D. Myers partial award para. 305, 306.
586 Id. para. 307.




for this case could be found in the Chorzow Factory case.590 That is to 
say, “the compensation should undo the material harm inflicted by a 
breach of an international obligation”.591 In his concurrent opinion, one 
of the members of the panel, Bryan P. Schwartz brings on interesting 
arguments. He claims that “fair market value might, in some cases, be 
less than fair value. An investment might be worth more to the investor 
for various reasons, including synergies within its overall operations, 
than it is to third parties.” He also argues that the finding that the 
expropriation has happened, on the other hand, should not reduce the 
amount of compensation that is ought to be awarded. He further states, 
that the cumulative principle applies within Chapter 11 of NAFTA. 
When a government denies to investors the protection assured by 
specific provisions of Chapter 11, compensation may be required above 
and beyond that which would apply in the ordinary case of a lawful 
expropriation. However, at the same time he says that: 
[…] even if we had found that the export ban did amount to 
an expropriation under the terms of article 1110, that finding 
would not necessarily have provided a basis for awarding any 
compensation above and beyond that already recoverable under 
the terms of article 1102 [National Treatment].592
In connection with this case, we have noticed that the Tribunal placed 
great emphasis on factual proof of the claims when determining the 
amount of compensation (supporting documentation, e.g., tax filing, 
etc.).593
The NAFTA case law also supports the assumption that the valuation 
standard of fair market value is the most accepted in international law, 
590 Id. para. 311.
591 Id. para. 315.
592 Concurrent opinion of  Bryan P. Schwartz. Source: Lexis database, 1 asPer 
rev. IntL busL and trade Law at 337, 406, 407.
593 Metalclad case, para. 124.
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and also that the principle of in integrum restitutio forms the basis of 
awards in expropriation cases where the main issue is compensation. 
This proves the constantly rising standard of investment protection in 
the world, that might be the result of the growing importance of private 
property protection or simply the fact that international competition for 
investments got tighter with the globalization, and therefore, investment 
recipient countries try to offer the most in every field.
5.5. Conclusion
Examining the development of compensation theories and international 
case law that developed in line with it, we came to the conclusion that 
there is neither uniform theory nor uniform practice in the field of 
compensation standards related to taking of foreign investment. Besides, 
it is not easy to establish whether the taking was lawful or not, that is 
to say, whether the conditions discussed in the previous chapters were 
fulfilled (the taking was non-discriminatory, there was an existing 
public purpose and there was appropriate compensation). On the basis 
of the studied cases we can say that, even if the first two conditions 
are fulfilled, but there has been no adequate compensation, the taking 
is considered many times unlawful, however, not always. It is also the 
practice of tribunals to order in integrum restitutio. There are a number 
of cases that refer to the standard of the Chorzow Factory case, in 
which it was stated that the reparation must reestablish the status quo 
ante. This means usually full compensation, based on fair market value, 
which is, in our opinion, the most objective valuation standard. In some 
cases, compensation is awarded for lost future profits as well, and this 
solution can be equitable, however, it is difficult to calculate fairly the 
lost profits. All in all, the examination of the case law shows that the 
prompt, adequate and effective standard prevails in practice. At the same 
time, we may not forget that many international conventions contain 
provisions that formally do not comply with the above-said, and that 
many countries of the world formally do not accept it.
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Thus, the majority of disputes is about the standard of compensation 
in the case of taking of foreign property. Therefore, it would be helpful 
to work out a more detailed and precise system of compensation on 
international level. We are convinced that making clear conditions for 
compensation can be beneficial for all the parties.
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6. conclusion
In the second chapter of this book the most important terms related 
to taking of foreign property were scrutinized. It was observed that 
notions like taking, expropriation and nationalization are often used 
indiscriminately to designate the same concept. In the case of expropriation 
and nationalization, private property is taken by the state on permanent 
basis. We noted that one of the differences between these two terms 
is that in the case of nationalization compensation is many times not 
assumed. However, there is no evidence that it is true in general. In 
the case of expropriation the expropriating state usually provides some 
compensation. Other important differences are that nationalization is 
usually related to some socio-economic changes in the given society and 
there is a specific underlying legislation, while in the case of expropriation 
general legislation constitutes the basis of the taking. Following this, the 
meaning of intervention was examined. It was concluded that intervention 
is an action of the government, whereby it assumes control of a business 
(or any other foreign private property) with the intention of operating it 
for a limited period of time, achieving a particular goal. It is important 
that the property gets back to the original owner after a reasonable period 
of time. The owner of such property is entitled to compensation for the 
time he was not able to use his property. Confiscation was defined as 
taking of foreign property with no compensation. We also concluded that 
distinction can be made between de jure and de facto taking. The host 
state might take measures that in fact (de facto) dispose the owner of his 
property, but legally do not affect the ownership – this is called creeping, 
indirect or de facto taking. We found that, in practice, the biggest problem 
is drawing the line between taking and creeping expropriation. Creeping 
expropriation basically has the same effect on the owner of the property as 
taking would have: it disables the owner to exercise all his rights related 
to his property. Generally, at the end of the chapter, it was established 
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that capital exporting states try to define the term taking (expropriation, 
nationalization) as general as possible, while capital importing states try 
to give as narrow interpretation to the term as possible.
The next two chapters dealt with two requirements of lawful taking of 
property: the existence of public interest (or purpose) and the requirement 
of non-discrimination when taking foreign property. It was concluded 
that sovereign states have the right to take foreign property if it is taken 
for public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, accompanied 
by appropriate compensation.594 This is supported by international 
documents, as well as by international court and arbitral decisions. We 
established that these requirements rarely constitute basis for dispute. 
Thus, as we have seen supra, there are still few cases related to these 
issues in international case law. These cases supported our premise that 
these principles are requirements for lawful taking of foreign property.
In the fifth chapter we scrutinized the most challenging issue, the 
requirement of compensation in the case of taking foreign property. 
The standard of compensation and the form and time of payment of 
compensation were examined. We found that there are many disputes 
regarding the standard of compensation, and that the present situation 
in international law, regarding this issue, is not really clarified. It can be 
said that there are many different standards and opinions concerning 
this question. To get a clearer picture on the issue, the development 
of compensation theories was presented through the most important 
milestone cases. First, the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case and the 
just compensation standard were scrutinized. Following this, we looked at 
the Chorzow Factory case and the standard of fair or full compensation. 
Based on these cases, it was concluded that the just compensation standard 
does not differ much from the fair or full compensation standard. In 
both cases, compensation was based on fair market value of the taken 
property and both required basically in integrum restitutio (if not 
594 And of  course, there is due process of  law guaranteed for the investor.
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possible, monetary compensation) including lost profits. The next step 
was to examine the Hull doctrine. During our research we came to the 
conclusion that the majority of capital exporting countries in fact support 
the requirements laid down in the Hull doctrine (expropriation should be 
prompt, adequate and effective), even if they usually use the expression of 
just compensation, or even accept appropriate compensation, interpreting 
it as prompt, adequate and effective, as the United States of America does. 
This interpretation is also supported by international case law. All in all, 
we found that capital importing states in general support the standard 
of appropriate compensation, however with different content. Related to 
this issue the so-called Calvo Doctrine was examined, which declares 
that the host country has the right to decide on the time, amount, and 
form of compensation, if there is no agreement to the contrary. When 
examining related international jurisprudence, we found that it is very 
colorful concerning this issue: there are mostly western authors who are 
of the opinion that the Hull Doctrine is too strict, and also, on other 
hand, there are some who claim that the Calvo Doctrine should be 
understood in a more flexible way. Some authors try to solve the problem 
with the principle of unjust enrichment (“what has the taker gained”), 
some would differentiate between industrialized and not-industrialized 
states (the latter should pay lower compensation in the case of takings), 
and there are some authors who would take into consideration how 
much did the foreign investor contributed to the development of the 
host state in the past. The debate during the last fifty years was mostly 
on the question what terminology should be used: just, fair, prompt, 
adequate, effective, appropriate or full. Concerning this, we fully agree 
with Professor Schachter who noticed very correctly that: “It is the 
definition of appropriate that matters, not the term itself, which might 
well be replaced by fair, just or a similar expression.”.595 We have also 
established that, in practice, developing countries, even if they hold 
on to classical principles of sovereignty over resources, accept the Hull 
595 See oscar scHacHter In LILLIcH, rIcHard b. ed.: tHe vaLuatIon of na-
tIonaLIzed ProPerty In InternatIonaL Law Iv. vii (1987).
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Doctrine in bilateral investment treaties. In our opinion the reason for 
this is very simple: developing countries understand that they need 
foreign capital for economic development and if they are not fair when 
expropriating foreign investors̀  property, there will be no willing investor 
in the future who would invest in these countries.596
Following this historical development overview, we examined current trends 
in international jurisprudence regarding the issue of compensation in the 
case of taking foreign property. First, the case law of the Iran – United 
States Claims Tribunal was scrutinized. The most important finding was 
that the Tribunal placed the emphasis on the issue of fair market value 
of the taken property and not on the compensation standard. Thus, the 
Tribunal mentioned in several awards compensation standards like just 
and full, using the fair market value of the taken property at the same time. 
Besides the practice of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal, some 
multilateral instruments and the related case law were investigated. Thus, 
we came to the conclusion that, regarding these multilateral instruments, 
the standard of compensation is prompt, adequate and effective.
All in all, in our opinion, investors require high standards of protection, 
meaning that, in the case of taking of their property, they wish to have 
full compensation based on the fair market value, as it was emphasized 
in most cases. Besides, it is also accepted that such compensation has 
to be paid promptly and has to be effective.
596 E.g., the arbitral Tribunal (Paul Reuter, President) in Aminoil case found 
the fair treatment of  investors correct both morally and economically: 
“But as regards States which welcome foreign investment, and which even 
engage in it themselves, it could be expected that their attitude towards 
compensation should not be such as to render foreign investment useless, 
economically. … [I]n the case of  the present dispute there is no room for 
rules of  compensation that would make nonsense of  foreign investment.” 
The Government of  the State of  Kuwait v. American Independent Oil 
Company at 1033 in International Legal Materials 1982, ed. Marilou M. 
Righini, American Society of  International Law, 1983.
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However, there is certain inconsistency in the practice and the position 
of developing countries. On the one hand, on international fora, these 
countries stand up for the principle that the issue of compensation and 
other issues related to taking, being under dispute, should be solely 
decided by the courts of the expropriating country, and that they should 
have right (limited only by local jurisdiction) to take foreign property, 
which is actually based on the Calvo Doctrine. On the other hand, they 
willingly sign bilateral investment treaties, in which these countries accept 
international legal standards as exemplified in the Hull doctrine which 
basically contradicts to the above said international claims.597 The reason 
for this contradiction might be the huge competition for luring in foreign 
capital and, at the same time, the need to correspond to domestic political 
expectations related to the protection of national interests. However, 
Sornarajah explains this phenomenon, or better to say contradiction, 
with the following: there is uncertain protection of foreign investment in 
international law, so the above-mentioned countries entered to these treaties 
to clarify the rules of the game for the case of expropriation.598 There is 
another argument that is not only supported by Sornarajah, but also by 
Dolzer, namely that developing countries accept the full compensation 
principle, or basically the Hull doctrine, in bilateral investment treaties, 
because of special benefits they enjoy under such treaties.599 We would not 
agree with this, as under these treaties, the host country usually, does not 
enjoy many benefits. The reason must be that host countries are forced 
to accept stricter conditions; otherwise investors would not bring their 
capital. At the same time, governments are frequently exposed to domestic 
pressure that requires stronger protection of domestic interests.
597 See Kishoiyian, Bernard, The Utility of  Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formu-
lation of  Customary International Law. 14 nortHwestern JournaL of Inter-
natIonaL Law and busIness 30 (1993); Guzman, Andrew T., Why LDCs 
Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of  Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 38 vIrgInIa JournaL of InternatIonaL Law 642 (1998).
598 See id. 668. [Primary source not available.]
599 See id.
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On the whole, it can be said that proper and adequate legal protection of 
foreign investors, especially in the case of taking of foreign investment, 
has positive impact on foreign direct investment inflows. At the same 
time, it has been concluded that sovereign states have the right to take 
foreign property, respecting certain principles of international law: the 
taking has to serve public purpose, has to be non-discriminatory and 
accompanied by appropriate compensation. Of course, all this should be 
done with the guarantee of due process. It is also a fact that investment 
protection standards are changing very fast in our globalizing world, 
and, with this process, the standard of foreign investment protection is 
constantly getting higher and higher. In a well functioning economy, 
guaranteeing full protection of foreign investment cannot be a burden 
for the state. Thus, generally it should not be a problem in case of taking 
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